THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH
UNDER THE EDITORSHIP

OF

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MAGNA MORALIA
ETHICA EUDEMIA
DE VIRTUTIBUS ET VITIIS

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In bringing out this part of the translation, I wish to acknowledge my many obligations to my fellow members of the Oxford Aristotelian Society. The Society has recently read the *Eudemian Ethics*, and while (owing to my occasional absence from the meetings) the translation has not profited as much by this as it might have done, yet I have been able to transmit to Mr. Solomon, and he has accepted, not a few readings and renderings which were suggested at meetings of the Society. Readings the authority for which is not given in the notes come as a rule from this source.

The introduction, the tables of contents, and the indices to the three works contained in this part have all been prepared by Mr. St. George Stock.

Mr. Stock and Mr. Solomon have for the most part rendered λόγος in the traditional way, as 'reason'. Personally I doubt whether this rendering is ever required, but the final choice in such a question rests with the translators.

W. D. ROSS.

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. The three moral treatises that go under the name of Aristotle present a problem somewhat analogous to that of the three Synoptic Gospels. All three used once to be ascribed to the direct authorship of Aristotle with the same simple-heartedness, or the same absence of reflection, with which all three Gospels used to be ascribed to the Holy Ghost. We may see that some advance, or at all events some movement, has been made in the Aristotelian problem, if we remember that it was once possible for so great a critic as Schleiermacher to maintain that the *Magna Moralia* was the original treatise from which the two others were derived. Nowadays the opinion of Spengel is generally accepted, namely, that the *Nicomachean Ethics* emanates directly from the mind of Aristotle himself, that the *Eudemian Ethics* contains the same matter recast by another hand, and that the *Magna Moralia* is the work of a later writer who had both the other treatises before him. Whether the three books which are common to the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* (*E. N.* v, vi, vii : *E. E.* iv, v, vi) proceed from the writer of the former or of the latter work is a point which is still under debate. To an Oxford man indeed who has been nurtured on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and to whom that treatise has become, mentally speaking, 'bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh', it seems too self-evident to require discussion that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the substance of which the others are the shadow. But this confidence may be born of prejudice, and it is possible that, if the same person had had the *Eudemian Ethics* equally carefully instilled into him in his youth, he might on making

acquaintance with the *Nicomachean* find nothing more in that than a less literary rearrangement of the *Eudemian*. There is no doubt a prejudice in favour of the familiar, which has to be guarded against, but we may encourage ourselves by remembering that the preference for the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not confined to Oxford, or to English or foreign Universities, or to modern times, since, as Grant points out, there have been many commentaries by Greek and Latin writers on the *Nicomachean*, but not one on the *Eudemian Ethics*. Herein we have an unconscious testimony to the superior value of the Nicomachean work.

§ 2. But why 'Nicomachean'? There is no certain tradition on this subject. Our earliest information is derived from the well-known passage in Cicero,[1] from which we gather that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was commonly ascribed to Aristotle himself, whereas Cicero thought that it might well have been written by his son Nicomachus. But what we are otherwise told about Nicomachus rather goes against this. Aristocles the Peripatetic, who is said to have been teacher to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, is thus quoted by Eusebius in his *Praeparatio Evangelica*, xv. 2 § 10: 'After the death of Pytheas, daughter of Hermeias, Aristotle married Epyllis of Stagira, by whom he had a son Nicomachus. He is said to have been brought up as an orphan in the house of Theophrastus and died, while a mere lad, in war.' On the other hand Diogenes Laertius at about the same date as Aristocles (A. D. 200) evidently shared Cicero's opinion that Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, wrote the work which bears his name.[2]

A different tradition, which appears in some of the commentators, is to the effect that Aristotle himself wrote three treatises on morals, one of which he addressed to his disciple Eudemus, another to his father Nicomachus, and yet a third to his son of the same name. The two latter

[1] *Fin.* v. § 12 'qua re teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patris similis esse filius.'

[2] D. L. viii. § 88 *φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν* (i. e. Eudoxus) *Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν.* Cp. *E. N.* 1101^{b} 27 and 1172^{b} 9.

were distinguished from one another by the one addressed to the father being called 'the great Nicomacheans', while that addressed to the son was called 'the little Nicomacheans'.[1]

That all three works were by Aristotle himself is assumed by Atticus the Platonist, who lived in the time of Marcus Aurelius, and who is the first writer to mention the *Magna Moralia*,[2] while the common authorship of the last-mentioned and of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is similarly assumed by the Scholiast on Plato, *Rep.* 495 E.[3] It seems to be only by Aspasius in a note on *E.N.* viii. 8 that Eudemus is recognized as being himself the author of the treatise which bears his name.[4]

§ 3. Let us now inquire what is known about Eudemus. First of all he is called by Simplicius[5] 'the most genuine among the followers of Aristotle', which may be taken to mean that he followed him most closely, as indeed we are expressly told elsewhere that of all the interpreters he was best acquainted with the mind of Aristotle. We are sometimes informed that Theophrastus deviated from Aristotle, but we never hear this of Eudemus. Then there is the charming story told by Aulus Gellius[6] of how Aristotle elected his successor by indicating his preference for the wine of Lesbos over that of Rhodes. 'Both are good,' pronounced the philosopher after tasting them, 'but *ἡδίων ὁ Λέσβιος*'. It was clearly understood by all that the suavity of Theophrastus of Lesbos had been preferred to the more austere excellence of Eudemus of Rhodes.

Further we are told by Ammonius[7] that 'the disciples of Aristotle, Eudemus and Phanias and Theophrastus, in

[1] Comm. Porphyr. Prolegg. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 9[b] 20 sqq.: David in Cat. Schol. 25[a] 40.

[2] Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xv. 4 § 6 Heinechen *αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδήμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχειοι καὶ μεγάλων ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμενοι.*

[3] He points out that the contrary of *μικροπρέπεια* is called by Aristotle *βαναυσία* or *ἀπειροκαλία* in the Nicomachean Ethics, but *σαλακωνία ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις.*

[4] *λέγει δὲ καὶ Εὔδημος καὶ Θεόφραστος, ὅτι καὶ αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαι* κτλ. See *E.E.* vii. 10 § 9, 1242[b] 4.

[5] Ar. *Phys.* fol. 93[b] *Εὔδημος ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων.*

[6] *N. A.* xiii. 5.

[7] Brandis, *Scholia in Aristot.* p. 28, note.

rivalry with their master, wrote *Categories* and *On Interpretation* and *Analytics'*. As to *Categories* or *de Interpretatione* written by Eudemus nothing more seems to be known, but the following works at least are ascribed to him by ancient writers :—

On the Angle . . .	(περὶ γωνίας).
Researches in Geometry .	(γεωμετρικαὶ ἱστορίαι).
Researches in Arithmetic .	(ἀριθμητικὴ ἱστορία).
Researches in Astronomy .	(ἀστρολογικαὶ ἱστορίαι).
Analytics	(ἀναλυτικά).
On Diction	(περὶ λέξεως).
On Physics	(φυσικά).[1]

It would appear from this list that, apart from Ethics, the chief interest of Eudemus lay in Mathematics. But Fritzsche has made it appear probable that Eudemus of Rhodes is identical with the author of a work *On Animals*, which was used by Aelian, and also with the famous anatomist of the same name who is often mentioned by Galen. However this may be—and Fritzsche himself abstains from pronouncing judgement—the composition of his treatise on Physics was no mere by-work with Eudemus, for we know that while he was engaged on the task he wrote to Theophrastus to send him a correct copy of the fifth book of Aristotle's *Physics*, because his own copy was vitiated by clerical errors. It would be a boon to us if some later member of the School had taken the like care with regard to the *Eudemian Ethics*; for as the text of that work now stands a reader or translator has to conjecture his way through a great part of it. That the opinion of Eudemus on general questions of philosophy was held in high esteem appears from the statement made by the Greek commentators that Aristotle before publishing his *Metaphysics* sent the work to Eudemus, and that in consequence of some difficulties raised by him its publication was delayed, so that it did not appear until after the

[1] References for the above writings are given by Fritzsche in his edition of the *Eudemian Ethics*.

author's death. It is said that the appendix to Book I known as *α' ἔλαττον* was the work of Pasicles, the nephew of Eudemus, son of his brother Boethus.

§ 4. We turn now to the work known as the *Eudemian Ethics*. The first thing that must strike any one who reads it is its general resemblance to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This, following Grant, we may exhibit as follows:—

E.E. i, ii	=	*E.N.* i–iii. 5.	
— iii	=	—	iii. 6–end of iv.
— iv, v, vi	=	—	v, vi, vii.
— vii	=	—	viii, ix.
— viii new.			

Further we may notice that in both treatises there is first a scheme of the moral virtues with some brief remarks followed by a more detailed treatment of each of the virtues in particular. Both treatises also are in what may be called a half-baked state, presenting now the appearance of mere lecture-notes, now that of finished literary work. Thus in *E.E.* 1220^{b} 10 the words *ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις* may be a memorandum for personal guidance, which had a meaning for the author, but has none for us. The same explanation perhaps applies to 1218^{a} 36 *τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον* and to 1244^{b} 30, 31 *ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται*. In using the words *ἐν τοῖς λόγοις* in 1240^{a} 23, 1244^{a} 20 the writer may be referring to his own lectures, while in 1233^{a} 1, the words 'But there's left there' are suggestive of the lecturer pointing to some diagram which he has just set before the eyes of his class.

§ 5. Grant has noticed how the greater precision of statement which we sometimes find in *E.E.* as compared with *E.N.* is suggestive of a commentator improving on the original author. Instances of this may be seen in connexion with the Delian inscription (1214^{a} 1–6: *E.N.* 1299^{a} 24–29), the saying of Anaxagoras (1216^{a} 11–16: *E.N.* 1179^{a} 13), Heraclitus on anger (1223^{b} 22: *E.N.* 1105^{a} 8), Socrates on courage (1229^{a} 16, 1230^{a} 7: *E.N.* 1116^{b} 4), Philoxenus (1231^{a} 17).

§ 6. Another thing which tends to show that the *Eudemian*

Ethics is the later work is that while it creates an impression of less power than the *Nicomachean*, it at the same time presents a more developed form of doctrine. Thus the division of impulse (ὄρεξις) into its three species, which is latent in *E. N.*, becomes patent in *E. E.*[1]

1123 Again the true nature of the σώφρων of *E. N.* 1123^{b} 5, or sober-minded man, who estimates himself at his true worth, comes out more clearly in *E. E.* 1233^{a} 16–25, where it appears that he is of the same nature as the man of great mind, who is in fact only a particular instance of sober-minded man, namely one whose merits happen to be superlative. Eudemus too is not content to enumerate the ways in which Happiness may conceivably be acquired, but adds some inducements to believe that the division is exhaustive.[2] He also states explicitly that Happiness must consist mainly in three things, Wisdom, Virtue, and Pleasure, which is only implied in *E. N.*[3] Generally the connexion of moral virtue with pleasure and pain comes out more clearly in *E. E.* than in *E. N.*, insomuch that this connexion is made to form part of the definition of moral virtue in *E. E.* (1227^{b} 5–10). The frank rejection also in *E. E.* of the Platonic ideas altogether as 'mere empty logical fictions' reflects weariness of a controversy which has been threshed out sufficiently 'both in the exoteric and in the philosophical treatises'.[4]

The method of arriving at a definition of Purpose is the same in both treatises, but in *E. E.* it is worked out with more consciousness of logic than in *E. N.* For instance in *E. E.* we have the explicit assumption that Purpose is one of two things, either opinion or impulse,[5] which in *E. N.* we have to extract for ourselves from the seemingly loose assertion—'Those who say that it is appetite or anger or wish or opinion of some kind do not seem to speak rightly'.[6]

The question why we should do what is right is not touched in *E. N.* or *E. E.*; in both it is assumed that τὸ καλόν shines by its own light. But while *E. N.* leaves

[1] 1223^{a} 26. Cp. *E. N.* 1111^{b} 11.
[2] 1214^{a} 26–30.
[3] 1214^{a} 30–^{b}5, 1218^{b} 31–35.
[4] 1217^{b} 16–23.
[5] *E. E.* 1225^{b} 22, 23.
[6] 1111^{b} 10–12.

the matter so, *E. E.* gives us the explicit declaration that there is no λόγος of the σκοπός,[1] that is, no rational account to be given of an end. It is in fact a question of values. This is what *E. N.* leads up to, but does not say. Aristotle often speaks of λόγος as a faculty which supplies us with ends. Eudemus coming after him is inclined to think that it ought to be confined to means, though in 1229ª 2 he says ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἱρεῖσθαι κελεύει. This latter is the orthodox view, which imports a moral meaning into λόγος, just as a moral meaning was imported into προαίρεσις, so that, strictly speaking, there was no such thing as a bad will (προαίρεσις). When Eudemus in a different context[2] asserts that 'Virtue is an instrument of the intellect' he has managed by anticipation exactly to reverse the famous saying of Comte that 'The intellect is the servant of the heart'.

§ 7. The *Nicomachean Ethics* might have emanated from a pure intelligence, but there are some touches of personal feeling about Eudemus. He is inclined to Pessimism. There is about him that note of melancholy which seems inseparable from the Asiatic Greek from Homer downwards. He has not got far in his treatise before we find him involved in a discussion of the question—'Is life worth living?' Eudemus, it is a relief to find, has not such a good conceit of himself as most of the Greek philosophers, whose tall talk about the sage seems to have incapacitated them from facing the rather sordid realities of the actual moral life. Eudemus speaks as one who has felt, when he includes the attractions of ignoble pleasures among the things which make it 'better not to be'.[3]

§ 8. Even with the *Eudemian Ethics* before us it is difficult to pronounce judgement on the literary merits of the writer, so corrupt is the text in many passages. Some parts of the treatise, especially the first book, show that he can write well and clearly; but at the same time there are signs here and there of a certain muddle-headedness, displayed among other things in his lugging in recognized

[1] *E. E.* 1227ᵇ 24, 25.

[2] 1248ª 29 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον.

[3] 1215ᵇ 25, 26.

doctrines of the School in inappropriate places, e. g. the two uses of anything from the *Politics*, when he is discussing the virtue of liberality.[1]

The close correspondence in the subject-matter between *E. E.* and *E. N.* is quite in accordance with what we are told by the commentators as to the fidelity of Eudemus to his master's doctrines. We find no deviations in the main outlines, though there are some on minor points, for instance, the writer of *E. E.* deliberately rejects the definition of wit proposed in *E. N.*, which shows that he must have had this work before him.[2]

On the whole the estimate that we form of this writer is that he is a man of sound judgement, but destitute of originality. Like the writer of *E. N.*, he has passages on Method[3] and is frequent in his appeal to Induction.[4] But personally he is more interested in the form than in the matter of knowledge. He has an unseasonable fondness for definition,[5] is over-addicted to distinction,[6] and likes to guard his statements in a way which seems due to long polemical habit.[7] In one word he is somewhat of a formalist. This is in keeping with the list of works which we have seen ascribed to Eudemus, which deal with Mathematics, Logic, and Diction, with the one exception of his work on Physics.

§ 9. The last point to notice about the writer of *E. E.*, whom we may as well frankly call Eudemus, is his religious tone, which differentiates him from Aristotle as we conceive of him. But the difference seems to be in the tone, not really in the utterance. For perhaps it is not true to say with Grant that Eudemus does not identify *θεωρία* with the highest good. Is not this just what he means by saying that the right limit with regard to health, wealth, friends, and all natural goods is whatever promotes most the contemplation of God? And when he alters his phrase into 'worshipping and contemplating God', we need not

[1] *E. E.* 1231^{b} 38–^{a} 9: *Pol.* 1257^{a} 6–14.
[2] *E. E.* 1234^{a} 21: *E. N.* 1128^{a} 26.
[3] 1216^{b} 26–1217^{a} 17: 1235^{b} 12–18.
[4] 1219^{a} 1, 1220^{a} 28, ^{b}30, 1248^{b} 26.
[5] 1215^{a} 29–32. [6] 1249^{b} 15. [7] 1221^{b} 4–7.

suppose that by 'worshipping' he means a Semitic prostration of the body, but rather the earnest prosecution by the mind of the search for truth. That Eudemus' conception of the divine nature was really no less abstract than that of Aristotle seems to follow from the hint which he throws out in passing that the things which admit not of change may perhaps be the highest in their nature.[1]

§ 10. We come now to the vexed question of the three disputed books. But let it be observed to begin with that the question is not one of any great importance. For in any case the doctrine is Aristotle's. The point in dispute is whether the three books come directly from the hand that wrote the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which we assume to be that of Aristotle himself, or indirectly through the most faithful of his followers, Eudemus.

§ 11. Neither the *Nicomachean* nor the *Eudemian Ethics*[2] would be complete without some treatment of the queen of virtues, Justice, of the Intellectual Virtues, or of that half-way house on the road to virtue, which is known as Self-control. There are therefore two gaps which have been filled up by the same three books. But if on inquiry it should turn out that these books fit into one of the gaps more neatly than into the other, it will be reasonable to conclude that that is the hole for which they were originally intended.

§ 12. Now if these books be assigned to *E. N.*, we have on the one hand two treatments of Pleasure in the same volume[3] which entirely ignore each other's presence, and on the other no treatment of Pleasure by Eudemus, though that is a subject on the importance of which he is specially insistent. This argument has authority as well as reason to support it. Aspasius ascribed the treatment of Pleasure in Book VII to Eudemus on the ground that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* speaks as though he had never yet said anything on the subject.[4] The double treatment of

[1] 1217^a 32–34.
[2] By *E. N.* will now be meant *Ethica Nicomachea* i–iv, viii–x, and by *E. E. Ethica Eudemia* i–iii, vii, viii.
[3] *E. N.* 1152^b 1–1154^b 31, 1172^a 16–1176^a 29.
[4] Aspasius on *E. N.* vii. 14, p. 151, ll. 21–26.

Pleasure is a difficulty, or rather an impossibility, on the hypothesis of Aristotelian authorship of the doubtful books, whereas on the hypothesis of Eudemian authorship things fall into their place. We have, as might be expected, a treatment of pleasure from the hand of Aristotle himself and another in close imitation of it from Eudemus.

§ 13. Another argument which certainly carries weight is that in the summary which is given at the beginning of the ninth chapter of Book X the writer enumerates the topics of *E. N.*, but ignores the contents of the doubtful books, Pleasure alone excepted. 'Having therefore' the passage runs, 'said enough in outline about these things (i. e. *θεωρία*), and about the virtues, and further about friendship and pleasure, are we to suppose that our purpose is accomplished?' Here we seem to have Aristotle himself telling us what were originally the exact contents of *E. N.*

§ 14. The mathematical character of Book V seems in favour of Eudemian authorship, though Professor Burnet gives this argument a curious twist the other way. He says in effect[1] that the fifth book must be by Aristotle, because it is so bad. 'Mathematics', he tells us, 'was just the one province of human knowledge in which Aristotle did not show himself a master, while Eudemus was one of the foremost mathematicians of an age in which that science made more progress than it ever did again till the seventeenth century.' But is not this reducible to the fact that Eudemus wrote on mathematics? And have we independent evidence that Aristotle was weak in this department?

§ 15. One obvious line of argument as to the authorship of the disputed books is to inquire whether there are any differences of doctrine between them and *E. N.* or *E. E.* It would be natural to assign the three books to that treatise with which they are least in disagreement.

Now the writer of Book V speaks of actions due to anger as being done knowingly, whereas in *E. N.* we are told that they are not.[2]

Again in Book VII it is proved that incontinence of

[1] Introd. pp. xiii, xiv.
[2] v. 8 § 8, 1135^{b} 20: *E. N.* iii. 1 § 14, 1110^{b} 27.

anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of appetite.[1] But in *E. N.* it is laid down that it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, and that virtue is always concerned with the more difficult,[2] whence it follows that incontinence of anger is more disgraceful than incontinence of appetite.

Similarly in Book VII we have the statement that continence or self-control is more choiceworthy than endurance.[3] Now endurance consists in resisting pain and self-control in abstaining from pleasure; and we are told in *E. N.* that it is more difficult to resist pain than to abstain from pleasure;[4] whence it follows, on the principle of the more difficult being the more virtuous, that endurance is more choiceworthy than self-control.

§ 16. Another line of argument which naturally presents itself is that based on references. But here the ground is a quagmire. For the works ascribed to Aristotle have been as 'heavily edited' as the Sacred Books of the Jews. Nevertheless we must try to see in what direction this argument points. There are three questions which present themselves.

1. Are there references in *E. N.* to the doubtful books?

2. Are there references in *E. E.* to the doubtful books?

3. Do the references in the doubtful books point rather to a connexion with *E. N.* or with *E. E.*?

1. In *E. N.* ii. 7 § 16, 1108^{b} 5–10 there is an anticipation of Books V and VI. But it is singularly out of place and is for well-known reasons open to the gravest suspicion on the score of genuineness.

Again in *E. N.* iv. 9 § 8, 1128^{b} 33–35 there is an anticipation of Books VII and V in a tag appended to the treatment of Shame.

Further *E. N.* x. 6 § 1, 1176^{a} 30, 31, like *E. N.* x. 9 § 1, 1179^{a} 33, 34, which has been already spoken of, is a good summary of the contents of *E. N.* minus the doubtful books. We may notice that in both these passages pleasure is mentioned *after* friendship.

[1] vii. 6 §§ 1–5, 1149^{a} 24–^{b}25.
[2] ii. 3 § 10, 1105^{a} 7–9.
[3] vii. 7 § 4, 1150^{a} 36.
[4] iii. 9 § 2, 1117^{a} 34, 35.

2. In *E. E.* 1216^{a} 37 Eudemus promises to inquire later into pleasure, which is done in Book VII, while the subject is again touched on in *E. E.* 1249^{a} 17–20.

In *E. E.* 1218^{b} 16 Eudemus makes a promise which is considered by Fischer and Fritzsche to be fulfilled in Book VI. 1141^{b} 23.

E. E. 1227^{a} 2, 3 is a reference to Book V. 8 § 1, 1135^{a} 15–36^{a} 9.

E. E. 1227^{b} 16 contains a promise which is fulfilled in Book VI. See especially 1144^{a} 35.

E. E. 1231^{b} 2–4 contains a promise which may be regarded as fulfilled in vii. 4, though some doubt this.

E. E. 1234^{a} 28. The promise here made is fulfilled in vi. 13 § 1, 1144^{b} 1–17.

E. E. 1234^{b} 14 is a transition formula to Book V, like that in *E. N.* 1128^{a} 35 with only the difference of ἤδη for νῦν.

E. E. 1249^{a} 17 looks back on Pleasure as a subject treated of. But where is this done, if we refuse to Eudemus the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII?

It will be seen from the above that the references, actual or possible, in *E. E.* to the doubtful books are much more numerous than those in *E. N.* They also come in much more naturally.

Now let us shift our point of view and see how things look from the other side. As *E. E.* is so like *E. N.* there will naturally be many references which are satisfied by either treatise.

v. 1 § 2, 1129^{a} 5, 6. A reference to previous method, which is much the same in both.

v. 4 § 6, 1132^{a} 17. There is mention here of 'gain' and 'loss', 'between which the equal is, as we found (ἦν), a mean.' There is nothing in *E. N.* for this to refer to, but we find it in *E. E.* 1221^{a} 4, 23.

v. 7 § 7, 1135^{a} 15. This is not satisfied by either treatise.

v. 8 § 3, 1135^{a} 23–25. 'I call that voluntary, as has been said before.' The substance of the definition here given is to be found in *E. N.* iii. 1 § 20, 1111^{a} 23, 24, but the language is rather that of *E. E.* ii. 9 § 2, 1225^{b} 8, 9.

vii. 1 § 4, 1145[a] 34. 'And about Vice we have spoken previously' (in both treatises).

vii. 2 § 5, 1146[a] 8. The previous passage here referred to must be vi. 8 §§ 8, 9, 1142[a] 25–30. But all that this goes to show is that Books VI and VII are by the same writer.

vii. 4 § 2, 1147[b] 28. Neutral.

vii. 7 § 1, 1150[a] 11. Neutral.

§ 17. We now come to the argument from language.

Grant used the word *ὅρος* as a striking instance of 'the agreement of philosophical phraseology between the Disputed Books and the *Eudemian Ethics*. In the sense of 'standard' or 'determining principle' this word occurs three times in these books.[1] It is not to be found in *E. N.*,[2] but it is used by Eudemus. But we must not insist very strongly on this argument, for, if pressed, it would prove the Eudemian authorship of the *Politics*, in which this use of *ὅρος* abounds.[3]

The way of speaking of the goods of fortune as being *ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*, which presents itself in the fifth book,[4] is not to be found in *E. N.*, but reappears at the end of *E. E.*[5]

Fritzsche noted the use of the word *μεταμελητικός* in the disputed books[6] as a sign of Eudemian authorship. It occurs in *E. E.* 1240[b] 23, but not in *E. N.*

In vi. 12 § 5, 1144[a] 5 we find the phrase *τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς*, which Professor Stewart notices does not occur in *E. N.*, but is used by Eudemus.[7]

Professor Stewart has also pointed out that the peculiar phrase *ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνειν*, which appears in vii. 9 § 2, 1151[b] 11 is to be found also in *E. E.* 1231[a] 29.

There is hardly anything more distinctive of Eudemus than his fondness for the formula *ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ*.[8]

[1] vi. 1 § 1, 1138[b] 23, vi. 1 § 3, 1138[b] 34, vii. 13 § 4, 1153[b] 25.
[2] *E. N.* i. 7 § 7, 1097[b] 12 is different.
[3] For contending views on this subject see Grant, Essay I, pp. 60, 61 Burnet, pp. 250, 251.
[4] v. 1 § 9, 1129[b] 3, v. 6 § 6, 1134[b] 4, v. 9 § 17 1137[a] 26.
[5] 1249[b] 25. See Grant, Essay I, p. 62.
[6] vii. 7 § 2, 1150[a] 21, vii. 8 § 1 (*bis*), 1150[b] 29, 30.
[7] *E. E.* ii. 1 § 14, 1219[b] 21.
[8] *E. E.* 1216[b] 22, 23, 1217[a] 19, 1220[a] 16, 17, 1249[b] 6.

Now in vi. 1 § 2, 1138^{b} 26 we find the same formula, which nowhere occurs in *E. N.*

It certainly looks as if the phrase *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις* in v. 5 § 8 came from the same hand as the words *κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν* in *E. E.* 1242^{b} 16. But the latter were written by the mathematician Eudemus. Therefore it is likely that the former were so also.

In v. 8 § 3, 1135^{a} 27 we find the words *ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον.* In *E. E.* 1224^{b} 13 we find them again with the substitution of *τινά* for *ἕτερον.*

In Book VII[1] there is a contrast drawn between the *θρασύς* and the *θαρραλέος*, where *θαρραλέος* as a substitute for *ἀνδρεῖος* comes as rather a surprise upon the reader familiar with *E. N.*, but it fits in nicely with the distinction drawn by Eudemus between *θάρσος* as a good quality and *θράσος* as a bad.[2]

εὐθύς in the sense of *ipso facto* occurs in the disputed books[3] and in *E. E.*,[4] but not in *E. N.*

In *E. N.* the abstract noun used as the contrary of *πραότης* is *ὀργιλότης*;[5] that used in *E. E.* is *χαλεπότης.*[6] In the disputed books *χαλεπότης* is used.[7]

In vi. 1 § 14, 1129^{b} 22 *μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν* are what occur to the writer as attributes of the *πρᾶος.* This would have a special appropriateness, if it came from the same writer who made the *πλήκτης καὶ λοιδορητικός* into a species co-ordinate with the *ὀξύθυμος*, *χαλεπός*, and *πικρός*,[8] to which species there is nothing to correspond in *E. N.*

The use of the neuter plural with a plural verb is not, I believe, to be found in *E. N.* It appears, however, in the disputed books and also in *E. E.*[9]

Lastly the use of the relative for the interrogative in v. 8 § 3, 1135^{a} 25 tallies with the practice of *E. E.*, and not with that of *E. N.*[10]

[1] vii. 9 § 2, 1151^{b} 7, 8.
[2] *E. E.* 1234^{b} 12.
[3] v. 10 § 4, 1137^{b} 19, vi. 5 § 6, 1140^{b} 17.
[4] 1237^{a} 28.
[5] 1108^{a} 7, 1125^{b} 29.
[6] 1231^{b} 6.
[7] v. 2 § 2, 1130^{a} 18, vii. 5 § 5, 1149^{a} 6, vii. 6 § 2, 1149^{b} 7.
[8] *E. E.* ii. 3 § 12, 1221^{b} 14.
[9] v. 4 § 2, 1131^{b} 30: *E. E.* 1231^{b} 35, 1232^{a} 10. It is common in the *Metaphysics.*
[10] *E. E.* 1225^{b} 2, 5: *E. N.* iii. 1 § 16, 1111^{a} 3–5.

§ 18. So far everything seems to go in favour of assigning the disputed books to *E. E.* But there is evidence from the *Politics*, which must be taken account of. The writer of that treatise, who has always been regarded as Aristotle himself, refers to the *Ethics* with all the modesty of an author.[1] In this of course there is nothing to surprise us. But out of six references in the *Politics* to the *Ethics* three are to Book V. We seem therefore to have the warrant of Aristotle himself for ascribing this book to him. And his it undoubtedly is, so far as the thought goes. Even the illustrations come from him. For instance an example given of the conventionally just is the hero-worship paid to Brasidas at Amphipolis. How natural this is in the mouth of Aristotle himself, who had lived near the place! But would it have occurred to Eudemus of Rhodes?

While, however, we regard Book V, and with it Books VI and VII, as the genuine outcome of the mind of Aristotle, there is no need to suppose that, in the form in which we have these books, they were written by him. The references in the *Politics* are not necessarily to a written work. They may be only to the author's lectures on Ethics. Part of these lectures have come down to us in the written form into which they were put either by Aristotle himself or possibly by his son. But part we have only as worked up by Eudemus and adjusted to his own treatise. That seems to be all that can be said with safety.

§ 19. The *Magna Moralia* justifies its name by its containing in a succinct form the whole course of Aristotle's lectures on Ethics, both what we get from *E. N.* and what we get from *E. E.*, and further what is contained in the doubtful books. At starting we find the writer distinguishing like Eudemus between the two questions of what virtue is and from what it comes, while towards the end he brings in the Eudemian discussion of Good Luck[2] and that on Nobility and Goodness,[3] which have no counterparts in

[1] *Pol.* iv. 11 § 3, 1295^{a} 37, vii. 13 § 5, 1332^{a} 8.
[2] *M. M.* ii. 8 = *E. E.* viii. 14.
[3] *M. M.* ii. 9 = *E. E.* viii. 15, 1248^{b} 8–49^{a} 16.

E. N. The writer's treatment of pleasure displays affinity both with that of Book VII and that of *E. N.* x. How close is the correspondence between *M. M.* and *E. N.* may be illustrated by the following striking instance. In *E. N.* 1109ª 15, 16 it is written—'and so we are more prone to intemperance than to sobriety' (*κοσμιότητα*). Here the natural word to employ would be 'stolidity' (*ἀναισθησία*)[1] which is, in fact, employed by the Paraphrast, but which Aristotle seems to have avoided because of its being unusual,[2] even at the cost of a slight impropriety; but when the writer of the *Magna Moralia* comes to the same subject we find him also using 'sobriety' instead of 'stolidity'.

§ 20. Who was this writer? He pronounces judgement in the first person as to what 'appears to me' (1181ᵇ 28); he poses as the representative of the school (1198ª 20); and he claims to have written the *Analytics* (1201ᵇ 25). This last pretension is peculiarly inconvenient. Aristotle's *Analytics* we know, and Eudemus' *Analytics* we know of: but who is this? We seem to be reduced to this alternative. Either we have here Aristotle himself, as Schleiermacher thought (but against this there are at all events linguistic objections), or else we have some student who has attended the whole course of lectures on Ethics, and written them out as coming from the Master. One thing seems certain, namely, that there is no allusion in the treatise which might not well have been made by Aristotle. Mention is made of Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea Pontica, in whom Aristotle would have a special interest, as he had, like Aristotle himself, been a pupil of Plato's. The transformation of one whom he probably knew personally from 'a most generous, kind, and gentle student', such as he is described by Isocrates (423 d) as being, into a monster of iniquity[3] must have presented a curious psychological problem to the philosopher. Clearchus was assassinated in B.C. 353, when Aristotle himself would have just turned

[1] See *E. N.* 1109ª 4, 1119ª 7.
[2] See *E. N.* ii. 7 § 3, 1107ᵇ 7, 8.
[3] See Justin xvi. 4 § 5.

thirty. Eight years later, in B.C. 345, there occurred an event which Aristotle was not likely to forget, namely, the treacherous seizure of his friend Hermeias, the autocrat of Atarneus, and his delivery to Artaxerxes, who put him to death. The Greek who perpetrated this crime was Mentor, the very person who is selected by the writer as an illustration of the man who is clever, but not wise (1197ª 21). The last historical event alluded to is the death of Darius in B.C. 330, when Aristotle was 54 years old. We may notice that the writer of *M. M.* agrees with Eudemus in taking the Indians instead of the Scythians[1] as the type of a far-away people, with whom we have no practical concern. The exploits of Alexander in India would make it extremely appropriate for Aristotle himself to say—'For we often think about things in India, but it does not follow that we purpose them' (1189ª 20).

§ 21. As regards the subject-matter of *M. M.* the most important point to notice is that here we get the crowning word of Peripatetic Ethics, for which we wait in vain in *E. N.* or even in *E. E.*—'Speaking generally, it is not the case, as the rest of the world think, that reason is the principle of and guide to virtue, but rather the feelings.'[2] It has been thought that 'the rest of the world' (*οἱ ἄλλοι*) here is meant for the Stoics, but they only carried on the doctrine of Plato and Speusippus. Professor Burnet, rightly, I think, declares that the *Magna Moralia* 'shows no trace of Stoic influence'.

On the subject of the self-contemplation of God the writer of *M. M.* dissents both from Aristotle and Eudemus; but he leaves the question undetermined.[3]

In one passage of this treatise[4] we find the statement that intellectual virtue is not praised. This, though it is in accordance with modern ideas, contradicts both *E. N.*[5] and *E. E.*[6] It is, however, itself contradicted in another passage.[7]

The poison case in the Areopagus, which is obscure in

[1] *M. M.* 1189ª 20: *E. E.* 1226ª 29: *E. N.* 1112ª 28.
[2] 1206ᵇ 17–19. [3] 1212ᵇ 37–1213ª 7. [4] 1185ᵇ 9.
[5] i. 13 § 20, 1103ª 8. [6] ii. i. § 18, 1220ª 5. [7] 1197ª 17.

E. E.[1] and which escaped notice altogether in *E. N.*, until it was revealed by Bernays and by Bywater's text,[2] comes out clearly in *M. M.*

The meaning put upon ἐνέργεια by this writer, namely, that it implies ὁρμή,[3] is confined to himself.

§ 22. Certain peculiarities of diction have been noticed in *M. M.*, such as the phrase τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν,[4] the use of ἐπιστήμη for τέχνη, of τὸ ὅλον in an adverbial sense for ὅλως, and above all the persistent employment of ὑπέρ for περί.[5] Further there are forty words in *M. M.* which occur neither in *E. N.* nor *E. E.* Lastly the utmost laxity is displayed as to the rule of syntax that a neuter plural should have its verb in the singular.

§ 23. The tract on Virtues and Vices, which closes the ethical works attributed to Aristotle, appears to be later than his time. The elaborate way in which the virtues and vices are divided and subdivided reminds one of Stoic work, which the writer may have wished to rival. But perhaps the tract may be later still. For the fixed place assigned to daemons, as intermediate between gods and men,[6] is suggestive of neo-Platonic times, while the eclectic nature of the work seems to point to the same period of the blending of philosophic brands.

Assuming, to start with, Plato's threefold division of the soul, the writer makes Wisdom the virtue of the rational part, Gentleness and Courage those of the passionate part, and Temperance and Self-restraint those of the appetitive part. Justice, Liberality and Magnanimity are declared to be virtues of the whole soul. The Vices are arranged on precisely parallel lines. After the Virtues and Vices have been duly defined we have a statement of the characteristics and concomitants of both, which occupies most of the treatise. The conclusion consists in a brief view of the general effect of virtue. The treatment is not purely Peripatetic. There is not a word about the Doctrine of

[1] 1225^{b} 5.
[2] *E. N.* iii. 1 § 17, 1111^{a} 14.
[3] 1185^{a} 28.
[4] 1183^{a} 6–1185^{a} 1.
[5] This last usage appears as early as Plato, *Apol.* 39 e.
[6] 1250^{b} 20, 1251^{a} 31.

the Mean. The assignment of the two virtues of Gentleness and Courage to the passionate part of the soul carries us back to Plato with his comparison of the Guardians to dogs. Self-restraint is exalted into a virtue in spite of Aristotle's regarding it as a mixed state. There is no mention of the Aristotelian virtue of Magnificence, but, by way of compensation, the liberal man has absorbed into himself some of the attributes of the magnificent man.[1]

[1] 1250b 28–31.

MAGNA MORALIA

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PREFACE

In these sad times it gives me special pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to eminent German scholars, past and present. In composing the Introduction to this volume I have availed myself of the learned labours of Fritzsche. The text of the *M. M.* which has been followed in the translation is that of Susemihl, from whose valuable Index and References I have also derived great advantage. Further I have to thank Mr. W. D. Ross, the Editor, and Mr. Charles Cannan, the Secretary to the Delegates, for their acute and searching criticisms.

ST. GEORGE STOCK.

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BOOK I

1 SINCE our purpose is to speak about ethics, we must 1181[a]
first inquire of what moral character is a branch. To 25
speak concisely, then, it would seem to be a branch of
nothing else than statecraft. For it is not possible to
act at all in affairs of state unless one is of a certain kind,
to wit, good. Now to be good is to possess the virtues.
If therefore one is to act successfully in affairs of state, 1181[b]
one must be of a good moral character. The treatment 25
of moral character then is, as it seems, a branch and
starting-point of statecraft. And as a whole it seems to
me that the subject ought rightly to be called, not Ethics,
but Politics.

We must therefore, as it seems, first say about virtue 1182[a]
both what it is and from what it comes. For it is perhaps
of no use to know virtue without understanding how or
from what it is to arise. We must not limit our inquiry
to knowing what it is, but extend it to how it is to be
produced. For we wish not only to know but also our- 5
selves to be such; and this will be impossible for us,
unless we know from what and how it is to be produced.
Of course, it is indispensable to know what virtue is (for it
is not easy to know the source and manner of its production,
if one does not know what it is, any more than in the
sciences); but we ought to be aware also of what others 10
have said before us on this subject.

Pythagoras first attempted to speak about virtue, but
not successfully; for by reducing the virtues to numbers
he submitted the virtues to a treatment which was not
proper to them. For justice is not a square number.[1]

1181[a] 24–1182[a] 1 = *E. N.* 1094[a] 26–[b] 11. 1–7 = *E. E.* 1216[b] 10–25. 4–6 = *E. N.* 1103[b] 27–29.

[1] Plat. *Theaet.* 147 E, 148 A; *Rep.* 546 C. Philo, *de Mund. Op.* § 16 *οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο ἀγνοητέον, ὅτι πρῶτος ἀριθμῶν ὁ τέτταρα τετράγωνός ἐστιν ἰσάκις ἴσος, μέτρον δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἰσότητος.*

After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him, are to be found in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues sciences he is doing away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also both with passion and moral character; so that he has not been successful in this respect in his treatment of the virtues.

After this Plato divided the soul into the rational and the irrational part—and in this he was right—assigning appropriate virtues to each. So far so good. But after this he went astray. For he mixed up virtue with the treatment of the good, which cannot be right, not being appropriate. For in speaking about the truth of things he ought not to have discoursed upon virtue; for there is nothing common to the two.

The above-mentioned, then, have touched upon the subject so far and in the way above described. The next thing will be to see what we ought to say ourselves upon the subject.

First of all, then, we must see that every science and art has an end, and that too a good one; for no science or art exists for the sake of evil. Since then in all the arts the end is good, it is plain that the end of the best art will be the best good. But statecraft is the best art, so that the end of this will be the good.[1] It is about good, then, as it seems, that we must speak, and about good not without qualification, but relatively to ourselves. For we have not to do with the good of the Gods. To speak about that is a different matter, and the inquiry is foreign to our present purpose. It is therefore about the good of the state that we must speak.

24, 25: cf. *E. N.* 1102a 26–28. 33–35 = *E. N.* 1094a 1, 2. 35–38 = *E. N.* 1094a 26–28. 1182b 2, 3: cf. *E. N.* 1094b 7, 1102a 13–15. 4 = *E. E.* 1217a 21–24.

[1] Reading τἀγαθόν with Casaubon.

But we must distinguish different meanings in the word 'good' itself. About good in what sense of the term have we to speak? For the word is not univocal. For 'good' is used either of what is best in the case of each being, that is, what is choiceworthy because of its own nature, or of that by partaking in which all other things are good, that is, the Idea of Good.

Are we, then, to speak of the Idea of Good? Or not of that, but of good as the element common to all goods? For this would seem to be different from the Idea. For the Idea is a thing apart and by itself, whereas the common element exists in all: it therefore is not identical with what is apart. For that which is apart and whose nature it is to be by itself cannot possibly exist in all. Are we then to speak about this indwelling good? Surely not![1] And why? Because the common element is that which is got by definition or by induction. Now the aim of defining is to state the essence of each thing, either what good is[2] or what evil is, or whatever else it may be. But the definition states that whatever thing is of such a kind as to be choiceworthy for its own sake is good in all cases. And the common element in all goods is much the same as the definition. And the definition says what is good, whereas no science or art whatsoever states of its own end that it is good,[3] but it is the province of another art to speculate as to this (for neither the physician nor the mason says that health or a house is good, but that one thing produces health, and how it produces it, and another thing a house). It is evident then that neither has statecraft to do with the common element of good. For it is itself only one science among the rest, and we have seen that it is not the business of any art or science to talk of this as end. It is not

10–1183b8 = *E.E.* 1217b1–1218b24 = *E.N.* 1096a11–1097a14. 22: cf. *E.N.* 1097a18. 23–27 = *E.E.* 1218b22–24: cf. *E.N.* 1112b12–16.

[1] Susemihl, addenda p. 100, corrects his punctuation.

[2] Printing thus—*ὅ τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὅ τι κακόν.*

[3] It is difficult here to follow the argument, which presents the appearance of an elementary fallacy—

The definition *λέγει ὅ τι ἀγαθόν.*

No art or science *λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος.*

therefore the business of statecraft any more than of any other art to speak of the common element of good corresponding to the definition.

But neither has it to speak of the common element as arrived at by induction. Why so? Because when we wish to show some particular[1] good, we either show by defining that the same description applies to the good and to the thing which we wish to show to be good, or else have recourse to induction; for instance, when we wish to show that magnanimity is a good, we say that justice is a good and courage is a good, and so of the virtues generally, and that magnanimity is a virtue, so that magnanimity also is a good. Neither then will statecraft have to speak of the common good arrived at by induction, because the same impossible consequences will ensue in this case as in that of the common good conformable to the definition. For here also one will be saying that the end is good. It is clear therefore that what it has to speak about is the best good, and the best in the sense of 'the best for us'.

And generally one can see that it is not the part of any one science or art to consider the question of good in general. Why so? Because good occurs in all the categories—in that of substance, quality, quantity, time, relation, [instrument], and generally in all. But what is good at a given time is known in medicine by the doctor, in navigation by the pilot, and in each art by the expert in that art. For it is the doctor who knows when one ought to amputate, and the pilot when one ought to sail. And in each art each expert will know the time of the good which concerns himself. For neither will the doctor know the time of the good in navigation nor the pilot that in medicine. It follows then from this point of view also that we have not to speak about the common good: for time is common to all the arts. Similarly the relative good and the good which corresponds to other categories is common to all, and it does not belong to any art or science to speak

1183a 7–23 = *E. E.* 1217b 25–1218a 1: cf. *E. N.* 1096a 23–34.

[1] Reading *κατὰ μέρος* (*κατά* is omitted by accident in Susemihl's text).

of what is good in each at a given time, nor, we may add, is it the part of statecraft to speak about the common element of good. Our subject then is the good, in the sense of the best, and that the best for us.

Perhaps when one wishes to show something, one ought not to employ illustrations that are not manifest, but to illustrate the obscure by the manifest, and the things of mind by the things of sense, for the latter are more manifest. When, therefore, one takes in hand to speak about the good, one ought not to speak about the Idea. And yet they think it quite necessary, when they are speaking about the good, to speak about the Idea. For they say that it is necessary to speak about what is most good, and the very thing in each kind has the quality of that kind in the highest degree, so that the Idea will be the most good, as they think. Possibly there is truth in such a contention: but all the same the science or art of statecraft, about which we are now speaking, does not inquire about this good, but about that which is good for us. [For no science or art pronounces its end to be good, so that statecraft does not do so either.] Wherefore it does not concern itself to speak about the good in the sense of the Idea.

But, it may be said, one may employ this good as a first principle to start from in speaking about particular goods. Even this is not correct. For the first principles that one assumes ought to be appropriate. How absurd it would be if, when one wished to show that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, one were to assume as a principle that the soul is immortal! For it is not appropriate, and the first principle ought to be appropriate and connected. As a matter of fact, one can prove that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles quite as well without the immortality of the soul. In the same way in the case of goods, one can speculate about the rest without the Ideal Good. Wherefore we declare[1] such a good is not an appropriate principle.

1183b

24–27 = *E. N.* 1104a 13, 14: cf. *E. E.* 1218a 15–19. 35–36 = *E. E.* 1218b 22–24. 39, b 1: cf. *E. N.* 1096b 35–1097a 14.

[1] Reading εἶναι λέγομεν (Spengel) τοῦτο τἀγαθόν (Bonitz).

Neither was Socrates right in making the virtues sciences. For he used to think that nothing ought to be in vain, but from the virtues being sciences he met with the result that the virtues were in vain. Why so? Because in the case of the sciences, as soon as one knows the essence of a science, it results that one is scientific (for any one who knows the essence of medicine is forthwith a physician, and so with the other sciences[1]). But this result does not follow in the case of the virtues. For any one who knows the essence of justice is not forthwith just, and similarly in the case of the rest. It follows then both that the virtues are in vain and that they are not sciences.

Now that we have settled these points, let us try to say **2** in how many senses the term 'good' is used. For goods may be divided into the honourable, the praiseworthy, and potencies. By the 'honourable' I mean such a thing as the divine, the more excellent (for instance, soul, intellect), the more ancient, the first principle, and so on. For those things are honourable which attract honour, and all such things as these are attended with honour. Virtue then also is a thing that is honourable, at least when[2] some one has become a good man in consequence of it; for already such a one has come into the form of virtue. Other goods are praiseworthy, as virtues; for praise is bestowed in consequence of the actions[3] which are prompted by them. Others are potencies, for instance, office, wealth, strength, beauty; for these are things which the good man can use well and the bad man ill. Wherefore such goods are called potencies. Goods indeed they are (for everything is judged

[b] 9–18 = *E. E.* 1216[b] 3–25. 20–35 = *E. N.* 1101[b] 10–1102[a] 4: cf. *E. E.* 1219[b] 8–16.

[1] *τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν* seems to depend on *ἐπιστήμονες* understood, but it looks as if *καί* ought to be *κἀπί*. See line 17.

[2] The writer is doubtless aware that he is running counter to *E. N.* 1101[b] 15 and *E. E.* 1219[b] 8. Hence the distinction drawn between *ἀρετή* and *ἀρεταί*. *ἀρετή* implies complete virtue, which is happiness, and above praise.

[3] According to Plat. *Rep.* 607 A, *E. N.* 1101[b] 33, and *E. E.* 1219[b] 15 *ἐγκώμιον* is appropriate to actual achievements, while *ἔπαινος* (praise) is bestowed upon meritorious qualities.

by the use made of it by the good man, not by that of the bad); and it is incidental to these same goods that fortune is the cause of their production. For from fortune comes wealth, and also office, and generally all the things which rank as potencies. The fourth and last class of goods is that which is preservative and productive of good,[1] as exercise of health, and other things of that sort.

But goods admit of another division, to wit, some goods are everywhere and absolutely choiceworthy, and some are not. For instance, justice and the other virtues are everywhere and absolutely choiceworthy, but strength, and wealth, and power, and the like, are not so everywhere nor absolutely. 1184a

Again, take another division. Some goods are ends and some are not; for instance, health is an end, but the means to health are not ends. And wherever things stand in this relation, the end is always better; for instance, health is better than the means to health, and without exception, always and universally, that thing is better for the sake of which the rest are.

Again, among ends themselves the complete is always better than the incomplete. A 'complete' good is one the presence of which leaves us in need of nothing;[2] an 'incomplete' good is one which may be present while yet we need something further; for instance, we may have justice and yet need many things besides, but when we have happiness we need nothing more. This then is the best thing of which we are in search, which is the complete end. The complete end then is the good and end of goods.

The next point is how we are to look for the best good. Is it itself to be reckoned in with other goods? Surely that is absurd. For the best is the final end, and the final end, roughly speaking, would seem to be nothing else than

35–37 = *E. N.* 1096b 11–13. 1184a 3–6: cf. *E. N.* 1096b 13, 14. 8, 9: cf. *E. N.* 1097b 14, 15. 15–38 = *E. N.* 1097b 16–20.

[1] Cp. the Stoic division of goods into δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετά and ποιητικά given in Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 126.

[2] In *E. N.* a good is τέλειον when you desire nothing beyond it; it is αὔταρκες when you desire nothing beside it. The definition here given of τέλειον is equivalent to that of τὸ αὔταρκες in *E. N.* 1097b 14.

happiness, and happiness we regard as made up of many goods; so that if, in looking for the best, you reckon in itself also, it will be better than itself, because it is itself the best thing. For instance, take the means to health, and health, and raise the question which is the best of all these. The answer is that health is the best. If then this is the best of all, it is also better than itself:[1] so that an absurdity ensues. Perhaps then this is not the way in which we ought to look for the best. Are the other goods then to be separated from it?[2] Is not this also absurd? For happiness is composed of certain goods. But to raise the question whether a given thing is better than its own components is absurd. For happiness is not something else apart from these, but just these.

But perhaps the right method of inquiry may be by comparison of the best somewhat as follows. I mean by comparing happiness itself, which is made up of these goods, with others which are not contained in it. But the best of which we are now in search is not of a simple nature. For instance, one might say that wisdom is the best of all goods when they are compared one by one. But perhaps this is not the way in which we ought to seek for the best good. For it is the complete good whereof we are in search, and wisdom by itself is not complete. It is not, therefore, the best in this sense, nor in this way, of which we are in search.

1184[b] After this, then, goods admit of another division. For 3
some goods are in the soul—for instance, the virtues; some in the body—for instance, health, beauty; and some outside of us—wealth, office, honour, and such like. Of these those in the soul are best. But the goods in the soul are divided into three—wisdom, virtue, and pleasure.

Now we come to happiness, which we all declare to be, and which seems in fact to be, the final good and the most

1184[b] 1–5 = *E. N.* 1098[b] 12–15 = *E. E.* 1218[b] 32–35.

[1] Reading *βέλτιον* with Spengel.

[2] Something seems wrong with the text here. Perhaps we should read *αὐτό* or *αὐτῶν* for *αὐτοῦ*.

complete thing, and this we maintain to be identical with[1] doing well and living well. But the end is not single but twofold. For the end of some things is the activity and use itself—for instance, of sight; and the using is more choiceworthy than the having; for the using is the end. For no one would care to have sight, if he were destined never to see, but always to have his eyes shut. And the same with hearing and the like. When then a thing may be both used and had, the using is always better and more choiceworthy than the having. For the use and exercise are the end, whereas the having is with a view to the using.

Next, then, if one examines this point in the case of all the arts, he will see that it is not one art that makes a house and another that makes a good house, but simply the art of housebuilding; and what the housebuilder makes, that same thing his virtue enables him to make well. Similarly in all other cases.

4 After this, then, we see that it is by nothing else than soul that we live. Virtue is in the soul. We maintain that the soul and the virtue of the soul do the same thing. But virtue in each thing does that well of which it is the virtue, and, among the other functions of the soul, it is by it we live. It is therefore owing to the virtue of the soul that we shall live well. But to live well and do well we say is nothing else than being happy. Being happy, then, and happiness, consist in living well, and living well is living in accordance with the virtues. This, then, is the end and happiness and the best thing. [Happiness therefore will consist in a kind of use and activity. For we found[2] that where there was having and using, the use and exercise are the end. Now virtue is a habit of the soul. And

9, 10: cf. *E. N.* 1098b 21. 9–17 = *E. N.* 1094a 3–16 = *E. E.* 1219a 13–18: cf. *E. N.* 1098a 5, 6. 17–21 = *E. N.* 1098a 7–12 = *E. E.* 1219a 18–23. 22–1185a 1 = *E. E.* 1219a 23–35.

[1] Reading τῷ, for which τό in Susemihl's text seems to be a misprint.

[2] 1184b 15. The passage in brackets belongs in sense to that context.

there is such a thing as the exercise and use of it;[1] so that the end will be its activity and use. Happiness therefore will consist in living in accordance with the virtues.] Since then the best good is happiness, and this is the end, and the final end is an activity,[2] it follows that it is by living in accordance with the virtues that we shall be happy and shall have the best good.

Since, then, happiness is a complete good and end, we must not fail to observe that it will be found in that which is complete. For it will not be found in a child (for a child is not happy), but in a man; for he is complete. Nor will it be found in an incomplete, but in a complete, period. And a complete period of time will be as long as a man lives. For it is rightly said among the many that one ought to judge of the happy man in the longest time of his life, on the assumption that what is complete ought to be in a complete period and a complete person. But that it is an activity can be seen also from the following consideration. For supposing some one to be asleep all his life, we should hardly consent to call such a man happy. Life indeed he has, but life in accordance with the virtues he has not, and it was in this that we made the activity to consist.[3]

The topic that is next about to be treated of is neither very intimately connected with our main subject nor yet quite alien from it. I mean, since there is, as it seems, a part of the soul whereby we are nourished, which we call 'nutritive' (for it is reasonable to suppose that this exists; at all events we see that stones are incapable of being nourished, so that it is evident that to be nourished is a property of living things; and, if so, the soul will be the cause of it; but none of these parts of the soul will be the cause of nourishment, to wit, the rational or spirited

1–4 = *E. N.* 1100a 1–5 = *E. E.* 1219a 35–39. 4–9 = *E. N.* 1098a 18 = *E. E.* 1219b 6–8. 10–13 = *E. N.* 1099a 1, 2 = *E. E.* 1219a 23–27. 14–35 = *E. N.* 1102a 32–b 12 = *E. E.* 1219b 20–25, 36–40.

[1] Omitting τῶν ἀρετῶν (Spengel).
[2] Reading ἐνέργεια for ἐνεργείᾳ.
[3] 1184b 34–36.

or appetitive, but something else besides these, to which we can apply no more appropriate name than 'nutritive'), one might say, 'Very well, has this part of the soul also a virtue? For if it has, it is plain that we ought to act with this also. For happiness is the exercise of perfect virtue.' Now, whether there is or is not a virtue of this part is another question; but, if there is, it has no activity. For those things which have no impulse will not have any activity either; and there does not seem to be any impulse in this part, but it seems to be on a par with fire. For that also will consume whatever you throw in, but if you do not throw anything in, it has no impulse to get it. So it is also with this part of the soul; for, if you throw in food, it nourishes, but, if you fail to throw in food, it has no impulse to nourish. Wherefore it has no activity, being devoid of impulse. So that this part in no way co-operates towards happiness.

After this, then, we must say what virtue is, since it is the exercise of this which is happiness. Speaking generally, then, virtue is the best state. But perhaps it is not sufficient to speak thus generally, but it is necessary to define more clearly.

5 First, then, we ought to speak about the soul in which it resides, not to say what the soul is (for to speak about that is another matter), but to divide it in outline. Now the soul is, as we say,[1] divided into two parts, the rational and the irrational. In the rational part, then, there resides wisdom, readiness of wit, philosophy, aptitude to learn, memory, and so on; but in the irrational those which are called the virtues—temperance, justice, courage, and such other moral states as are held to be praiseworthy. For it is in respect of these that we are called praiseworthy; but no one is praised for the virtues of the rational part. For no one is praised for being philosophical nor for being wise, nor generally on the ground of anything of that

1185[b]

38 = *E. N.* 1103[a]9. [b] 1–12 = *E. N.* 1102[a]18–28 = *E. E.* 1219[b]26–30.

[1] Cf. 1182[a]23–26.

sort.[1] Nor indeed is the irrational part praised, except in so far as it is capable of subserving or actually subserves the rational part.

Moral virtue is destroyed by defect and excess. Now, that defect and excess destroy can be seen from moral instances,[2] but we must use what we can see as an illustration of what we cannot see. For one can see this at once in the case of gymnastic exercises. If they are overdone, the strength is destroyed, while if they are deficient, it is so also. And the same is the case with food and drink. For if too much is taken health is destroyed, and also if too little, but by the right proportion strength and health are preserved. The same is the case with temperance and courage and the rest of the virtues. For if you make a man too fearless, so as not even to fear the Gods, he is not brave but mad, but if you make him afraid of everything, he is a coward. To be brave, then, a man must not either fear everything or nothing. The same things, then, both increase and destroy virtue. For undue and indiscriminate fears destroy, and so does the lack of fear about anything at all. And courage has to do with fears, so that moderate fears increase courage. Courage, then, is both increased and destroyed by the same things. For men are liable to this effect owing to fears. And the same holds true of the other virtues.

6 In addition to the preceding, virtue may also be determined by pleasure and pain. For it is owing to pleasure that we commit base actions, and owing to pain that we abstain from noble ones. And generally it is not possible

13–26 = *E. N.* 1104[a] 11–[b] 3. 26–32 = *E. N.* 1103[b] 7–22 = *E. E.* 26–32. 33–37 = *E. N.* 1104[b] 3–1105[a] 14 = *E. E.* 1220[a] 34–39.

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[1] This contradicts *E. N.* 1103[a] 8 *ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*, and also *E. E.* 1220[a] 5 *ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφούς*. The author of this treatise himself reverts to the older view in 1197[a] 17.

[2] The text makes sense as it stands, if the brackets are removed. *ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν* may be an anticipation of *ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις* κτλ. in line 21. But *ἐκτὸς τῶν ἠθικῶν* would be a great improvement.

to achieve virtue or vice without pain and pleasure. Virtue then has to do with pleasures and pains.

The word 'ethical' (or 'moral') virtue is derived as follows, if etymology has any bearing upon truth, as perhaps 1186a it has. From *ĕthos* comes *ēthos*, and so moral virtue is called 'ethical', as being attained by practice. Whereby it is evident that no one of the virtues of the irrational part springs up in us by nature. For nothing that is by nature becomes other by training. For instance, a 5 stone, and heavy things in general, naturally go downwards. If any one, then, throws them up repeatedly, and tries to train them to go up, all the same they never would go up, but always down. Similarly in all other such cases.

7 After this, then, as we wish to say what virtue is, we 10 must know what are the things that there are in the soul. They are these—feelings, capacities, states; so that it is evident that virtue will be some one of these. Now feelings are anger, fear, hate, regret, emulation, pity, and the like, which are usually attended by pain or pleasure. Capacities are those things in virtue of which we are said 15 to be capable of these feelings; for instance, those things in virtue of which we are capable of feeling anger or pain or pity, and so on. States are those things in virtue of which we stand in a good or bad relation to these feelings; for instance, towards being angered; if we are angry overmuch, we stand in a bad relation towards anger, whereas if we are not angry at all where we ought to be, in that case also we stand in a bad relation towards anger.

The mean state, then, is neither to be pained overmuch 20 nor to be absolutely insensible. When, then, we stand thus, we are in a good disposition. And similarly as regards other like things. For good temper and gentleness are in a mean between anger and insensibility to anger. Similarly in the case of boastfulness and mock-humility. 25 For to pretend to more than one has shows boastfulness,

38–1186a 2 = *E. N.* 1103a 17, 18 = *E. E.* 1220a 39–b 1. 2–8 = *E. N.* 1103a 18–26 = *E. E.* 1220b 2–5. 9–22 = *E. N.* 1105b 19–28 = *E. E.* 1220b 10–20.

while to pretend to less shows mock-humility. The mean state, then, between these is truthfulness.

Similarly in all other cases. For this is what marks the 8
state, to stand in a good or bad relation towards these feelings, and to stand in a good relation towards them is
30 neither to incline towards the excess nor towards the defect. The state, then, which implies a good relation is directed towards the mean of such things, in respect of which we are called praiseworthy, whereas that which implies a bad relation inclines towards excess or defect.

Since, then, virtue is a mean of these feelings, and the feelings are either pains or pleasures or impossible apart
35 from pain or pleasure, it is evident from this that virtue has to do with pains and pleasures.[1]

But there are other feelings, as one might think, in the case of which the vice does not lie in any excess or defect; for instance, adultery and the adulterer. The adulterer is
1186b not the man who corrupts free women too much; but both this and anything else of the kind which is comprised under the pleasure of intemperance, whether it be something in the way of excess or of defect,[2] is blamed.

After this, then, it is perhaps necessary to have it stated 9
5 what is opposed to the mean, whether it is the excess or the defect. For to some means the defect is opposed and to some the excess; for instance, to courage it is not rashness, which is the excess, that is opposed, but cowardice, which is the defect; and to temperance, which is a mean between intemperance and insensibility to pleasures, it does
10 not seem that insensibility, which is the defect, is opposed, but intemperance, which is the excess. But both are opposed to the mean, excess and defect. For the mean is in defect of the excess and in excess of the defect. Hence it is that prodigals call the liberal illiberal, while

33–36 = *E. N.* 1104b 13–16. 36–b 3 = *E. N.* 1107a 8–17 = *E. E.* 1221b 18–26. 4–13 = *E. N.* 1108b 35–1109a 5. 14–16 = *E. N.* 1108b 23–26.

[1] Reading ἀρετὴ ὅτι ἐστίν (Sylburg).

[2] The meaning is plain, though the text at this point is corrupt, the ἢ not being wanted.

the illiberal call the liberal prodigals, and the rash and headlong call the brave cowards, while cowards call the brave headlong and mad.

There would seem to be two reasons for our opposing the excess or the defect to the mean. Either people look at the matter from the point of view of the thing itself, to see which is nearer to, or further from, the mean; for instance, in the case of liberality, whether prodigality or illiberality is further from it. For prodigality would seem more to be liberality than illiberality is. Illiberality, then, is further off. But things which are further distant from the mean would seem to be more opposed to it. From the point of view, then, of the thing itself the defect presents itself as more opposed. But there is also another way, to wit, those things are more opposed to the mean to which we have a greater natural inclination. For instance, we have a greater natural inclination to be intemperate than sober in our conduct. The tendency, therefore, occurs rather towards the things to which nature inclines us; and the things to which we have a greater tendency are more opposed; and our tendency is towards intemperance rather than towards sobriety; so that the excess of the mean will be the more opposed; for intemperance is the excess in the case of temperance.

What virtue is, then, has been examined (for it seems to be a mean of the feelings, so that it will be necessary for the man who is to obtain credit for moral character to observe the mean with regard to each of the feelings; for which reason it is a difficult matter to be good; for to seize the mean in anything is a difficult matter; for instance, any one can draw a circle, but to fix upon the mean point in it is hard; and in the same way to be angry indeed is easy, and so is the opposite of this, but to be in the mean is hard; and generally in each of the feelings one can see that what surrounds the mean is easy, but the mean is hard, and this is the point for which we are praised; for which reason the good is rare).

17–32 = *E. N.* 1109a 5–19 = *E. E.* 1222a 36–43. 33–1187a 4 = *E. N.* 1109a 20–29.

Since, then, virtue has been spoken of . . . we must next inquire whether it is possible of attainment or is not, but, as Socrates[1] said, to be virtuous or vicious does not rest with us to come about. For if, he says, one were to ask any one whatever whether he would wish to be just or unjust, no one would choose injustice. Similarly in the case of courage and cowardice, and so on always with the rest of the virtues. And it is evident that any who are vicious will not be vicious voluntarily; so that it is evident that neither will they be voluntarily virtuous[2].

Such a statement is not true. For why does the lawgiver forbid the doing of wrong acts, and bid the doing of right and virtuous ones? And why does he appoint a penalty for wrong acts, if one does them, and for right acts, if one fails to do them? Yet it would be absurd to legislate about those things which are not in our power to do. But, as it seems, it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious.

Again, we have evidence in the praise and blame that are accorded. For there is praise for virtue and blame for vice. But praise and blame are not bestowed upon things involuntary. So it is evident that it is equally in our power to do virtuous and vicious acts.

They used also to employ some such comparison as this in their desire to show that vice is not voluntary. For why, they say, when we are ill or ugly, does no one blame us for things of this sort? But this is not true. For we do blame people for things of this sort, when we think that they themselves are the causes of their being ill or of their having their body in a bad state, on the assumption that there is voluntary action even there. It seems, then, that there is voluntariness in being virtuous and vicious.

14-18 = *E. N.* 1113b 20-30. 19-22 = *E. N.* 1109b 30-33.

[1] See, for instance, *Meno* 78 A, *Rep.* 589 C, *Soph.* 228 C, *Tim.* 86 D, E. But the strongest expression given to the doctrine of the involuntariness of vice is in *Laws* 731 C, 860 D, E, the latter of which passages seems to be directed against Aristotle.

[2] This is an inference drawn by the writer, not by Plato. In Plato's view, vice was involuntary because it was ignorance, and virtue was voluntary for the opposite reason. Aristotle's main contention in *E. N.* iii. 5 against Plato is that the one is as voluntary as the other.

10 One can see this still more clearly from the following considerations. Every natural kind is given to begetting a being like itself, i. e. plants and animals; for both are apt to beget. And they are given to beget from their first principles—for instance, the tree from the seed; for this is a kind of principle. And what follows the principles stands thus: as are the principles, so is what comes from the principles.

This can be seen more clearly in matters of geometry. For there also, when certain principles are assumed, as are the principles, so are what follow the principles; for instance, if the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, and the quadrilateral to four, then according as the triangle changes, so does the quadrilateral share in its changes (for it is convertible), and if the quadrilateral has not its angles equal to four right angles, neither will the triangle have its angles equal to two right angles.

11 So, then, and in the like way with this, is it in the case of man. For since man is apt to produce being, he tends to produce the actions which he does from certain principles. How else could it be? For we do not say that any of the things without life acts, nor any other of the things with life, except men. It is evident, then, that man is the begetter of his acts.

Since, then, we see that the acts change, and we never do the same things, and the acts have been brought into being from certain principles, it is evident that, since the acts change, the principles from which the acts proceed also change, as we said in our comparison was the case with geometrical properties.

Now the principle of an act, whether virtuous or vicious, is purpose and wish, and all that accords with reason. It is evident, then, that these also change. But we change in our actions voluntarily. So that the principle also, purpose, changes voluntarily. So that it is plain that it will be in our power to be either virtuous or vicious.

Perhaps, then, some one may say, 'Since it is in my power to be just and good, if I wish I shall be the best of

all men'. This, of course, is not possible. Why so? Because in the case of the body it is not so either. For if one wishes to bestow attention upon his body, it does not follow that he will have the best body that any one has. For it is necessary not merely for attention to be bestowed, but also for the body to be beautiful and good by nature. He will then have his body better, but best of all men, No. And so we must suppose it to be also in the case of soul. For he who wills to be best will not be so, unless Nature also be presupposed; better, however, he will be.

Since, then, it appears that to be good is in our power, it is necessary next to say what the voluntary is. For this is what chiefly determines virtue, to wit, the voluntary. Roughly speaking, that is voluntary which we do when not under compulsion. But perhaps we ought to speak more clearly about it. 12

What prompts us to action is impulse; and impulse has three forms—appetite, passion, wish.

First of all, then, we must inquire into the act which is in accordance with appetite. Is that voluntary or involuntary? That it is involuntary would not seem to be the case. Why so? And on what ground? Because wherever we do not act voluntarily, we act under compulsion, and all acts done under compulsion are attended with pain, whereas acts due to appetite are attended with pleasure, so that on this way of looking at the matter acts due to appetite will not be involuntary, but voluntary.

But, again, there is another argument opposed to this, which makes its appeal to incontinence. No one, it is maintained, does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. But yet the incontinent, knowing that what he does is vicious, nevertheless does it, and does it in accordance with appetite; he is not therefore acting voluntarily; therefore he is under compulsion. There again the old answer will

[b] 32 = *E. N.* 1109[b] 33. 37, 38 = *E. E.* 1223[a] 26, 27. 39–1188[a] 5 = *E. N.* 1111[a] 32, 33 = *E. E.* 1223[a] 29–35. 6–12 = *E. E.* 1223[b] 5–8.

meet this argument. For if the act be in accordance with appetite, it is not of compulsion; for appetite is attended with pleasure, and acts due to pleasure are not of compulsion.

There is another way in which this conclusion may be made plain; I mean, that the incontinent acts voluntarily. For those who commit injustice do so voluntarily, and the incontinent are unjust and act unjustly. So that the incontinent man will voluntarily commit his acts of incontinence.

13 But, again, there is another argument opposed to this, which maintains that action due to appetite is not voluntary. For the self-restrained man voluntarily performs his acts of self-restraint. For he is praised, and people are praised for voluntary acts. But if that which is in accordance with appetite is voluntary, that which runs counter to appetite is involuntary. But the man of self-restraint acts contrary to his appetite. So that the man of self-restraint will not be self-restrained voluntarily. But this conclusion does not commend itself. Therefore the act which is in accordance with appetite is not voluntary.

Again, the same thing holds of acts prompted by passion. For the same arguments apply as to appetite, so that they will cause the difficulty. For it is possible to be incontinent or continent of anger.

Among the impulses in our division we have still to inquire about wish, whether it is voluntary. But assuredly the incontinent wish for the time being the things to which their impulse is directed. Therefore the incontinent perform their vicious acts with their own wish. But no one voluntarily does evil, knowing it to be evil. But the incontinent man, knowing evil to be evil, does it with his own wish. Therefore he is not a voluntary agent, and wish therefore is not a voluntary thing. But this argument annuls incontinence and the incontinent man. For, if he is not a voluntary agent, he is not blameworthy. But the incontinent is blameworthy. Therefore he is a voluntary agent. Therefore wish is voluntary.

12–16 = *E. E.* 1223ª 36–ᵇ 3.

Since, then, certain arguments seem opposed, we must speak more clearly about the voluntary.

Before doing so, however, we must speak about force 14
1188b and about necessity. Force may occur even in the case of things without life. For things without life have each their proper place assigned to them—to fire the upper region and to earth the lower. It is, however, possible to force a stone to go up and fire to go down. It is also possible to apply force to an animal; for instance, when a horse is galloping straight ahead, one may take hold of him and divert his course. Now whenever the cause of men's doing something contrary to their nature or contrary to their wish is outside of them, we will say that they are forced[1] to do what they do. But when the cause is in themselves, we will not in that case say that they are forced. Otherwise the incontinent man will have his answer ready, in denying that he is vicious. For he will say that he is forced by his appetite to perform the vicious acts.

Let this, then, be our definition of what is due to force— 15
those things of which the cause by which men are forced to do them is external (but where the cause is internal and in themselves there is no force).

But now we must speak about necessity and the necessary. The term 'necessary' must not be used in all circumstances nor in every case—for instance, of what we do for the sake of pleasure. For if one were to say 'I was necessitated by pleasure to debauch my friend's wife', he would be a strange person. For 'necessary' does not apply to everything, but only to externals; for instance, whenever a man receives some damage by way of alternative to some other greater, when compelled by circumstances. For instance, 'I found it necessary to hurry my steps to the country; otherwise I should have found my stock destroyed.' Such, then, are the cases in which we have the necessary.

38–b 14 = *E. E.* 1224a 12–b 5. 13, 14 = *E. N.* 1110a 1–3.

[1] 1188b 8 reading *βιαζομένους*. *βιαζομένοις* in Susemihl is a misprint.

16 But since the voluntary lies in no impulse, there will remain what proceeds from thought.[1] For the involuntary is what is done from necessity or from force, and, thirdly, what is not accompanied by thought. This is plain from facts. For whenever a man has struck or killed a man, or has done something of that sort without having thought about it beforehand, we say that he has acted involuntarily, implying that the voluntariness lies in the having thought about it. For instance, they say that once on a time a woman gave a love-potion to somebody; then the man died from the effects of the love-potion, and the woman was put on her trial before the Areopagus; on her appearance before which she was acquitted, just for the reason that she did not do it with design. For she gave it in love, but missed her mark; wherefore it was not held to be voluntary, because in giving the love-potion she did not give it with the thought of killing. In that case, therefore, the voluntary falls under the head of what is accompanied with thought.

17 It now remains for us to inquire into purpose. Is purpose impulse or is it not? Now impulse is found in the lower animals, but not purpose; for purpose is attended with reason, and none of the lower animals has reason. Therefore it will not be impulse.

Is it then wish? Or is it not this either? For wish is concerned even with the impossible; for instance, we wish that we may live for ever, but we do not purpose it. Again, purpose is not concerned with the end but with

32–38 = *E.N.* 1111a 14 = *E.E.* 1225b 5. 1189a 1–4 = *E.N.* 1111b 12, 13. 5–12 = *E.N.* 1111b 19–30 = *E.E.* 1226a 6–17.

[1] The distinction drawn in *E.N.* between a merely voluntary act and an act done on purpose is here rather blurred. Ἐκ διανοίας must not be taken to mean more than εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις in *E.N.* 1111a 23. This is evident from the words which follow here in 1189a 33, where it is recognized that instinctive acts are voluntary. When the jury acquitted the woman of design, they pronounced that she was ignorant of the ἕνεκα τίνος (*E.N.* 1111a 5) of her act, an ignorance which rendered it involuntary. The words μετὰ διανοίας, which are used in this chapter of a voluntary act, are in the next (1189a 36) made to be the differentia of an act done on purpose.

the means; for instance, no one purposes to be in health, but we purpose what leads to health, e. g. walking, running; but we wish for the ends. For we wish to be in health. So that it is evident in this way also that wish and purpose are not the same thing.

But purpose seems to be what its name suggests; I mean, we choose one thing instead of another; for instance, the better instead of the worse. Whenever, then, we take the better in exchange for the worse as a matter of choice, there the verb 'to purpose' would seem to be appropriate.

Since, then, purpose is none of these things, can it be thought that constitutes purpose? Or is this not so either? For we entertain many thoughts and opinions in our minds. Do we then purpose whatever we think? Or is this not so? For often we think about things in India, but it does not follow that we purpose them. Purpose therefore is not thought either.

Since, then, purpose is not any of these singly, and these are the things that there are in the soul, purpose must result from the combination of some of them.

Since, then, purpose, as was said before,[1] is concerned with the goods that are means and not with the end, and with the things that are possible to us, and with such as afford ground for controversy as to whether this or that is choiceworthy, it is evident that one must have thought and deliberated about them beforehand; then when a thing appears best to us after having thought it over, there ensues an impulse to act, and it is when we act in this way that we are held to act on purpose.

Since, then, purpose is a deliberate impulse attended with thought, the voluntary is not necessarily done on purpose. For there are many acts which we do voluntarily before thinking and deliberating about them; for instance, we sit down and rise up, and do many other things of the

13–16 = *E. N.* 1112[a] 16, 17 = *E. E.* 1226[b] 14–17. 17–22 = *E. N.* 1111[b] 30–34 = *E. E.* 1226[a] 1–6. 32 = *E. N.* 1113[a] 11 = *E. E.* 1226[b] 9. 33–[b] 6 = *E. N.* 1111[b] 6–10 = *E. E.* 1226[b] 30–1227[a] 1.

[1] ll. 7–10.

same sort voluntarily but without having thought about them, whereas every act done on purpose was found to be attended with thought. The voluntary, therefore, is not 1189[b] necessarily done on purpose, but the act done on purpose is voluntary; for if we purpose to do anything after deliberation, we act voluntarily. And a few legislators, even, appear to distinguish the voluntary act from the act done on purpose as being something different, in making the penalties that they appoint for voluntary acts less than for those that are done on purpose.

Purpose, then, lies in matters of action, and in those in which it is in our power to do or not to do, and to act in this way or in that, and where we can know the reason why.

But the reason why is not always of the same kind. For in geometry, when one says that the quadrilateral has its angles equal to four right angles, and one asks the reason why, one says, 'Because the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles.' Now in such cases they reached the reason why from a definite principle; but in matters of action, with which purpose has to do, it is not so (for there is no definite principle laid down), but if one asks, 'Why did you do this?' the answer is, 'Because it was the only thing possible,' or 'Because it was better so.' It is from the consequences themselves, according as they appear to be better, that one forms one's purpose, and these are the reason why.

Wherefore in such matters the deliberation is as to the how, but not so in the sciences. For no one deliberates how he ought to write the name Archicles, because it is a settled matter how one ought to write the name Archicles. The error, then, does not arise in the thought, but in the act of writing. For where the error is not in the thought, neither do people deliberate about those things. But wherever there is an indefiniteness about the how, there error comes in.

Now there is the element of indefiniteness in matters of action, and in those matters in which the errors are two-

18–24 = *E.N.* 1112[a] 34–[b] 9 = *E.E.* 1226[a] 33–[b] 2.

fold. We err, then, in matters of action and in what pertains to the virtues in the same way. For in aiming at virtue we err in the natural directions. For there is error both in defect and in excess, and we are carried in both these directions through pleasure and pain. For it is owing to pleasure that we do base deeds, and owing to pain that we abstain from noble ones.

Again, thought is not like the senses; for instance, with 18
sight one could not do anything else than see, nor with hearing anything else than hear. So also we do not deliberate whether we ought to hear with hearing or see. But thought is not like this, but it is able to do one thing and others also. That is why deliberation comes in there.

The error, then, in the choice of goods is not about the ends (for as to these all are at one in their judgement, for instance, that health is a good), but only about those which lead to the ends; for instance, whether a particular food is good for health or not. The chief cause of our going wrong in these matters is pleasure and pain; for we avoid the one and choose the other.

Since, then, it has been settled in what error takes place and how, it remains to ask what it is that virtue aims at. Does it aim at the end or at the means; for instance, at what is right or at what conduces thereto?

How, then, is it with science? Does it belong to the science of housebuilding to design the end rightly, or to see the means that conduce to it? For if the design be right—I mean, to make a beautiful house—it is no other than the housebuilder who will discover and provide the means. And similarly in the case of all the other sciences.

So, then, it would seem to be also in the case of virtue, that its aim is rather the end, which it must design rightly, than the means. And no one else will provide the materials for this or discover the means that are required. And it is reasonable to suppose that virtue should have this in view. For both design and execution always belong to that with

27-32 = *E.N.* 1104b 9-11 = *E.E.* 1227a 36-41. 1190a 8-33 = *E.E.* 1227b 12-1228a 2.

which the origination of the best lies. Now there is nothing better than virtue; for it is for its sake that all other things are, and the origination looks to this, and the means are rather for the sake of it; now the end seems to be a kind of principle, and everything is for the sake of it. But this will be as it ought to be. So that it is plain also in the case of virtue, since it is the best mode of causation, that it aims at the end rather than at the means.

19 Now the end of virtue is the right. This, then, is what virtue aims at rather than the things from which it will be produced. But it has to do also with these. But to make these its whole concern is manifestly absurd. For perhaps in painting one might be a good imitator and yet not be praised, if one does not make it his aim to imitate the best subjects. This, therefore, is quite the business of virtue, to design the right.

Why, then, some one may say, did we say before[1] that the activity was better than the corresponding state, whereas now we are assigning to virtue as nobler not the material for activity, but something in which there is no activity? Yes, but now also we assert this just the same, 1190ᵇ that the activity is better than the state. For his fellow men in viewing the good man judge him from his acts, owing to its not being possible to make clear the purpose which each has, since if it were possible to know how the judgement of each man stands towards the right, he would have been thought good even without acting.

But since we reckoned up certain means of the feelings, we must say with what sort of feelings they are concerned.[2]

20 . . . Since, then, courage has to do with feelings of confidence and fear, we must examine with what sort of fears and confidences it has to do. If, then, any one is afraid

24: cf. *E.N.* 1102ª 2, 3: *E.E.* 1227ᵇ 25. 26: cf. *E.N.* 1099ᵇ 23. ᵇ2–6: cf. *E.N.* 1111ᵇ 5, 6, 1178ª 34, 35: *E.E.* 1228ª 2–19. 9–20 = *E.N.* 1115ª 6–21.

[1] 1184ᵇ 11–17, 32–36.

[2] The author has mentioned various μεσότητες, 1185ᵇ 21–30, 1186ª 17–35, ᵇ5–32, but has not enumerated them.

of losing his property, is he a coward? And if any one is confident about these matters, is he brave? Surely not! And in the same way if one is afraid of or confident about illness, one ought not to say that the man who fears is a coward or that the man who does not fear is brave. It is not, therefore, in such fears and confidences as these that courage consists. Nor yet in such as follow; for instance, if one is not afraid of thunder or lightning or any other superhuman terror, he is not brave but a sort of madman. It is with human fears and confidences, then, that the brave man has to do; I mean to say that whoso is confident under circumstances in which most people or all are afraid, he is a brave man.

These points having been settled, we must inquire, since there are many ways in which men are brave, which is the truly brave man. For you may have a man who is brave from experience, like professional soldiers. For they know, owing to experience, that in such a place or time or condition it is impossible to suffer any damage. But the man who knows these things and for this reason stands his ground against the enemy is not brave; for if none of these things be the case, he does not stand his ground. Wherefore one ought not to call those brave whose courage is due to experience. Nor indeed was Socrates right in asserting that courage was knowledge.[1] For knowledge becomes knowledge by getting experience from habit. But of those whose endurance is due to experience we do not say, nor would men in general say, that they are brave. Courage, therefore, will not consist in knowledge.

But again, on the other hand, there are some who are brave from the opposite of experience. For those who have no experience of the probable results are free from

16–20 = *E. N.* 1115b 7–15, 26–28. 23–32 = *E. N.* 1116b 3–23 = *E. E.* 1229a 14–16. 33–35 = *E. N.* 1117a 22–24 = *E. E.* 1229a 16–18.

[1] Cp. *E. N.* 1116b 4. It is true that Socrates thought courage to be a branch of knowledge, but, at least as represented by Plato, he meant thereby the knowledge that death is not really to be feared, if it comes in the course of duty. See the definition suggested in the *Laches*, 195 a.

fear owing to their inexperience. Neither, then, must we call these brave.

Again, there are others who appear brave owing to their passions; for instance, those who are in love or are inspired by religion. We must not call these brave either. For if their passion be taken away, they are not brave any more, whereas the truly brave man must always be brave. Wherefore one would not call wild beasts like boars brave, owing to their defending themselves when they have been pained by a wound, nor ought the brave man to be brave through passion.

Again, there is another form of courage, which we may call civic; for instance, if men endure dangers out of shame before their fellow citizens, and so appear to be brave. In illustration of this we may take the way in which Homer has represented Hector as saying—

Then were Polydamas first to pile reproaches upon me;[1]

for which reason he thinks that he ought to fight. We must not call this sort courage either. For the same definition will apply to each of these. For he whose courage does not endure on the deprivation of something cannot properly be considered brave; if, then, I take away the shame owing to which he was brave, he will no longer be brave.

There is yet another way of appearing brave, namely, through hope and anticipation of good. We must not say that these are brave either, since it appears absurd to call those brave who are of such a character and under such circumstances.

No one, then, of the above kinds must be put down as brave.

We have then to ask who is to be so put down, and who is the really brave man. Broadly speaking, then, it is he who is brave owing to none of the things above-men-

36–1191a 4 = *E.N.* 1116b 23–1117a 9 = *E.E.* 1229a 20–30. 5–13 = *E.N.* 1116a 17–35 = *E.E.* 1229a 13, 14, 19. 14–16 = *E.N.* 1117a 9–22 = *E.E.* 1229a 18–20. 17–21: cf. *E.N.* 1115a 33, 34: *E.E.* 1230a 29–33.

[1] *Il.* xxii. 100.

tioned, but owing to his thinking it to be right, and who acts bravely whether any one be present or not.

Not, indeed, that courage arises in one entirely without passion and impulse. But the impulse must proceed from reason and be directed to the right. He, then, who is carried by a rational impulse to face danger for the sake of right, being free from fear about these things, is brave; and these are the things with which courage has to do.

When we say 'free from fear', it is not to be understood that the brave man feels no fear at all. For such a person is not brave, for whom nothing at all has any terrors. For in that way a stone and other things without life would be brave. But it is necessary that while he feels fear he should still face the danger; for if, on the other hand, he faces it without feeling fear, he will not be brave.

Further, according to the distinction that we made above,[1] it is not concerned with all fears and dangers, but only with those which threaten existence. Moreover, not at any and every time, but when the fears and the dangers are near. For if one is void of fear with regard to a danger that is ten years off, it does not follow that he is brave. For some are confident owing to its being far away, but, if they come near it, are ready to die with fear. Such, then, are courage and the brave man.

Temperance is a mean between intemperance and insensibility to pleasures. For temperance and generally every virtue is the best state, and the best state lies in the attainment of the best thing, and the best thing is the mean between excess and defect; for people are blameworthy on both grounds, both on that of excess and on that of defect. So that, since the mean is best, temperance will be a mean state between intemperance and insensibility. These, then, are the vices between which it will be a mean. 21

Temperance is concerned with pleasures and pains, but

25–30 = *E.N.* 1150b 10–13 = *E.E.* 1229a 1–11. 37–b 22 = *E.N.* 1117b 27–1118a 26 = *E.E.* 1230a 36–1231b 4.

[1] 1190b 9–20.

not with all, nor with those that have to do with all objects. For one is not intemperate if one takes pleasure in beholding a painting or a statue or something of that sort, and in the same way not so in the case of hearing or smell; but only in the pleasures which have to do with touch and taste.

Nor yet with regard to these will a man be temperate who is in such a state as not to be affected at all by any pleasures of this sort (for such a person is devoid of feeling), but rather he who feels them and yet does not let himself be led away into enjoying them to excess and regarding everything else as of secondary consideration; and, we must add, the man who acts for the sake of right and nothing else. . . . For whoever abstains from the excess of such pleasures either from fear or some other such motive is not temperate. For neither do we call the other animals temperate except man, because there is not reason in them whereby they test and choose the right. For every virtue is concerned with and aims at the right. So temperance will be concerned with pleasures and pains, and these those that occur in touch and taste.

22 Next to this it behoves us to speak about the definition and sphere of gentleness. Gentleness, then, is in a mean between irascibility and a want of anger. And generally the virtues seem to be a kind of means. One can show that they are so in this way as well. For if the best is in the mean, and virtue is the best state [and the mean is best], virtue will be the mean. But it will be more plain as we inquire into them separately. For since he is irascible who gets angry with everybody and under all circumstances and to too great an extent, and such a one is blameworthy (for one ought not to be angry with everybody nor at everything nor under all circumstances and always, nor yet again on the other hand[1] ought one to be in such a state as never to be angry with anybody; for this character also is blameworthy, as being insensible),

23–41 = *E. N.* 1125ᵇ 26–1126ᵃ 8 = *E. E.* 1231ᵇ 5–26.

[1] Reading *αὖ* for *οὖ*, which is evidently a misprint.

since then both he who is in the excess is blameworthy and he who is in the defect, the man who is in the mean between them will be gentle and praiseworthy. For neither he who is in defect in anger nor he who is in excess is praiseworthy, but he who stands in a mean with regard to these things. He is gentle; and gentleness will be a mean state with regard to these feelings.[1]

23 Liberality is a mean state between prodigality and illiberality. Feelings of this sort have to do with property. The prodigal is he who spends on wrong objects and more than he ought and at wrong times, while the illiberal man, in the opposite way to him, is he who does not spend on right objects and as much as he ought and when he ought. And both these characters are blameworthy. And one of them is characterized by defect and the other by excess. The liberal man, therefore, since he is praiseworthy, will be in a mean between them. Who, then, is he? He who spends on right objects and right amounts and at right times.

24 There are several forms of illiberality; for instance, we call some people *niggards* and *cheese-parers*, and *lovers of base gain*, and *penurious*. Now all these fall under the head of illiberality. For evil is multiform, but good uniform; for instance, health is single, but disease has many shapes. In the same way virtue is single, but vice has many shapes. For all these characters are blameworthy in relation to property.

Is it, then, the business of the liberal man also to get and procure property? Surely not! That sort of thing is not the business of any virtue at all. It is not the business of courage to make weapons, but of something else, but it is the business of this when it has got them to make a right use of them; and so in the case of temperance and the other virtues. This, then, is not the

42–1192a 20 = *E. N.* 1119b 22–1122a 17 = *E. E.* 1231b 28–1232a 18. 8–10 = *E. N.* 1121b 21–28 = *E. E.* 1232a 10–18. 11–14 = *E. N.* 1106b 29–31.

[1] Putting the full stop after *ταῦτα* instead of after *πρᾶος*.

business of liberality, but rather of the art of procuring property.

25 Greatness of soul is a mean between vanity and littleness of soul, and it has to do with honour and dishonour, not so much with honour from the many as with that from the good, and more indeed with this. For the good will bestow honour with knowledge and good judgement. He will wish then rather to be honoured by those who know as he does himself that he deserves honour. For he will not be concerned with every honour, but with the best, and with the good that is honourable and ranks as a principle. Those, then, who are despicable and bad, but who deem themselves worthy of great things, and besides that think that they ought to be honoured, are vain. But those who deem themselves worthy of less than befits them are men of little soul. The man, therefore, who is in the mean between these is he who neither deems himself worthy of less honour than is befitting to him, nor of greater than he deserves, nor of all. And he is the man of great soul. So that it is evident that greatness of soul is a mean between vanity and littleness of soul.

26 Magnificence is a mean between ostentation and shabbiness. Now magnificence has to do with expenses which are proper to be incurred by a man of eminence. Whoever therefore spends on the wrong occasions is ostentatious; for instance, one who feasts his dinner-club as though he were giving a wedding-banquet, such a person is ostentatious (for the ostentatious man is the sort of person who shows off his own means on the wrong occasion). But the shabby man is the opposite of this, who fails to make a great expenditure when he ought;[1] or if, without going to that length, when, for instance, he is spending money on a wedding-feast or the mounting of

1192b

21–36 = *E. N.* 1123a 34–1125a 35 = *E. E.* 1232a 19–1233a 30. 37–b 17 = *E. N.* 1122a 18–1123a 33.

[1] The meaning would be better expressed by saying, 'who, when he ought to make a great expenditure, fails to spend at all'. This, however, would require us to read ὃς οὐ δεῖ μεγαλείως, μὴ δαπανήσει.

a play, he does it in an unworthy and deficient way, such a person is shabby. Magnificence from its very name shows itself to be such as we are describing. For since it spends the great amount on the fitting occasion, it is rightly called magnificence. Magnificence, then, since it is praiseworthy, is a mean between defect and excess with regard to proper expenses on the right occasions.

But there are, as people think, more kinds of magnificence than one; for instance, people say, 'his gait was magnificent,' and there are of course other uses of the term 'magnificent' in a metaphorical, not in a strict sense. For it is not in those things that magnificence lies, but in those which we have mentioned.

Righteous indignation is a mean state between enviousness and malice.[1] For both these states are blameworthy, but the man who shows righteous indignation is praiseworthy. Now righteous indignation is a kind of pain with regard to good things which are found to attach to the undeserving. The man, then, who feels righteous indignation is he who is apt to feel pain at such things. And this same person again will feel pain, if he sees a man faring ill, who does not deserve it. Righteous indignation, then, and the person who feels it, are perhaps of this sort, but the envious man is the opposite of this. For he will feel pain without distinction as to whether one deserves the good fortune or not. In the same way with him the malicious man will be pleased at ill-fortune, whether deserved or 27

18–29 = *E.N.* 1108b 1–6 = *E.E.* 1233b 18–26.

[1] This is in verbal agreement with *E.N.* ii. 1108b 1, but the *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* there is the man who is so far in the defect of being pained at the prosperity of the wicked, that he even feels pleasure at it, having a disinterested delight in evil. This strained meaning of *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* is discarded in the *Rhetoric* (ii. 1386b 34), but it is the one which is required by the theory of the mean. Here, instead of an excess and defect, we have two different forms of excess over *νέμεσις*. The *νεμεσητικός* is pained at the good fortune of the bad, and in this he is exceeded by the *φθονερός*, who is pained at any one's good fortune; on the other hand, the *νεμεσητικός* is pleased at the ill-fortune of the bad, and in this he is exceeded by the *ἐπιχαιρέκακος*, who is pleased at any one's ill-fortune.

undeserved. Not so with the man who feels righteous indignation, but he is in the mean between these.

28 Reserve is in a mean between pride[1] and complaisance, and has to do with social intercourse. For the proud man is inclined not to meet or talk to anybody (but his name seems to be given to him from his character; for it means self-pleasing, from his gratifying himself); but the complaisant is ready to associate with every one under all circumstances and in all places. Neither of these characters, then, is praiseworthy, but the reserved man, being in the mean between them, is praiseworthy. For he does not lay himself out to please everybody, but only those who are worthy, nor yet nobody, for he does so to these same.

29 Modesty is a mean between shamelessness and bashfulness, and it has to do with deeds and words. For the shameless man is he who says and does anything on any occasion or before any people; but the bashful man is the opposite of this, who is afraid to say or do anything before anybody (for such a man is incapacitated for action, who is bashful about everything); but modesty and the modest man are a mean between these. For he will not say and do anything under any circumstances, like the shameless man, nor, like the bashful man, be afraid on every occasion and under all circumstances, but will say and do what he ought, where he ought, and when he ought. 1193a

30 Wit is a mean state between buffoonery and boorishness, and it is concerned with jests. For the buffoon is he who thinks fit to jest at every one and everything, and the boor is he who neither thinks fit to make jests nor to have them made at him, but gets angry. But the witty man is midway between these, who neither jests at all persons and

30–41 = *E.E.* 1233b 34–38. 1128b 10–35 = *E.E.* 1233b 26–29. 1128b 4 = *E.E.* 1234a 4–23. 1193a 1–10 = *E.N.* 1108a 31–35, 11–19 = *E.N.* 1127b 33–

[1] Neither reserve (*σεμνότης*) nor pride (*αὐθάδεια*) is to be found in *E.N.* They come from *E.E.* (iii. 1233b 34–8). The *ἄρεσκος* in *E.N.* ii. 1108a 28, 29 is the *κόλαξ* minus his interested motive.

under all circumstances, nor on the other hand is a boor. But wit has two sides to it. For both he who is able to jest in good taste and he who can stand being jested at may be called a man of wit. Such, then, is wit.

Friendliness is a mean state between flattery and un- 31
friendliness,[1] and it has to do with acts and words. For the flatterer is he who adds more than is proper and true, while the unfriendly man is hostile and detracts from the truth. Neither of them, then, can rightly be praised, but the friendly man is between the two. For he will not add more than the facts, nor praise what is not proper, nor on the other hand will he represent things as less than they are, nor oppose in all cases even contrary to what he thinks. Such, then, is the friendly man.

Truthfulness is a mean between self-depreciation and 32
boastfulness. It has to do, of course, with words, but not with all words. For the boaster is he who pretends to have more than he has, or to know what he does not know; while the self-depreciator, on the other hand, lays claim to less than he really has and does not declare what he knows, but tries to hide his knowledge. But the truthful man will do neither of these things. For he will not pretend either to more than he has or less, but will say that he has and knows what as a matter of fact he does have and does know.

Whether, then, these are virtues or not is another question. But that they are means of the above-mentioned states is plain. For those who live according to them are praised.

1193[b] It remains to speak about justice—what it is, in what, 33
and about what.

20–28 = *E. N.* 1126[b] 11–1127[a] 12 = *E. E.* 1233[b] 29–34. 28–35 = *E. N.* 1127[a] 13–[b] 32 = *E. E.* 1233[b] 38–1234[a] 3. 36–38 = *E. E.* 1234[a] 24–30. 39–[b] 3 = *E. N.* 1129[a] 3–5.

[1] This term (ἔχθρα) comes from Eudemus (iii. 1233[b] 30), who, in his table (ii. 1220[b] 38–1221[a] 12), splits up Aristotle's φιλία into two qualities, thus—

Excess.	Mean.	Defect.
κολακεία	φιλία	ἀπέχθεια
ἀρέσκεια	σεμνότης	αὐθάδεια

First, then, if we could fix upon what justice is. Justice is twofold, of which one kind is legal justice. For people say that what the law commands is just. Now the law commands us to act bravely and temperately, and generally to perform the actions which come under the head of the virtues. For which reason also, they say, justice appears to be a kind of perfect virtue. For if the things which the law commands us to do are just, and the law ordains what is in accordance with all virtues, it follows that he who abides by legal justice will be perfectly virtuous, so that the just man and justice are a kind of perfect virtue.

The just, then, in one sense is in these things and about these things. But it is not the just in this sense, nor the justice which deals with these things, of which we are in search. For in respect of just conduct of this sort it is possible to be just when one is alone (for the temperate and the brave and the self-controlled is so each of them when alone). But what is just towards one's neighbour is different from the legal justice that has been spoken of. For in things just towards one's neighbour it is not possible to be just when alone. But it is the just in this sense of which we are in search, and the justice which has to do with these things.

The just, then, in relation to one's neighbour is, speaking generally, the equal. For the unjust is the unequal. For when people assign more of the goods to themselves and less of the evils, this is unequal, and in that case they think that injustice is done and suffered. It is evident, therefore, that since injustice implies unequal things, justice and the just will consist in an equality of contracts. So that it is evident that justice will be a mean between excess and defect, between too much and too little. For the unjust man by doing wrong has more, and his victim by being wronged has less; but the mean between these is just. And the mean is equal. So that the equal between more and less will be just, and he will be just who wishes to have what is

3–18 = *E. N.* 1129[a] 26–[b] 1. 19–32 = *E. N.* 1129[a] 32–[b] 10, 1131[a] 10–15.

equal. But the equal implies two things at least. To be equal therefore in relation to one's neighbour is just, and a man of this sort will be just.

Since, then, justice consists in just and equal dealing and in a mean, we must notice that the just is said to be just as between certain persons, and the equal is a relation between certain persons, and the mean is a mean for certain persons; so that justice and the just will have relation to certain persons and be between certain persons.

Since, then, the just is equal, the proportionally equal will be just. Now proportion implies four terms at least: A : B : : C : D. For instance, it is proportional that he who 1194[a] has much should contribute much, and that he who has little should contribute little; again, in the same way, that he who has worked much should receive much, and that he who has worked little should receive little. But as the man who has worked is to the man who has not worked, so is the much to the little; and as the man who has worked is to the much, so is the man who has not worked to the little. Plato also seems to employ proportional justice in his *Republic*.[1] For the farmer, he says, produces food, and the housebuilder a house, and the weaver a cloak, and the shoemaker a shoe. Now the farmer gives the housebuilder food, and the housebuilder gives the farmer a house; and in the same way all the rest exchange their products against those of others. And this is the proportion. As the farmer is to the housebuilder, so is the housebuilder to the farmer. In the same way with the shoemaker, the weaver, and all the rest, the same proportion holds towards one another. And this proportion holds the commonwealth together. So that the just seems to be the proportional. For the just holds commonwealths together, and the just is the same thing as the proportional.

But since the work which the housebuilder produces is of more value than that of the shoemaker, and the shoe-

33–38 = *E. N.* 1131[a] 14–20. 1194[a] 18–25 = *E. N.* 1133[a] 19–29.

[1] 369 D.

maker had to exchange[1] his work with the housebuilder, but it was not possible to get a house for shoes; under these circumstances they had recourse to using something for which all these things are purchasable, to wit silver, which they called money, and to effecting their mutual exchanges by each paying the worth of each product, and thereby holding the political communion together.

Since, then, the just is in those things and in what was mentioned before, the justice which is concerned with these things will be an habitual impulse[2] attended with purpose about and in these things.

Retaliation also is just; not, however, as the Pythagoreans maintained. For they thought that it was just that a man should suffer in return what he had done. But this cannot be the case in relation to all persons. For the same thing is not just for a domestic as for a freeman. For if the domestic has struck the freeman, it is not just that he should merely be struck in return, but many times. And retaliatory justice, also, consists in proportion. For as the freeman is to the slave in being superior, so is retaliation to aggression. It will be the same with one freeman in relation to another. For it is not just, if a man has knocked out somebody's eye, merely that he should have his own knocked out, but that he should suffer more, if he is to observe the proportion. For he was the first to begin and did a wrong, and is in the wrong in both ways, so that the acts of injustice are proportional, and for him to suffer more than he did is just.

But since the term 'just' is used in more senses than one, we must determine what kind of justice it is about which our inquiry is.

There is, then, a sort of justice, as they say, for a domestic as against his master, and a son as against his

29–[b]2 = *E. N.* 1133[a] 24–1134[b] 18.

[1] ἦν with the dative seems here to be equivalent to ἔδει with the accusative. ἔργον in such a context can hardly be anything but the object after ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι.

[2] Lit. 'possessed by habit of an impulse'. But perhaps we should read τις ἕξις (Spengel).

father. But the just in these cases would seem only to share the name of political justice without sharing the nature (for the justice about which we are inquiring is political justice); for this above all consists in equality (for citizens are a sort of partners, and tend to be on a par by nature, though they differ in character), but a son as against his father or a domestic against his master would not seem to have any rights at all, any more than my foot or my hand has any rights against me, and in the same way with each of the members. The same, then, would seem to be the case with the son as against his father. For the son is, as it were, a part of his father, except when he has already attained to the position of a man and has been separated from him; then, and not till then, is he the equal and peer of his father. Now citizens are supposed to be on that footing. And in the same way neither has a domestic any rights as against his master for the same reason. For the domestic is a part of his master. Or if he has any rights as against him, it is in the way of economic justice. But this is not what we are in search of, but political justice; for political justice seems to lie in equality and peerdom. Though, indeed, the justice that there is in the intercourse between wife and husband comes near to political justice. For the wife is inferior to the husband, but more intimately connected with him, and partakes in a way more of equality, because their life is an approximation to political society, so that justice between man and wife is more than any other like that between citizens. Since, then, the just is that which is found in political society, justice also and the just man will be concerned with the politically just.

Things are just either by nature or by law. But we must not regard the natural as being something which cannot by any possibility change; for even the things which are by nature partake of change. I mean, for instance, if we were all to practise always throwing with the left hand, we should become ambidextrous. But still by nature left is left, and the right is none the less naturally superior to the left hand, even if we do everything with

the left as we do with the right. Nor because things change does it follow that they are not by nature. But if for the most part and for the greater length of time the left continues thus to be left and the right right, this is by nature. The same is the case with things just by 1195[a] nature. Do not suppose that, if things change owing to our use, there is not therefore a natural justice; because there is. For that which continues for the most part can plainly be seen to be naturally just. As to what we establish for ourselves and practise, that is thereby just, 5 and we call it just according to law. Natural justice, then, is better than legal. But what we are in search of is political justice. Now the politically just is the legal, not the natural.

The unjust and the unjust act might seem on first hearing to be the same, but they are not. For the unjust is that which is determined by law; for instance, it is 10 unjust to steal a deposit, but the unjust act is the actual doing of something unjustly. And in the same way the just is not the same with a piece of just conduct. For the just is what is determined by law, but a piece of just conduct is the doing of just deeds.

When, therefore, have we the just, and when not? Generally speaking, when one acts in accordance with 15 purpose and voluntarily (what was meant by the voluntary has been stated by us above[1]), and when one does so knowing the person, the means, and the end, those are the conditions of a just act. In the very same way the unjust man will be he who knows the person, the means, and the end. But when without knowing any of these things one has done something that is unjust, one is not unjust oneself, 20 but unfortunate. For if a man has slain his father under the idea that he was slaying an enemy, though he has done something that is unjust, still he is not doing injustice to anybody, but is unfortunate.

The possibility, then, of not committing injustice when

1195[a] 8–14 = *E. N.* 1135[a] 5–15. 15–22 = *E. N.* 1135[a] 15–31.

[1] See chs. 12–16.

one does things that are unjust lies in being ignorant of what was mentioned a little above, viz. when one does not know whom one is hurting, nor with what, nor to what end. But we must now define the ignorance, and say how the ignorance must arise if a man is not to be doing an injustice to the person whom he hurts. Let this, then, be the definition. When the ignorance is the cause of his doing something, he does not do this voluntarily, so that he does not commit injustice; but when he is himself the cause of his ignorance and does something in accordance with the ignorance of which he is himself the cause, then he is guilty of injustice, and such a person will justly be called unjust. Take for instance people who are drunk. Those who are drunk and have done something bad commit injustice. For they are themselves the causes of their ignorance. For they need not have drunk so much as not to know that they were beating their father. Similarly with the other sorts of ignorance which are due to men themselves, the people who commit injustice from them are unjust. But where they are not themselves the causes, but their ignorance is the cause of their doing what they do, they are not unjust. This sort of ignorance is that which comes from nature; for instance, children strike
1195[b] their parents in ignorance, but the ignorance which is in them being due to nature does not make the children to be called unjust owing to this conduct. For it is ignorance which is the cause of their behaving thus, and they are not themselves to blame for their ignorance, for which reason they are not called unjust either.

But how about being injured? Can a man be injured voluntarily? Surely not! We do indeed voluntarily perform just and unjust acts, but we cannot be said to be injured voluntarily. For we avoid being punished, so that it is evident that we would not voluntarily let ourselves be injured. For no one voluntarily endures to be hurt. Now to be injured is to be hurt.

Yes, but there are some who, when they ought to have an equal share, give way to others, so that if, as we have

32–38: cf. *E.N.* 1113[b] 30–1114[a] 3. [b] 5–34 = *E.N.* 1136[a] 15–[b] 14.

seen,[1] to have the equal is just, and to have less is to be injured, and a man voluntarily has less, it follows, it is maintained, that he is injured voluntarily. But from the following consideration it is evident, on the other hand, that this is not so. For all who accept less get compensation for it in the way of honour, or praise, or glory, or friendship, or something of that sort. But he who takes compensation of some kind for what he forgoes cannot be said to be injured; and if he is not injured at all, then he is not injured voluntarily.

Yet again, those who get less and are injured in so far as they do not get what is equal, pride and plume themselves on such things, for they say, 'Though I might have had my share, I did not take it, but gave way to an elder' or 'to a friend'. But no one prides himself on being injured. But if they do not pride themselves upon suffering acts of injustice and do pride themselves upon such things, it follows generally that they will not be injured by thus getting less. And if they are not injured at all, then they will not be injured voluntarily.

But as against these and the like arguments[2] we have a counter-argument in the case of the incontinent man. For the incontinent man hurts himself by doing bad acts, and these acts he does voluntarily; he therefore hurts himself knowingly, so that he is voluntarily injured by himself. But here if we add the distinction,[3] it will impede the force of the argument. And the distinction is this, that no one wishes to be injured. The incontinent man does with his own wish[4] what is prompted by his incontinence, so that he injures himself; he therefore wishes to do to himself what is bad. But no one wishes to be injured, so that even the incontinent man will not voluntarily be doing an injury to himself.

But here again one might perhaps raise a difficulty. Is

35–1196a 24 = *E. N.* 1136a 34, 1138a 4–28.

[1] 1193b 19–24. [2] Reading *τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους* (MSS.).
[3] 1195a 29 keeping *ὁ*, with the MSS.
[4] This is said only for the sake of argument. Contrast *E. N.* v. 1136b 6 *οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής.*

it possible for a man to be unjust to himself? Judging from the incontinent man it would seem possible. And, again, in this way. If it is just to do those things which the law ordains to be done, he who does not do these is
1196[a] committing injustice; and if when he does not do them to him to whom the law commands, he is doing an injustice to that person, but the law commands one to be temperate, to possess property, to take care of one's body, and all other such things, then he who does not do these things
5 is doing an injustice to himself. For it is not possible to refer such acts of injustice to any one else.

But these statements can hardly have been true, nor is it possible for a man to be unjust to himself. For it is not possible for the same man at the same time to have more and less, nor at once to act voluntarily and involuntarily. But yet he who does injustice, in so far as he does
10 it, has more, and he who suffers it, in so far as he suffers it, has less. If therefore a man does injustice to himself, it is possible for the same man at the same time to have more and less. But this is impossible. It is not therefore possible for a man to be unjust to himself.

Again, he who does injustice does it voluntarily, and he who suffers it suffers it involuntarily, so that, if it is possible
15 for a man to be unjust to himself, it would be possible at the same time to do something involuntarily and voluntarily. But this is impossible. So in this way also it is not possible for a man to be unjust to himself.

Again, one might look at the question from the point of view of particular acts of injustice. Whenever men commit injustice, it is either by stealing a deposit, or
20 committing adultery, or thieving, or doing some other particular act of injustice; but no one ever robbed himself of a deposit, or committed adultery with his own wife, or stole his own property; so that if the commission of injustice lies in such things, and it is not possible to do any of them to oneself, it will not be possible to commit injustice against oneself.

25 Or if so, it will not be an act of injustice of the political,

25–33 = *E.N.* 1138[b] 9–14.

but rather of the family type. For the soul being divided into several parts has in itself a something better and a something worse, so that if there is any act of injustice within the soul, it will be done by the parts against one another. Now we distinguished[1] the economic act of injustice by its being directed against the better or worse, so that in this sense a man may be unjust or just to himself. But this is not what we are investigating, but the political act of injustice. So that in such acts of injustice as form the subject of our inquiry, it is not possible for a man to commit injustice against himself.

Which of the two, again, commits injustice, and with which of the two does the act of injustice lie, when a man has anything unjustly? Is it not with him who has judged and made the award, as in the games? For he who takes the palm from the president who has adjudged it to him is not committing injustice, even if it be wrongly awarded to him; but without doubt it is he who has judged badly and given it who is in the wrong. And he is in a way committing injustice, while in a way he is not. For in that he has not judged what is really and naturally just, he is committing an injustice, while in that he has judged what appears to him to be just, he is not committing an injustice.

34 Now since we have spoken about the virtues in general, saying what they are and in what and about what, and about each of them in particular, how that we must do the best in accordance with right reason,[2] to say no more than this, namely, 'to act in accordance with right reason,' would be much the same as if one were to say that health would be best secured, if one were to adopt the means of health. Such a statement is of course obscure. I shall have it said to me, 'Explain what are the means of health.' So also in the case of reason, 'What is reason and which is right reason?'

34–[b]3 = *E.N.* 1136[b] 15–1137[a] 4. 4–11 = *E.N.* 1138[b] 18–34.

[1] 1194[b] 5–29.
[2] The author has not mentioned 'right reason' before.

Perhaps it is necessary first of all to make a division of that in which reason is found. A distinction, indeed, was made in outline[1] about soul before, how that one part of it is possessed of reason, while there is another part of the soul that is irrational. But the part of the soul which is possessed of reason has two divisions, of which one is the deliberative faculty, the other the faculty by which we know. That they are different from one another will be evident from their subject-matter. For as colour and flavour and sound and smell are different from one another, so also nature has rendered the senses whereby we perceive them different (for sound we cognise by hearing, flavour by taste, and colour by sight), and in like manner we must suppose it to be the same with all other things. When, then, the subject-matters are different, we must suppose that the parts of the soul whereby we cognise these are also different. Now there is a difference between the object of thought and the object of sense; and these we cognise by soul. The part of the soul, therefore, which is concerned with objects of sense will be different from that which is concerned with objects of thought. But the faculty of deliberation and purpose has to do with objects of sense that are liable to change, and generally all that is subject to generation and destruction. For we deliberate about those things which depend upon us and our purpose to do or not to do, about which there is deliberation and purpose as to whether to do them or not. And these are sensible objects which are in process of change. So that the part of the soul in which purpose resides will correspond to sensible objects.

These points having been settled, we must go on as follows. The question is one of truth, and the subject of our inquiry is how the truth stands, and we have to do with science, wisdom, intellect, philosophy, supposition. What, then, is the object of each of these?

Now science deals with the object of science, and this

12–33 = *E.N.* 1138[b] 35–1139[a] 15. 34–38 = *E.N.* 1139[b] 15–17. 38–1197[a] 2 = *E.N.* 1139[b] 31–36.

[1] 1185[b] 1–12.

through a process accompanied with demonstration and reason, but wisdom with matters of action, in which there 1197a is choice and avoidance, and it is in our power to do or not to do.

When things are made and done, that which makes and that which does them are not the same. For the arts of making have some other end beyond the making; for instance, beyond housebuilding, since that is the art of making a house, there is a house as its end beyond the making, and similarly in the case of carpentry and the other arts of making; but in the processes of doing there is no other end beyond the doing; for instance, beyond playing the harp there is no other end, but just this is the end, the activity and the doing. Wisdom, then, is concerned with doing and things done, but art with making and things made; for it is in things made rather than in things done that artistic contrivance is displayed.

So that wisdom will be a state of purposing and doing things which it is in our own power to do or not to do, so far as they are of actual importance to welfare.

Wisdom is a virtue, it would seem, not a science. For the wise are praiseworthy, and praise is bestowed on virtue. Again, every science has its virtue, but wisdom has no virtue, but, as it seems, is itself[1] a virtue.

Intellect has to do with the first principles of things intelligible and real. For science has to do with things that admit of demonstration, but the principles are indemonstrable, so that it will not be science but intellect that is concerned with the principles.

Philosophy is compounded of science and intellect. For philosophy has to do both with the principles and with what can be proved from the principles, with which science deals. In so far, then, as it deals with the principles, it itself partakes of intellect, but in so far as it deals with demonstrative conclusions from the principles, it partakes

3–13 = *E.N.* 1140a 1–6, b 1–4. 14–16 = *E.N.* 1140b 4–6. 16–19: cf. *E.N.* 1140b 22. 17: cf. *E.N.* 1103a 8, 9. 20–23 = *E.N.* 1140b 31–1141a 8. 23–29 = *E.N.* 1141a 9–b 8.

[1] Reading *αὐτή ἐστιν* (coni. Spengel).

of science. So that it is evident that philosophy is compounded of intellect and science, so that it will deal with the same things with which intellect and science do.

Supposition is that whereby we are left in doubt about all things as to whether they are in a particular way or not.

Are wisdom and philosophy the same thing? Surely not! For philosophy has to do with things that can be demonstrated and are eternally the same, but wisdom has not to do with these, but with things that undergo change. I mean, for instance, straight or crooked or convex and the like are always what they are, but things expedient do not follow this analogy, so as never to change into anything else; they do change, and a given thing is expedient now, but not to-morrow, to this man but not to that, and is 1197[b] expedient in this way, but not in that way. Now wisdom has to do with things expedient, but philosophy not. Therefore philosophy and wisdom are not the same.

Is philosophy a virtue or not? It can become plain to us that it is a virtue by merely looking at wisdom. For if wisdom is, as we maintain, the virtue of one of the two rational parts, and wisdom is inferior to philosophy (for its objects are inferior; for philosophy has to do with the eternal and the divine, as we maintain, but wisdom with what is expedient for man), if, then, the inferior thing is a virtue, it is reasonable that the better should be a virtue, so that it is evident that philosophy is a virtue.

What is intelligence, and with what is it concerned? The sphere of intelligence is the same as that of wisdom, having to do with matters of action. For the intelligent man is doubtless so called from his capacity for deliberation, and in that he judges and sees a thing rightly. But his judgement is about small things and on small occasions. Intelligence, then, and the intelligent man are a part of wisdom and the wise man, and cannot be found apart from these; for you cannot separate the intelligent from the wise man.

The case would seem to be the same with cleverness.

32-[b]3 = *E. N.* 1141[a]22-28. 11-17 = *E. N.* 1142[b]34-1143[a]18.
18-26 = *E. N.* 1144[a]23-37.

For cleverness and the clever man are not wisdom and the wise man; the wise man, however, is clever, wherefore also cleverness co-operates in a way with wisdom. But the bad man also is called clever; for instance, Mentor was thought to be clever, but he was not wise. For it is the part of the wise man and of wisdom to aim at the best things, and always to purpose and do these, but it is the part of cleverness and the clever man to consider by what means each object of action may be effected, and to provide these. Such, then, would seem to be the surroundings and sphere of the clever man.

It may raise a question and cause surprise that, when speaking of ethics and dealing with a department of statecraft, we are speaking about philosophy. Perhaps the reason is, firstly, that the inquiry about it will not appear foreign to our subject, if it is a virtue, as we maintain. Again, it is perhaps the part of the philosopher to glance also at subjects adjacent to his main interest. And it is necessary, when we are speaking about the contents of soul, to speak about them all; now philosophy is also in soul; so that we are not going beyond our proper subject in speaking about it.[1]

But as cleverness is to wisdom, so it would seem to be in the case of all the virtues. What I mean is that there are virtues which spring up even by nature in different persons, a sort of impulses in the individual, apart from reason, to courageous and just conduct and the like behaviour in accordance with virtue; and there are also 1198[a] virtues due to habit and purpose. But the virtues that are accompanied with reason, when they supervene, are completely praiseworthy.

Now this natural virtue which is unaccompanied by reason, so long as it remains apart from reason, is of little account, and falls short of being praised, but when added to reason and purpose, it makes perfect virtue. Wherefore also the natural impulse to virtue co-operates with reason

36–1198[a] 9 = *E. N.* 1144[b] 1–17.

[1] The text is here unsound. Susemihl says of ψυχῆς, which appears in his text, that it is *aut lacunosum aut corruptum.*

and is not apart from reason. Nor, on the other hand, are reason and purpose quite perfected as regards being virtue without the natural impulse.

Wherefore Socrates was not speaking correctly when he said that virtue was reason, thinking that it was no use doing brave and just acts, unless one did them from knowledge and rational purpose. This was why he said that virtue was reason. Herein he was not right, but the men of the present day say better; for they say that virtue is doing what is good in accordance with right reason. Even they, indeed, are not right. For one might do what is just without any purpose at all or knowledge of the good, but from an irrational impulse, and yet do this rightly and in accordance with right reason (I mean he may have acted in the way that right reason would command); but all the same, this sort of conduct does not merit praise. But it is better to say, according to our definition, that it is the accompaniment by reason of the impulse to good. For that is virtue and that is praiseworthy.

The question might be raised whether wisdom is a virtue or not. It will be evident, however, from the following consideration that it is a virtue. For if justice and courage and the rest of the virtues, because they lead to the doing of right, are also praiseworthy, it is evident that wisdom will also be among the things that are praiseworthy and that rank as virtues. For wisdom also has an impulse towards those acts which courage has an impulse to do. For, speaking generally, courage acts as wisdom ordains, so that if it is itself praiseworthy for doing what wisdom ordains, wisdom will be in a perfect degree both praiseworthy and virtue.

But whether wisdom is practical or not one might see from this, namely, by looking at the sciences, for instance at housebuilding. For there is, as we say, in housebuilding one person who is called an architect, and another, who is subordinate to him, a housebuilder; and he is capable of making a house. But the architect also, inasmuch as he made the house, is capable of making a house. And the

10–21 = *E. N.* 1144b 18–30.

case is the same in all the other productive arts, in which there is a master-craftsman and his subordinate. The 1198b master-craftsman therefore also will be capable of making something, and that the same thing which his subordinate is capable of making. If, then, the analogy holds in the case of the virtues, as is likely and reasonable, wisdom also will be practical. For all the virtues are practical, and 5 wisdom is a kind of master-craftsman of them. For as it shall ordain, so the virtues and the virtuous act. Since then the virtues are practical, wisdom also will be practical.

But does this hold sway over all things in the soul, as is held and also questioned? Surely not! For it would not 10 seem to do so over what is superior to itself; for instance, it does not hold sway over philosophy. But, it is said, this has charge of all, and is supreme in issuing commands. But perhaps it holds the same position as the steward in the household. For he is supreme over all and manages everything. But it does not follow that he holds sway over all; instead of that he is procuring leisure for the 15 master, in order that he may not be hindered by necessary cares and so shut out from doing something that is noble and befitting. So and in like manner with him wisdom is, as it were, a kind of steward of philosophy, and is procuring leisure for it and for the doing of its work, by subduing the passions and keeping them in order. 20

1198b 9–20 = *E. N.* 1143b 33–36, 1145a 6–11.

BOOK II

AFTER this we must inquire into equity. What is it? 1
And what is its field and sphere? The equitable man with his equity is he who is inclined to take less than his legal rights. There are matters in which it is impossible for the lawgiver to enter into exact details in defining, and where he has to content himself with a general statement. When, then, a man gives way in these matters, and chooses those things which the lawgiver would have wished indeed to determine in detail,[1] but was not able to, such a man is equitable. It is not the way with him to take less than what is just absolutely; for he does not fall short of what is naturally and really just, but only of what is legally just in matters which the law left undetermined for want of power.

Considerateness[2] and the considerate man have to do 2
with the same things as equity, with points of justice that have been omitted by the lawgiver owing to the inexactness of his definitions. The considerate man criticizes the omissions of the lawgiver, and knows that, though things have been omitted by the lawgiver, they are nevertheless
1199a just. Such is the considerate man. Now considerateness is not found apart from equity. To the considerate man it belongs to judge, and to the equitable man to act in accordance with the judgement.

Good counsel is concerned with the same things as 3
wisdom (dealing with matters of action which concern

24–33 = *E. N.* 1137a 31–1138a 3. 34–1199a 3 = *E. N.* 1143a 19–24.
4–13 = *E. N.* 1142a 32–b 33.

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[1] τῷ καθ' ἕκαστα. The τῷ is not required before καθ' ἕκαστα. But there was a growing tendency in Hellenistic Greek to prefix the article to such phrases.

[2] The Greek is εὐγνωμοσύνη, corresponding to the γνώμη of *E. N.* vi. 1143a 19. Εὐγνωμοσύνη is among the concomitants of virtue in *De Virtutibus et Vitiis*, 1251b 34. It does not appear in Eudemus.

choice and avoidance), and it is not found apart from wisdom. For wisdom leads to the doing of these things, while good counsel is a state or disposition, or whatever you are pleased to call it, which leads to the attainment of the best and most expedient in matters of action. Hence things that turn out right spontaneously do not seem to form the subject of good counsel. For where there is no reason which is on the look-out for what is best, you would not in that case say that a man to whom something turned out as it should be was well counselled, but lucky. For things that go right without the judgement of reason are due to good luck.

Is it the part of the just man to put himself on a level with everybody in his intercourse (I mean in the way of becoming all things to all men)? Surely not! For this would seem to be the part of a flatterer and obsequious person. But to suit his intercourse to the worth of each, this would seem to be the part of the man who is absolutely just and virtuous.

Here is also a difficulty that might be raised. If doing injustice is hurting somebody voluntarily and with full knowledge of the person and the manner and the end, and harm and injustice are in and concerned with good things, it follows that the doer of injustice and the unjust man will know what kind of things are good and what bad. But to know about these things is a peculiar property of the wise man and of wisdom. The absurdity then follows that wisdom, which is the greatest good, is attendant upon the unjust man. Surely it will not be thought that wisdom is attendant upon the unjust man. For the unjust man does not discern and is not able to judge between what is good in itself and what is good for him, but makes a mistake. But this is the province of wisdom, to be able to take a right view of these things (just as in matters of medicine we all know what is absolutely wholesome and what is productive of health, that hellebore and an aperient and surgery and cautery are wholesome and productive of health, and yet we do not possess the science of medicine), for without it we no longer know what is

good in particular cases, just as the doctor knows for whom a given thing is good and when and in what disposition; for herein the science of medicine displays itself. Now we may know things that are absolutely wholesome, and yet not have the science of medicine
1199[b] attendant upon us; and the same is the case with the unjust man. That in an absolute sense autocracy and government and power are good, he knows; but whether they are good for him or not, or when, or in what condition, that is what he does not also know. But this is just the
5 business of wisdom, so that wisdom does not attend upon the unjust man. For the goods which he chooses and for which he commits injustice are what are absolutely good, not what are good for him. For wealth and office are good in themselves, but for him perhaps they are not good; for by obtaining wealth and office he will do much evil to himself and his friends, for he will not be able to make a right use of office.

10 Here also is a point which presents a difficulty and suggests inquiry. Can injustice be done to a bad man or not? For if injustice consists in hurt, and hurt in the deprivation of goods, it would seem not to hurt him. For the goods which he supposes to be good for him are not
15 really so. For office and wealth will hurt the bad man who is not able to make a right use of them. If then they will hurt him by their presence, he who deprives him of these would not seem to be doing him an injustice. This kind of argument indeed will appear a paradox to the many. For all think that they are able to use office and power and wealth, but they are not right in this supposition.
20 This is made plain by the lawgiver. For the lawgiver does not allow all to hold office, but there is a standard of age and means which must be possessed by him who is to hold office, implying that it is not possible for every one to do so. If then some one were to make it a grievance that he does not hold office or that he is not allowed to steer the
25 ship, the answer would be, 'Well, you have nothing in your soul of a kind which will enable you to hold office or steer the ship.' In the case of the body we see that those can-

not be in good health who apply to themselves things that are absolutely good, but if a man is to have his bad body in health, he must first apply to it water and a low diet. And when a man has his soul in a vicious state, in order that he may not work any ill must we not withhold him from wealth and office and power and things of that sort generally, the more so as soul is easier to move and more ready to change than body? For as the man whose body was bad was fit to be dieted in that way, so the man whose soul is bad is fit to live thus, without having any things of this sort.

This also presents a difficulty. For instance, when it is not possible at the same time to do brave and just acts, which is one to do? Now in the case of the natural virtues we said that there existed only the impulse to right without reason; but he who has choice has it in reason and the rational part. So that as soon as choice is present, perfect virtue will be there, which we said[1] was accompanied by wisdom, but not without the natural impulse to right. Nor will one virtue run counter to another, for its nature is to obey the dictates of reason, so that it inclines to that to which reason leads. For it is this which chooses the better. For the other virtues do not come into existence without wisdom, nor is wisdom perfect without the other virtues, but they co-operate in a way with one another, attending upon wisdom. 1200[a]

Nor less will the following present itself as a difficulty. Is it in the case of the virtues as it is in the case of the other goods, whether external or bodily? For these when they run to excess make men worse; for instance, when wealth becomes great it makes men supercilious and disagreeable. And so also with the other goods—office, honour, beauty, stature. Is it, then, thus in the case of virtue also, so that, if one comes to have justice or courage to excess, he will be worse? Surely not![2] But, it will be said, from virtue comes honour, and when honour be-

[1] 1197[b] 36–1198[a] 21.

[2] Instead of supplying another *οὔ*, we want to get rid of the *φησίν*, which may have crept in from below. *ἢ οὔ* is carried out below by *ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀληθές*;

comes great, it makes men worse, so that it is evident that virtue when progressing to a great extent will make men worse. For virtue is the cause of honour, so that virtue also, if it becomes great, will make men worse. Surely this cannot be true! For virtue, though it may have many other functions, as it has, has this among the most special, to be able to make a right use of these and the like goods when they are there. If therefore the good man on there coming to him high honour or high office shall not make a right use of these, it shows that he is not a good man. Therefore neither honour nor office will make the good man worse, so that neither will virtue. But generally, since it was laid down by us at the start[1] that the virtues are mean states, it follows that the more any state is a virtue, the more it is a mean; so that not only will virtue as it becomes great not make a man worse, but it will make him better. For the mean in question was found[2] to be the mean between excess and defect in the passions. So much then for these matters.

4 After this we must make a new start and speak about self-control and its opposite. But as the virtue and the vice are themselves of a strange nature, so the discussion which will ensue about them must necessarily be strange also. For this virtue is not like the rest. For in the rest reason and passion have an impulse towards the same objects and are not opposed to one another, but in the case of this reason and passion are opposed to one another. There are three things in the soul in respect of which we are called bad—vice, incontinence, brutality. About virtue and vice, then, their nature and their sphere, we have spoken above;[3] but now we must speak about incontinence and brutality.

5 Brutality is a kind of excessive vice. For when we see some one utterly degraded, we say that he is not even a man but a brute, implying that there is a vice of brutality.

1200a 36–b 8 = *E. N.* 1145a 15–17. b 9–19 = *E. N.* 1145a 18–33.

[1] 1185b 13–32, 1186a 9–35, cf. 1186a 36–1187a 4. [2] 1186a 9–35.
[3] 1185a 14–1200a 34.

Now the virtue opposed to this is without a name, but this sort of thing is above man, a kind of heroic and divine virtue. But this virtue is without a name, because virtue does not belong to God. For God is superior to virtue and it is not in the way of virtue that his goodness lies. For, if it were, virtue would be better than God. For this reason the virtue which is opposed to the vice of brutality is without a name. But the usual antithesis to this kind of vice is divine and superhuman virtue. For as the vice of brutality transcends man, so also does the virtue opposed to it.

6 But with regard to incontinence and self-control we must first state the difficulties and the arguments which run counter to appearances, in order that, having viewed the matter together from the point of view of the difficulties and counter-arguments, and having examined these, we may see the truth about them so far as possible; for it will be more easy to see the truth in that way.

Now Socrates of old[1] used to annul and deny incontinence altogether, saying that no one would choose evil who knew it to be such. But the incontinent seems, while knowing things to be bad, to choose them all the same, letting himself be led by passion. Owing to such considerations he did not think that there was incontinence. But there he was wrong. For it is absurd that conviction of the truth of this argument should lead to the annulment of a fairly established fact. For men do display lack of self-control, and do things which they themselves know to be bad.

Since, then, there is such a thing as lack of self-control, does the incontinent possess some knowledge whereby he views and examines his bad acts? But, again, this would

20–24 = *E. N.* 1145ᵇ 21–31. 25–32 = *E. N.* 1145ᵇ 21–31.

[1] ὁ πρεσβύτης seems to be an instance of the well-known confusion of thought between living long and living long ago, which leads Horace (*Sat.* II. i. 34) to call Lucilius *senex*—

quo fit ut omnis
votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
vita senis.

As a matter of fact, Lucilius died prematurely.

For Σωκράτης ὁ πρεσβύτης or γέρων cf. *E. E.* 1216ᵇ 3, 1235ᵃ 37.

not seem so. For it would be strange that the strongest and surest thing in us should be vanquished by anything. For knowledge is of all things in us the most permanent and the most constraining. So that this argument again runs counter to there being knowledge.[1]

Is it then not knowledge, but opinion? But if the incontinent man only has opinion, he will not be blame-
1201a worthy. For if he does something bad with respect to which he has no exact knowledge but only an opinion, one would make allowances for his siding with pleasure and doing what is bad, if he does not know for certain that it is bad, but only has an opinion; and those for whom we make allowances we do not blame. So that the incontinent, if he only has opinion, will not be to blame. But he is to blame. Such arguments then land us in difficulties. For one denied knowledge on the ground of absurd consequences, and the other again denied opinion on the ground that there were absurd consequences from that also.

Here is also a difficulty that might be raised. It is held that the temperate man is also self-controlled. Will this involve the temperate man's having vehement appetites? If then he is to be self-controlled, it will be necessary for him to have vehement appetites (for you would not speak of a man as self-controlled who masters moderate appetites); but if he is to have vehement appetites, in that case he will not be temperate (for the temperate is he who does not display appetite or feeling at all).

The following considerations again present a difficulty. For it results from the statements that the man who lacks self-control is sometimes praiseworthy and the man who possesses it blameworthy. For let it be supposed, it may be said, that some one has gone wrong in his reasoning, and let it appear to him as the result of his reasoning that what is right is wrong, but let appetite lead him to the right; then reason indeed will forbid his doing it, but being

38–1201a 9 = *E. N.* 1145b 31–1146a 9. 10–15 = *E. N.* 1145b 14, 15, 1146a 9–16. 16–35 = *E. N.* 1146a 16–21.

[1] Reading, without any marks of lacuna, *ἐναντιοῦται τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην.*

led by appetite he does it (for such we found[1] was the incontinent man); he will therefore do what is right, supposing that appetite leads him thereto (but reason will try to hinder him; for let it be supposed that he is mistaken in his reasoning about right); it follows that he will be lacking in self-control, and yet be praiseworthy; for in so far as he does what is right, he is praiseworthy. The result then is a paradox.

Again, on the other hand, let his reason be mistaken, and let what is right not seem to him to be so, but let appetite lead him to the right. Now he is self-controlled who, though he has an appetite for a thing, yet does not act upon it owing to reason; therefore if his reason is wrong it will hinder him from doing what he has an appetite for;[2] therefore it hinders him from doing what is right (for to that we supposed that his appetite led him); but he who fails to do what is right, when it is his duty to do it, is blameworthy; therefore the man of self-control will sometimes be blameworthy. In this way then also the result is a paradox.

A difficulty might also be raised as to whether lack of self-control and the incontinent man display themselves in and about everything, for instance, property and honour and anger and glory (for people seem to be deficient in self-control with regard to all these things), or whether they do not, but lack of self-control has a certain definite sphere.

The above, then, are the points which present a difficulty; 1201b but it is necessary to solve these difficulties. First, then, that which is connected with knowledge. For it appeared[3] to be an absurdity that one who possessed knowledge should cast it from him or fall away from it. But the same reasoning applies also to opinion; for it makes no difference whether it is opinion or knowledge. For if opinion is intensely firm and unalterable by persuasion,

36–39 = *E. N.* 1146b 2–5. b 1–9 = *E. N.* 1146b 6, 7, 24–31.

[1] 1188a 8 sq., 28 sqq., b 9 sqq., 1200b 27 sq.
[2] Such seems to be the required sense in a corrupt passage.
[3] 1200b 25–1201a 9.

it will not differ at all from knowledge, opinion carrying with it the belief that things are as people opine them to be; for instance, Heraclitus of Ephesus has this sort of opinion about his own dogmas.

But there is no paradox in the incontinent man's doing something bad, whether he has knowledge or opinion such as we describe. For there are two ways of knowing, one of which is the possessing knowledge (for we say that one knows when he possesses knowledge), the other is putting the knowledge into operation. He then who possesses the knowledge of right, but does not operate with it, is incontinent. When, then, he does not operate with this knowledge, it is nothing surprising that he should do what is bad, though he possesses the knowledge. For the case is the same as that of sleepers. For they, though they possess the knowledge, nevertheless in their sleep both do and suffer many disgusting things. For the knowledge is not operative in them. So it is in the case of the incontinent. For he seems like one asleep and does not operate with his knowledge. Thus, then, is the[1] difficulty solved. For the difficulty was whether the incontinent man at the moment of action expels his knowledge or falls away from it, both of which appear paradoxical.

But, again, the thing may be made manifest in this way, as we said in the *Analytics*[2] that the syllogism consists of two premisses, and that of these the first is universal, while the second is subsumed under it and is particular. For instance—

I know how to cure any one with a fever.
This man has a fever.
∴ I know how to cure this man.

Now there are things which I know with the knowledge of the universal, but not with that of the particular. Here then also mistake becomes possible to the man who pos-

9–24 = *E.N.* 1146b 31–35. 24–1202a 1 = *E.N.* 1146b 35–1147a 10.

[1] Reading δὴ ἡ (coni. Susemihl).
[2] Cf. *An. Pr.* i. 24, 25; but it is doubtful whether Aristotle's *Analytics* is actually referred to.

sesses the knowledge, for instance how to cure [1] any one with a fever; whether, however, a given person has a fever, I do not know. Similarly then in the case of the incontinent man who possesses the knowledge the same mistake will arise. For it is possible for the incontinent man to possess the knowledge of the universal, that such and such things are bad and hurtful, but yet not to know that these particular things are bad, so that while possessing knowledge in this way he will go wrong; for he has the universal knowledge, but not the particular. Neither, then, in this way is it at all a surprising result in the case of the incontinent man, that he who has the knowledge should do something bad. 1202[a]

For it is so in the case of persons who are drunk. For those who are drunk, when the intoxication has passed off, are themselves again. Reason was not expelled from them, nor was knowledge, but it was overcome by the intoxication, but when they have got rid of the intoxication, they are themselves again. So, then, it is with the incontinent. His passion gains the mastery and brings his reasoning to a standstill. But when the passion, like the intoxication, has been got rid of, he is himself again.

There was another argument [2] touching incontinence which presented a difficulty as seeming to show that the man who lacks self-control will sometimes be praiseworthy, and the man who possesses it blameworthy. But this is not the case. For the man who is deceived in his reason is neither continent nor incontinent, but only he who possesses right reason and thereby judges of right and wrong, and it is the man who disobeys this kind of reason who lacks self-control, while he who obeys it and is not led by his appetites is self-controlled. If a man does not think it disgraceful to strike his father and has a desire to strike him, but abstains from doing so, he is not a man of self-control. So that, since there is neither self-control nor its opposite in such cases, neither will lack of self-

2–7 = *E. N.* 1147[a] 10–18. 8–18 = *E. N.* 1151[a] 29–[b] 4.

[1] Omitting *ἐπίσταμαι*.

[2] 1201[a] 16–35.

control be praiseworthy nor self-control blameworthy in the way that was thought.

There are forms of incontinence which are morbid and others which are due to nature. For instance, such as these are morbid. There are some people who pluck their hairs and nibble them. If one masters this pleasure, then, he is not praiseworthy, nor blameworthy if he fails to do so, or not very much. As an instance of incontinence due to nature we may take the story of a son who was brought to trial in court for beating his father, and who defended himself by saying, 'Why, he did so to his own father', and, what 's more, who was acquitted, for the judges thought that his going wrong was due to nature. If, then, one were to master the impulse to beat his father, he is not praiseworthy. It is not, then, such forms of incontinence or continence as these of which we are now in search, but those for which we are called blameworthy or praiseworthy without qualification.

Of goods some are external, as wealth, office, honour, friends, glory; others necessary and concerned with the body, for instance, touch and taste [he, then, who is incontinent with respect to these, would appear to be incontinent without qualification[1]] and bodily pleasures. And the incontinence of which we are in search would seem to be concerned with just these. And the difficulty was[2] about the sphere of incontinence. As regards honour, then, a man is not incontinent without qualification; for he who is incontinent with regard to honour is praised in a way, as being ambitious. And generally when we call a man incontinent in the case of such things we do it with some addition, incontinent 'as regards honour or glory or
1202b anger'. But when a man is incontinent in the strict sense we do not add the sphere, it being assumed in his case, and being manifest without the addition, what the sphere is.

19–29 = *E.N.* 1148b 15–30, 1149b 8–11. 30–b 3 = *E.N.* 1148a 22–b 14.

[1] Rassow and Susemihl wish to put these words after 'and bodily pleasures'.

[2] 1201a 35–39.

For he who is incontinent in the strict sense has to do with the pleasures and pains of the body.

It is evident also from the following consideration that incontinence has to do with these things. For since the incontinent man is blameworthy, the subject-matter of his incontinence ought also to be blameworthy. Now honour and glory and office and riches, and the other things with respect to which people are called incontinent, are not blameworthy, whereas bodily pleasures are blameworthy. Therefore, reasonably enough, the man who is concerned with[1] these more than he ought is called incontinent in the complete sense.

Among the so-called 'incontinences' with respect to other things that which is concerned with anger is the most blameworthy. But which is more blameworthy, this or incontinence with regard to pleasures? Now incontinence with regard to anger resembles servants who are eager to minister to one's needs. For they, when the master says 'Give me', are carried away by their eagerness, and before they hear what they ought to give, give something, and give the wrong thing. For often, when they ought to give a book, they give a pen. Something like this is the case with the man who cannot control his anger. For passion, as soon as it hears the first mention of injury, starts up to take vengeance, without waiting to hear whether it ought or ought not, or not so vehemently. This sort of impulse, then, to anger, which appears to be incontinence of anger, is not greatly to be blamed, but the impulse to pleasure is blameworthy. For this latter differs from the former owing to the injunction of reason to abstain, which it nevertheless acts against; for which reason it is more blameworthy than incontinence due to anger. For incontinence due to anger is a pain (for no one feels anger without being pained), but that which is due to appetite is attended with pleasure, for which reason it is more blameworthy. For incontinence due to pleasure seems to involve wantonness.

1202^b 10–28 = *E. N.* 1149^a 24–^{b} 26.

[1] In 1202^b 9 ἄν is evidently a misprint for ὧν.

Are self-control and endurance the same thing? Surely not! For self-control has to do with pleasures and the man of self-control is he who masters pleasures, but endurance has to do with pains. For the man of endurance is he who endures and undergoes pains. Again, lack of self-control and softness are not the same thing. For the soft person with his softness is he who does not undergo pains—not all of them, but such as any one else would undergo, if he had to; whereas the man who lacks self-control is he who is not able to endure pleasures, but succumbs to them and lets himself be led by them.

Again, there is another character who is called 'intemperate'. Is the intemperate, then, the same with the incontinent? Surely not! For the intemperate is the kind of man who thinks that what he does is best and most expedient for himself, and who has no reason opposing the things which appear pleasant to himself, whereas the incontinent does possess reason which opposes his going in pursuit of those things to which his appetite leads.

But which is the more curable, the intemperate or the incontinent? On first sight, indeed, it might seem that it is not the incontinent. The intemperate, it may be urged, is more easy to cure; for if reason could be engendered in him, to teach him that things are bad, he will leave off doing them; but the incontinent man has reason, and yet acts as he does, so that such a person would seem to be incurable. But on the other hand which is in the worse condition, he who has no good at all, ⟨or he who has some good⟩ joined with these evils? Plainly the former, the more so inasmuch as it is the more valuable part that is in a bad condition. The incontinent man, then, does possess a good in his reason being right, while the intemperate does not. Again, reason is the principle in each. Now in the incontinent the principle, which is the most valuable thing, is in a good condition, but in the intemperate in

29–33 = *E.N.* 1150a 33–36. 33–38 = *E.N.* 1150a 14. 39: cf. *E.N.* 1150a 19–21. 1203a 6–20 = *E.N.* 1146a 31–b 2, 1150a 19–22, 1150b 29–1151a 28.

a bad; so that the intemperate will be worse than the incontinent. Again, like the vice of brutality of which we spoke, you cannot see it in a beast, but only in a human being (for brutality is a name for excessive vice). Why so? Just because a beast has in it no bad principle. Now the principle is reason. For which would do more evil, a lion, or Dionysius or Phalaris or Clearchus, or some of those monsters of wickedness? Plainly the latter. For their having in them a principle which is at the same time a bad principle contributes greatly to their powers of mischief, but in the beast there is no principle at all. In the intemperate, then, there is a bad principle. For inasmuch as he does bad acts and reason assents to these, and it seems to him that he ought to do these things, there is in him a principle which is not a sound one. Wherefore the incontinent would seem to be better than the intemperate.

There are two species of incontinence, one in the way of precipitancy and want of forethought, a kind that comes on suddenly (for instance, when we see a beautiful woman, we are at once affected in some way, and from the affection there ensues an impulse to do something which perhaps we ought not), the other a sort of weakness, but attended with reason which warns against action. Now the former would not seem to be very blameworthy. For this kind occurs even in the good, in those who are of warm temperament and of a rich natural endowment; but the other in 1203[b] the cold and atrabilious, and such are blameworthy. Again, one may avoid being affected by fortifying oneself beforehand with the thought, 'There will come a pretty woman, so one must repress oneself.' So that, if he has fortified himself beforehand with a thought of this kind, he whose incontinence is due to the suddenness of the impression will not be affected at all, nor do anything wrong. But he who knows indeed from reason that he ought not, but gives in to pleasure and succumbs to it, is more blameworthy. The good man would never become incontinent in that way, and fortification by reason would be no cure for it. For this is the guide within the man, and yet he

30–[b] 11 = *E. N.* 1150[b] 19–28.

does not obey it, but gives in to pleasure, and succumbs with a contemptible sort of weakness.

Whether the temperate man is self-controlled was raised as a difficulty above,[1] but now let us speak of it. Yes, the temperate man is also self-controlled. For the man of self-control is not merely he who, when he has appetites in him, represses these owing to reason, but also he who is of such a kind that, though he has not appetites in him, he would repress them, if they did arise. But it is he who has not bad desires and who has his reason right with respect to these things who is temperate, while the man of self-control is he who has bad desires and who has his reason right with regard to these things; so that self-control will go along with temperance, and the temperate ⟨will be self-controlled, but not the self-controlled temperate⟩. For the temperate is he who does not feel passion, while the self-controlled man is he who does feel passion, or is capable of feeling it, but subdues it. But neither of these is actually the case with the temperate. Wherefore the self-controlled is not temperate.

But is the intemperate incontinent or the incontinent intemperate? Or does neither follow on the other? For the incontinent is he whose reason fights with his passions, but the intemperate is not of this sort, but he who in doing base deeds has the consent of his reason. Neither then is the intemperate like the incontinent nor the incontinent like the intemperate. Further, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent. For what comes by nature is harder to cure than what results from habit (for the reason why habit is held to be so strong is that it turns things into nature). The intemperate, then, is in himself the kind of man who is bad by nature, owing to which, and as a result of which, the reason in him is bad. But not so the incontinent. It is not true of him that his reason is not good because he is himself such (for he must needs have been bad, if he were of himself by nature such as the bad). The inconti-

12–23 = *E. N.* 1151[b] 32–1152[a] 3. 24–1204[a] 4 = *E. N.* 1152[a] 4–6.

[1] 1201[a] 9–16.

nent, then, seems to be bad by habit, but the intemperate by nature. Therefore the intemperate is the harder to cure. For one habit is dislodged by another, but nothing will dislodge nature.

But seeing that the incontinent is the kind of man who knows and is not deceived in his reason, while the wise man also is of the same kind, who views everything by right reason, is it possible for the wise man to be incontinent? Surely not! For though one might raise the foregoing difficulties, yet if we keep consistent with our former statements, the wise man will not be incontinent. For we said that the wise man was not merely he in whom right reason exists, but he who also does what appears in accordance with right reason to be best. Now if the wise man does what is best, the wise man will not be incontinent; but an incontinent man may be clever. For we distinguished above [1] between the clever and the wise as being different. For though their spheres are the same, yet the one does what he ought and the other does not. It is possible, then, for the clever man to be incontinent (for he does not succeed in doing what he ought), but it is not possible for the wise man to be incontinent.

7 After this we must speak about pleasure, since our discussion is on the subject of happiness, and all think that happiness is pleasure and living pleasantly, or not without pleasure. Even those who feel disgust at pleasure, and do not think that pleasure ought to be reckoned among goods, at least add the absence of pain; now to live without pain borders on pleasure. Therefore we must speak about pleasure, not merely because other people think that we ought, but because it is actually indispensable for us to do so. For since our discussion is about happiness, and we have defined [2] and declare happiness to be an exercise of virtue in a perfect life, and virtue has to do with pleasure and pain, it is indispensable to speak about pleasure, since happiness is not apart from pleasure.

5–18 = *E.N.* 1152[a] 6–15. 19–22: cf. *E.N.* 1098[b] 25.
22–31 = *E.N.* 1152[b] 3–7.

[1] 1197[b] 18–28, cf. 36 sq. [2] 1184[b] 22–1185[a] 13.

First, then, let us mention the reasons which some people give for thinking that one ought not to regard pleasure as part of good. First, they say that pleasure is a becoming, and that a becoming is something incomplete, but that the good never occupies the place of the incomplete. Secondly, that there are some bad pleasures, whereas the good is never to be found in badness. Again, that it is found in all, both in the bad man and in the good, and in beasts wild and tame; but the good is unmixed with the bad and not promiscuous. And that pleasure is not the best thing, whereas the good is the best thing. And that it is an impediment to right action, and what tends to impede right cannot be good.

First, then, we must address ourselves to the first argument,[1] that about becoming, and must endeavour to dispose of this on the ground of its not being true. For, to begin with, not every pleasure is a becoming. For the pleasure which results from thought is not a becoming, nor that which comes from hearing and ⟨seeing and⟩ smelling. For it is not the effect of want, as in the other cases; for instance, those of eating and drinking. For these are the result of defect and excess, owing to the fulfilment of a want or the relief of an excess; which is why they are held to be a becoming. Now defect and excess are pain. There is therefore pain wherever there is a becoming of pleasure. But in the case of seeing and hearing and smelling there is no previous pain. For no one in taking pleasure in seeing or smelling was affected with pain beforehand. Similarly in the case of thought. One may speculate on something with pleasure without having felt any pain beforehand. So that there may be a pleasure which is not a becoming. If then pleasure, as their argument maintained, is not a good for this reason, namely, that it is a becoming, but there is some pleasure which is not a becoming, this pleasure may be good.

33–35 = *E.N.* 1152[b] 12–14. 35–[b]2 = *E.N.* 1152[b] 19–22.
3 = *E.N.* 1152[b] 16, 17. 4–20 = *E.N.* 1152[b] 33–1153[a] 7.

[1] [a]32–35.

But generally no pleasure is a becoming. For even the vulgar pleasures of eating and drinking are not becomings, but there is a mistake on the part of those who say that these pleasures are becomings. For they think that pleasure is a becoming because it ensues on the application of the remedy; but it is not. For there being a part of the soul with which we feel pleasure, this part of the soul acts and moves simultaneously with the application of the things which we need, and its movement and action are pleasure. Owing, then, to that part of the soul acting simultaneously with the application, or owing to its activity, they think that pleasure is a becoming, from the application being visible, but the part of the soul invisible. It is like thinking that man is body, because this is perceptible by sense, while the soul is not: but the[1] soul also exists. So it is also in this case; for there is a part of the soul with which we feel pleasure, which acts along with the application. Therefore no pleasure is a becoming.

And it is, they say, a conscious restoration to a normal state. ⟨This, however, cannot be accepted either.⟩ For there is pleasure without such restoration to a normal state. For restoration means the filling up of what by nature is wanting, but it is possible, as we maintain,[2] to feel pleasure without any want. For the want is pain, and we say that there is pleasure without pain and prior to pain. So that pleasure will not be a restoration in respect of a want. For in such pleasures there is no want. So that if the reason for thinking that pleasure is not a good was because it is a becoming, and it is found that no pleasure is a becoming, pleasure may be a good.

But next it is maintained[3] that some pleasures are not good. One can get a comprehensive view of this point as follows. Since we maintain that good is mentioned in all the categories (in that of substance and relation and

21–1205a 6 = *E. N.* 1153a 7–17. 7–15 = *E. E.* 1217b 25–1218a 1.

[1] Retaining ἡ (MSS.). [2] 1204b 6–20.
[3] A reference to this view may have originally existed at 1204a 35 or b 1.

quantity and time and generally in all), this much is plain at once. Every activity of good is attended with a certain pleasure, so that, since good is in all the categories, pleasure also will be good; so that since the goods and pleasure are in these, and the pleasure that comes from the goods is pleasure, every pleasure will be good.[1]

At the same time it is manifest from this that pleasures differ in kind. For the categories are different in which pleasure is. For it is not as in the sciences, for instance grammar or any other science whatever. For if Lampros possesses the science of grammar, he as a grammarian will be disposed by this knowledge of grammar in the same way as any one else who possesses the science; there will not be two different sciences of grammar, that in Lampros and that in Ileus. But in the case of pleasure it is not so. For the pleasure which comes from drunkenness and that which comes from the commerce of the sexes do not dispose in the same way. Therefore pleasures would seem to differ in kind.

But another reason why pleasure was held by them[2] not to be good was because some pleasures are bad. But this sort of objection and this kind of judgement is not peculiar to pleasure, but applies also to nature and knowledge. For there is such a thing as a bad nature, for example that of worms and beetles and of ignoble creatures generally, but it does not follow that nature is a bad thing. In the same way there are bad branches of knowledge, for instance the mechanical; nevertheless it does not follow that knowledge is a bad thing, but both knowledge and nature are good in kind. For just as one must not form one's views of the quality of a statuary from his failures and bad workmanship, but from his successes, so one must not judge of the quality of knowledge or nature or of anything else from the bad, but from the good.

26, 27: cf. *E.N.* 1152ᵇ 20–22, 1153ª 17–20, 1153ᵇ 7–9.

[1] It is difficult to understand how this conclusion is reached, and its truth is expressly denied in 1205ᵇ 2.

[2] 1204ª 35 sq.

In the same way pleasure is good in kind, though there are bad pleasures—of that we ourselves are as well aware as any one. For since the natures of creatures differ in the way of bad and good, for instance that of man is good, but that of a wolf or some other beast bad, and in like manner there is one nature of a horse, another of a man, an ass, or a dog, and since pleasure is a restoration of each to its own nature from that which runs counter to it, it follows that this will be appropriate, that the bad nature should have the bad pleasure. For the thing is not the same for a horse and a man, any more than for any of the rest. But since their natures are different, their pleasures also are different. For pleasure, as we saw,[1] is a restoration, and the restoration, they maintain, restores to nature, so that the restoration of the bad nature is bad, and that of the good, good.

But those who assert that pleasure is not a good thing are in much the same case as those who, not knowing nectar, think that the gods drink wine, and that there is nothing more delightful than this. But this is owing to their ignorance. In much the same case, I say, are all those who assert that all pleasures are becoming, and therefore not a good. For owing to their not knowing other than bodily pleasures, and seeing these to be becomings and not good, for this reason they think in general that pleasure is not a good.

Since, then, there are pleasures both of a nature undergoing restoration and also of one in its normal state, for instance of the former the satisfactions which follow upon want, but of a nature in its normal state the pleasures of sight, hearing, and so on, the activities of the nature in its normal state will be better—'activities' I say, for the pleasures of both kinds are activities. It is evident, then, that the pleasures of sight, hearing, and thought will be best, since the bodily result from a satisfaction.

Again, this was also said[2] by way of showing that it

1205[b] 29, 30: cf. *E. N.* 1153[a] 28.

[1] 1204[b] 36 sqq., 1205[b] 6 sq.

[2] 1204[a] 36–[b] 1.

is not a good, that what exists in all and is common to all is not good. Such an objection might seem to be appropriate in the case of a man who covets honour and is actuated by that feeling. For the man who is covetous of honour is one who wishes to be sole possessor of something and by some such means to surpass all others; so he thinks that, if pleasure is to be a good, it too must be something of this sort. Surely this is not so, but, on the contrary, it would seem to be a good for this reason, that all things aim at it. For it is the nature of all things to aim at the good, so that, if all things aim at pleasure, pleasure must be good in kind.

1206a Again, it was denied [1] that pleasure is a good on the ground that it is an impediment. But their asserting it to be an impediment seems to arise from a wrong view of the matter. For the pleasure that comes from the performance of the action is not an impediment; if, however, it be a different pleasure, it is an impediment; for instance, the pleasure of intoxication is an impediment to action; but on this principle one kind of knowledge will be a hindrance to another, for one cannot exercise both at once. But why is knowledge not good, if it produces the pleasure that comes from knowledge? And will that pleasure be an impediment? Surely not; but it will intensify the action. For the pleasure is an incentive to increased action, if it comes from the action itself. For suppose the good man to be doing his acts of virtue, and to be doing them pleasantly; will he not much more exert himself in the action? And if he acts with pleasure, he will be virtuous, but if he does the right with pain, he is not virtuous. For pain attends upon what is due to compulsion, so that if one is pained at doing right, he is acting under compulsion; and he who acts under compulsion is not virtuous.

But indeed it is not possible to perform virtuous acts without pain or pleasure. The middle state does not

33–35 = *E.N.* 1153b 25–28. 1206a 1–25: cf. *E.N.* 1153a 20–23.

[1] 1204b 2 sq.

exist. Why so? Because virtue implies feeling, and feeling pain or pleasure, and there is nothing intermediate. It is evident, then, that virtue is either attended with pain or with pleasure. Now if one does the right with pain he is not good. So that virtue will not be attended with pain. Therefore with pleasure. Not only, then, is pleasure not an impediment, but it is actually an incentive to action, and generally virtue cannot be without the pleasure that comes from it.

There was another argument,[1] to the effect that there is no science which produces pleasure. But this is not true either. For cooks and garland-makers and perfumers are engaged in the production of pleasure. But indeed the other sciences do not have pleasure as end, but the end is with pleasure and not without it;[2] there is, therefore, a science productive of pleasure.

Again, there was another argument,[3] that it is not the best thing. But in that way and by the like reasoning you will annul the particular virtues. For courage is not the best thing. Is it, therefore, not a good? Surely this is absurd! And the same with the rest. Neither, then, is pleasure not a good simply because it is not the best thing.

To pass on, a difficulty of the following kind might be raised in the case of the virtues. I mean, since the reason sometimes masters the passions (for we say so in the case of the man of self-control), and the passions again conversely master the reason (as happens in the case of the incontinent), since, then, the irrational part of the soul, being 1206[b] vicious, masters the reason, which is well-disposed (for the incontinent man is of this kind), the reason in like manner, being in a bad condition, will master the passions, which are well-disposed and have their proper virtue, and if this should be the case, the result will be a bad use of virtue (for the reason being in a bad condition and using virtue will use it badly); now such a result would appear paradoxical.

[1] This argument is suspected to have dropped out at 1204[b] 1. It is to be found in *E. N.* vii. 1152[b] 18, and the answer to it in 1153[a] 23–27.

[2] Susemihl would place these words after 'production of pleasure' in l. 30.

[3] 1204[b] 1.

This difficulty it is easy to answer and resolve from what has been said by us before[1] about virtue. For we assert that then, and only then, is there virtue, when reason being in a good condition is commensurate with the passions, these possessing their proper virtue, and the passions with the reason; for in such a condition they will accord with one another, so that reason should always ordain what is best, and the passions being well disposed find it easy to carry out what reason ordains. If, then, the reason be in a bad condition, and the passions not, there will not be virtue owing to the failure of reason (for virtue consists in both). So that it is not possible to make a bad use of virtue.

Speaking generally, it is not the case, as the rest of the world think, that reason is the principle and guide to virtue, but rather the feelings. For there must first be produced in us (as indeed is the case) an irrational impulse to the right, and then later on reason must put the question to the vote and decide it. One may see this from the case of children and those who live without reason. For in these, apart from reason, there spring up, first, impulses of the feelings towards right, and reason supervening later and giving its vote the same way is the cause of right action. But if they have received from reason the principle that leads to right, the feelings do not necessarily follow and consent thereto, but often oppose it. Wherefore a right disposition of the feelings seems to be the principle that leads to virtue rather than the reason.

8 Since our discussion is about happiness, it will be connected with the preceding to speak about good fortune. For the majority think that the happy must be the fortunate life, or not apart from good fortune, and perhaps they are right in thinking so. For it is not possible to be happy without external goods, over which fortune is supreme. Therefore we must speak about good fortune, saying gene-

1206b 30–1207b 18 = 1246b 37–1248b 7.

[1] 1202a 8–18, cf. 1201a 16–35 and 1197b 36–1198a 9.

rally who the fortunate man is, and what are his surroundings and his sphere.

First, then, one may raise difficulties by having recourse to the following considerations. One would not say of fortune that it is nature. For what nature is the cause of, that she produces for the most part or without exception,[1] but this is never the case with fortune—her effects are disorderly and as it may chance; this is why we speak of 'chance' in the case of such things. 1207a

Neither would one identify it with any mind or right reason. For here more than ever is there order and uniformity, but not chance. Wherefore, where there is most of mind and reason, there is least chance, and where there is most chance, there is there least mind.

Can it be, then, that good fortune is a sort of care of the gods? Surely it will not be thought to be this! For we suppose that, if God is the disposer of such things, he assigns both good and evil in accordance with desert, whereas chance and the things of chance do really occur as it may chance. But if we assign such a dispensation to God, we shall be making him a bad judge or else unjust. And this is not befitting to God.

And yet outside of these there is no other position which one can assign to fortune, so that it is plain that it must be one of these. Now mind and reason and knowledge seem to be a thing utterly foreign to it. And yet neither would the care and providence of God seem to be good fortune, owing to its being found also in the bad, though it is not likely that God would have a care of the bad.

Nature, then, only is left as being most connected with good fortune. And good fortune and fortune generally displays itself in things that are not in our own power, and of which we are not masters nor able to bring them about. For which reason no one calls the just man, in so far as he is just, fortunate, nor yet the brave man, nor any other virtuous character. For these things are in our power to have or not to have. But it is just in such things as follow that we shall speak more appropriately of good fortune. For we

[1] Transferring ἀεί (l. 38) to after ἤ (l. 39) (Susemihl).

do call the well-born fortunate, and generally the man who possesses such kinds of goods, whereof he is not himself the arbiter.

But all the same even there good fortune would not seem to be used in its strict sense. But there are more meanings than one of the term 'fortunate'. For we call a man fortunate to whom it has befallen to achieve some good beyond his own calculation, and him who has made a gain when he ought reasonably to have incurred a loss. Good fortune, then, consists in some good accruing beyond expectation, and in escaping some evil that might reasonably have been expected. But good fortune would seem to consist to a greater extent and more properly in the obtaining of good. For the obtaining of good would seem to be in itself a piece of good fortune, while the escaping evil is a piece of good fortune indirectly.

Good fortune, then, is nature without reason. For the fortunate man is he who apart from reason has an impulse to good things and obtains these, and this comes from nature. For there is in the soul by nature something of this sort whereby we move, not under the guidance of reason, towards things for which we are well fitted. And
1207b if one were to ask a man in this state, 'Why does it please you to do so?'—he would say, 'I don't know, except that it does please me,' being in the same condition as those who are inspired by religious frenzy; for they also have an impulse to do something apart from reason.

We cannot call good fortune by a proper name of its own, but we often say that it is a cause, though cause is not a suitable name for it. For a cause and its effect are different, and what is called a cause contains no reference to an impulse which attains good, in the way either of avoiding evil or on the other hand of obtaining good, when not thinking to obtain it. Good fortune, then, in this sense is different from the former, and this seems to result from the way in which things fall out, and to be good fortune indirectly. So that, if this also is to be called good fortune, at all events the other sort has a more intimate connexion with happiness, namely, that wherein the principle of

impulse towards the attainment of goods is in the man himself.

Since, then, happiness cannot exist apart from external goods, and these result from good fortune, as we said just now,[1] it follows that it will work along with happiness. So much then about good fortune.

9 But since we have spoken about each of the virtues in detail, it remains to sum up the particulars under one general statement. There is a phrase, then, which is not badly used of the perfectly good man, namely, 'nobility and goodness.' For 'he is noble and good', they say, when a man is perfectly virtuous. For it is in the case of virtue that they use the expression 'noble and good'; for instance, they say that the just man is noble and good, the brave man, the temperate, and generally in the case of the virtues. Since, then, we make a dual division, and say that some things are noble and others good, and that some goods are absolutely good and others not so, calling 'noble' such things as the virtues and the actions which spring from them, and 'good', office, wealth, glory, honour, and the like, the noble and good man is he to whom the things that are absolutely good are good, and the things that are absolutely noble are noble. For such a man is noble and good. But he to whom things absolutely good are not good is not noble and good, any more than he would be thought to be in health to whom the things that are absolutely healthy are not healthy. For if the accession of wealth and office were to hurt anybody, they would not be choiceworthy, but he will choose to have for himself such things as will not hurt him. But he who is of such a nature as to shrink from having anything good would not seem to be noble and good. But he for whom the possession of all good things is good and who is not spoilt by them, as, for instance, by wealth and power, such a man is noble and good.

10 But about acting rightly in accordance with the virtues

19–1208[a] 4 = *E. E.* 1248[b] 8–1249[a] 16. 5–30: cf. *E. N.* 1138[b] 18–24: *E. E.* 1249[b] 3-9.

[1] 1206[b] 33 sqq.

something indeed has been said,[1] but not enough. For we said that it was acting in accordance with right reason. But possibly one might be ignorant as to this very point, and might ask, 'What is acting in accordance with right reason? And where is right reason?' To act, then, in accordance with right reason is when the irrational part of the soul does not prevent the rational from displaying its own activity. For then only will the action be in accordance with right reason. For seeing that in the soul we have a something worse and a something better, and the worse is always for the sake of the better, as in the case of body and soul the body is for the sake of the soul, and then only shall we say that we have our body in a good state, when its state is such as not to hinder, but actually to help and take part in inciting towards the soul accomplishing its own work (for the worse is for the sake of the better, to aid the better in its work); when, then, the passions do not hinder the mind from performing its own work, then you will have what is done in accordance with right reason.

Yes, but perhaps some one may say, 'In what state must the passions be so as not to act as a hindrance, and when are they in this state? For I do not know.' This sort of thing is not easy to put into words, any more than the doctor finds it so. But when he has given orders that barley-gruel shall be administered to a patient in a fever, and you say to him, 'But how am I to know when he has a fever?'—he replies, 'When you see him pale.' But how am I to know when he is pale?' There the doctor loses patience with you, 'Well, if you can't perceive that much yourself, it 's no good talking to you any more.'[2] The same thing applies in like manner to all such subjects. And the case is the same with regard to recognizing the passions. For one must contribute something oneself towards the perception.

But perhaps one might raise the following sort of question

[1] 1198ª 10–21, cf. 1196ᵇ 4–10.

[2] The text here is corrupt and defective, but the above seems to represent the required meaning.

also, 'If I really know these things, shall I then be happy?' For they think they must be; whereas it is not so. For none of the other sciences transmits to the learner the use and exercise, but only the faculty. So in this case also the knowing of these things does not transmit the use (for happiness is an activity, as we maintain[1]), but the faculty, nor does happiness consist in the knowledge of what produces it, but comes from the use of these means. Now the use and exercise of these it is not the business of this treatise to impart, any more than any other science imparts the use of anything, but only the faculty.

11 In addition to all that has gone before, it is necessary to speak about friendship, saying what it is, and what are its circumstances and sphere. For since we see that it is co-extensive with life and presents itself on every occasion, and that it is a good, we must embrace it also in our view of happiness.

First, then, perhaps it will be as well to go through the difficulties and questions that are raised about it. Does friendship exist among the like, as is thought and said? For 'Jackdaw sits by jackdaw', as the proverb has it, and

'Unto the like God ever brings the like'.[2]

There is a story also of a dog that used always to sleep upon the same tile, and how Empedocles, on being asked, 'Why does the dog sleep on the same tile?' said, 'Because the dog has something that is like the tile', implying that it was owing to the likeness that the dog resorted to it.

But again, on the other hand, some people think that friendship occurs rather among opposites. Take the saying—

'Earth loves the shower, what time the plain is dry'.[3]

1208b 3–6 = *E. N.* 1153a 3–15: *E. E.* 1234b 18–22. 7–10 = *E. N.* 1155a 32–35: *E. E.* 1235a 4–9. 11–14 = *E. N.* 1155b 7: *E. E.* 1235a 10–12. 15–20 = *E. N.* 1155a 35–b 6: *E. E.* 1235a 13–18.

[1] Cf. 1184b 31 sqq., 1204a 27 sq. [2] Hom. *Od.* xvii. 218.

[3] Athenaeus xii. 600a gives the context of this line of Euripides—

ἐρᾷ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖ', ὅταν ξηρὸν πέδον
ἄκαρπον αὐχμῷ νοτίδος ἐνδεῶς ἔχῃ·
ἐρᾷ δ' ὁ σεμνὸς οὐρανὸς πληρούμενος
ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν Ἀφροδίτης ὕπο.

But it is not known from what play it comes.

It is the opposite, they say, that loves to be friends with the opposite; for among the like there is no room for friendship. For the like, they say, has no need of the like, and more to the same effect.

Again, is it hard or easy to become a friend? Flatterers, at all events, who quickly gain a footing of close attendance, are not friends, though they appear to be.

Further, such difficulties as the following are raised. Will the good man be a friend to the bad? Or will he not? For friendship implies fidelity and steadfastness, and the bad man is not at all of this character. And will one bad man be a friend to another? Or will this not be the case either?

First, then, we must determine what kind of friendship we are in search of. For there is, people think, a friendship towards God and towards things without life, but here they are wrong. For friendship, we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection, but friendship towards God does not admit of love being returned, nor at all of loving. For it would be strange if one were to say that he loved Zeus. Neither is it possible to have affection returned by lifeless objects, though there is a love for such things, for instance wine or something else of that sort. Therefore it is not love towards God of which we are in search, nor love towards things without life, but love towards things with life, that is, where there can be a return of affection.

If, then, one were to inquire next what is the lovable, it is none other than the good. Now there is a difference between the lovable and what is to be loved, as between the desirable and what is to be desired. For that is desirable which is absolutely good, but that is to be desired 1209a by each which is good for him; so also that which is absolutely good is lovable, but that is to be loved which is good for oneself, so that the lovable is also to be loved, but that which is to be loved is not necessarily lovable.[1]

20–22 = *E. E.* 1235b 5–9. 22–25 = *E. N.* 1155b 11, 12: *E. E.* 1235a 31–33. 26–35: cf. *E. N.* 1155b 28–31, 1158b 35.

[1] Here the translation follows Bekker's text, which seems to convey the right meaning.

Here, then, we see the source of the difficulty as to whether the good man is a friend to the bad man or not. For what is good for oneself is in a way attached to the good, and so is that which is to be loved to the lovable, and it depends as a consequence upon the good that it should be pleasant and that it should be useful. Now the friendship of the virtuous lies in their loving one another; and they love one another in so far as they are lovable; and they are lovable in so far as they are good. 'The good man, then,' it will be replied, 'will not be a friend to the bad.' Nay, but he will. For since the good had as its consequence the useful and the pleasant, in so far as, though bad, he is agreeable, so far he is a friend; again, on the other hand, being useful, then so far as he is useful, so far is he a friend. But this sort of friendship will not depend upon lovableness. For the good, we saw,[1] was lovable, but the bad man is not lovable. Rather such a friendship will depend on a man's being one who is to be loved. For springing from the perfect friendship which exists among the good there are also these forms of friendship, that which refers to the pleasant and that which refers to the useful. He, then, whose love is based on the pleasant does not love with the love which is based on the good, nor does he whose friendship is based upon the useful. And these forms of friendship, that of the good, the pleasant, and the useful, are not indeed the same, nor yet absolutely different from one another, but hang in a way from the same head. Just so we call a knife surgical, a man surgical, and knowledge surgical. These are not called so in the same way, but the knife is called surgical from being useful in surgery, and the man from his being able to produce health, and the knowledge from its being cause and principle. Similarly, the forms of friendship are not all called so in the same way, the friendship of the virtuous which is based on the good, the friendship depending on pleasure, and that depending on utility. Nor yet is it

1209a 7: cf. *E. N.* 1156a 7–14.

[1] 1 sq.

a mere case of equivocation, but, while they are not actually the same, they have still in a way the same sphere and the same origin. If, therefore, some one were to say, 'He whose love is prompted by pleasure is not a friend to so-and-so; for his friendship is not based on the good,' such an one is having recourse to the friendship of the virtuous, which is a compound of all these, of the good and the pleasant and the useful, so that it is true that he is not a friend in respect of that friendship, but only in respect of the friendship depending on the pleasant or the useful.

Will the good man then be a friend to the good, or will he not? For the like, it is urged, has no need of the like. An argument of this sort is on the look-out for the friend-
1209[b] ship based on utility; for if they are friends in so far as the one has need of the other, they are in the friendship which is based on utility. But the friendship which is based on utility has been distinguished from that which is based on virtue or on pleasure. It is likely, then, that the virtuous should be much more friends; for they have all the qualifications for friendship, the good and the pleasant and the useful. But the good may also be a friend to the bad; for it may be that he is a friend in so far as he is agreeable. And the bad also to the bad; for it may be that they are friends in so far as they have the same interest. For we see this as a matter of fact, that, when persons have the same interest, they are friends owing to that interest, so that there will be nothing to prevent the bad also having to some extent the same interest.

Now friendship among the serious, which is founded on virtue and the good, is naturally the surest, the most abiding, and the finest form. For virtue, to which the friendship is due, is unchangeable, so that it is natural that this form of friendship should be unchangeable, whereas interest is never the same. Wherefore the friendship which rests on interest is never secure, but changes along with the interest; and the same with the friendship which rests on pleasure. The friendship, then, of the best men is that which arises from virtue, but that of the common run of

37–[b] 10: cf. *E. E.* 1238[a] 30–[b] 14. 11–17: cf. *E. N.* 1156[b] 7–12.

men depends upon utility, while that which rests on pleasure is found among vulgar and commonplace persons.

When people find their friends bad, the result is complaint and expressions of surprise; but it is nothing extraordinary. For when friendship has taken its start from pleasure, and this is why they are friends, or from interest, so soon as these fail the friendship does not continue. Very often the friendship does remain, but a man treats his friend badly, owing to which there are complaints; but neither is this anything out of the way, For your friendship with this man was not from the first founded on virtue, so that it is not extraordinary that he should do nothing of what virtue requires. The complaints, then, are unreasonable. Having formed their friendship with a view to pleasure, they think they ought to have the kind which is due to virtue; but that is not possible. For the friendship of pleasure and interest does not depend on virtue. Having entered then into a partnership in pleasure, they expect virtue, but there they are wrong. For virtue does not follow upon pleasure and utility, but both these follow upon virtue. For it would be strange not to suppose that the serious are the most agreeable to one another. For even the bad, as Euripides says, are pleasant to one another. 'The bad man is fused into one with the bad.'[1] For virtue does not follow upon pleasure, whereas pleasure does follow upon virtue.

But is it necessary that there should be pleasure in the friendship of the serious? Or is it not? It would be strange indeed to say that it is not. For if you deprive 1210a them of the quality of being agreeable to one another, they will procure other friends, who are agreeable, to live with, for in view of that there is nothing more important than being agreeable. It would be curious then not to think that the virtuous ought above all others to live in common

[1] Quoted in *E. E.* vii. 2, § 41, in the form *κακὸς κακῷ . . . συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ*. Dindorf (*Eur. Frag.* 310) gives these three lines as a fragment from the Bellerophontes—

Ἀνὴρ δὲ χρηστὸς χρηστὸν οὐ μισεῖ ποτέ,
κακῷ κακός τε συντέτηκεν ἡδοναῖς,
φιλεῖ δὲ θοὐμόφυλον ἀνθρώπους ἄγειν.

one with another; and this cannot be without the element of pleasure. It will be necessary, then, as it seems, for them above all to be agreeable.

But since friendships have been divided into three species, and in the case of these the question was raised[1] whether friendship takes place in equality or in inequality,[2] the answer is that it may depend on either. For that which implies likeness is the friendship of the serious, and perfect friendship; but that which implies unlikeness is the friendship of utility. For the poor man is a friend to the rich owing to his own lack of what the wealthy man has in abundance, and the bad man to the good for the same reason. For owing to his lack of virtue he is for this reason a friend to him from whom he thinks he will get it. Among the unequal then there arises friendship based on utility. So that Euripides says,

'Earth loves the shower, what time the plain is dry,'[3]

intimating that the friendship of utility has place between these as opposites. For if you like to set down fire and water as the extreme opposites, these are useful to one another. For fire, they say, if it has not moisture, perishes, as this provides it with a kind of nutriment, but that to such an extent as it can get the better of; for if you make the moisture too great, it will obtain the mastery, and will cause the fire to go out, but if you supply it in moderation, it will be of service to it. It is evident, then, that friendship based on utility occurs among things the most opposite.

All the forms of friendship, both those in equality and those in inequality, are reducible to the three in our division. But in all the forms of friendship there is a difference that arises between the partners when they are not on a level in love or in benefaction or in service, or whatever else of the kind it may be. For when one exerts himself energetically, and the other is in defect, there is complaint and

[1] 1208b 8–20.

[2] Used here, as the context shows, for *ὁμοιότης* and *ἀνομοιότης*. There is no reference here to the distinction between friendships *ἐν ἰσότητι* and *καθ' ὑπεροχήν* of *E. N.* 1162a 35. Cf. *E. E.* 1239a 4.

[3] See 1208b 16.

blame on the score of the defect. Not but that the defect on the part of the one is plain to see in the case of such persons as have the same end in view in their friendship; for instance, if both are friends to one another on the ground of utility or of pleasure or of virtue. If, then, you do me more good than I do you, I do not even dispute that you ought to be loved more by me; but in a friendship where we are not friends with the same object, there is more room for differences. For the defect on one side or the other is not manifest. For instance, if one is a friend for pleasure and the other for interest, that is where the dispute will arise. For he who is superior in utility does not think the pleasure a fair exchange for the utility, and he who is more agreeable does not think that he receives in the utility an adequate return for the pleasure which he bestows. Where- 1210b
fore differences are more likely to arise in such kinds of friendship.

When men are friends on an unequal footing, those who are superior in wealth or anything of that sort do not think that they themselves ought to love, but think that they ought to be loved by their inferiors. But it is better to love than to be loved. For to love is a pleasurable activity and a good, whereas from being loved there results no activity to the object of the love. Again, it is better to know than to be known; for to be known and to be loved attaches even to things without life, but to know and to love only to things with life. Again, to be inclined to benefit is better than not; now he who loves is inclined to benefit, just in so far as he loves, but this is not the case with him who is loved, in so far as he is loved.

But owing to ambition men wish rather to be loved than to love, because of there being a certain superiority in being loved. For he who is loved has always a superiority in agreeableness or means or virtue, and the ambitious man reaches out after superiority. And those who are in a position of superiority do not think that they themselves ought to love, since they make a return to those who love them, in those things in which they are superior. And

1210b 14–22: cf. *E. N.* 1159a 12–17: *E. E.* 1239a 21–27.

again the others are inferior to them, for which reason the superiors do not think they themselves ought to love but to be loved. But he who is deficient in wealth or pleasures or virtue admires him who has a superiority in these things, and loves him owing to his getting these things or thinking that he will get them.

Now such friendships arise from sympathy, that is, from wishing good to some one. But the friendship which takes place in these cases has not all the required attributes. For often we wish good to one person and like to live with another. But ought we to say that these things are friendships or that they are characteristics of the perfect friendship which is founded on virtue? For in that friendship all these things are contained; for there is none other with whom we should more wish to live (for pleasantness and usefulness and virtue are attributes of the good man), and it is to him that we should most wish good, and to live and to live well we should wish to none other than he.

Whether a man can have friendship for and towards himself may be omitted for the present, but we shall speak of it later.[1] But all the things that we wish for a friend we wish for ourselves. For we wish to live along with ourselves (though that is perhaps unavoidable), and to live well, and to live, and the wishing of the good applies to none so much. Further, we are most sympathetic with ourselves; for if we meet with a defeat or fall into any kind of misfortune, we are at once grieved. So looking at the matter in this way it would seem that there is friendship towards oneself. In speaking then of such things as sympathy and living well and so on we are referring either to friendship towards ourselves or to the perfect friendship. For all these things are found in both. For the living together and the wish for a thing's being and for its well-being and all the rest are found in these.

Further, it may perhaps be thought that wherever justice is possible, there friendship may exist too. Wherefore

32, 33 = *E. N.* 1166a 33, 34. 34–1211a 5 = *E. N.* 1166a 1–33. 6–15 = *E. N.* 1159b 25–32 = *E. E.* 1241b 11–17.

[1] Cf. 1211a 16 sqq.

there are as many species of friendship as there are of just dealing. Now there can be justice between a foreigner and a citizen, between a slave and his master, between one citizen and another, between son and father, between wife and husband, and generally every form of association has its separate form of friendship. But the firmest of friendships would seem to be that with a foreigner ; for they have no common aim about which to dispute, as is the case with fellow-citizens ; for when these dispute with one another for the priority, they do not remain friends.

It will be in place now to speak about this, whether there is friendship towards oneself or not. Since then we see, as we said just a little above,[1] that the act of loving is recognized from the particulars, and it is to ourselves that we should most wish the particulars (the good, and being, and well-being ; and we are most sympathetic with ourselves, and we most wish to live along with ourselves) ; therefore, if friendship is known from the particulars, and we should wish the particulars to belong to ourselves, it is plain that there is friendship towards ourselves, just as we maintained that there is injustice towards oneself.[2] Though, indeed, as it takes one person to inflict and another to receive an injury, while each individual is the same person, it appeared[3] for that reason that there was no injustice towards oneself. It is possible, however, as we said[4] on examining into the parts of the soul, when these, as they are more than one, are not in agreement, that then there should be injustice towards oneself. In the same way then there would seem to be friendship towards oneself. For the friend being, according to the proverb—when we wish to describe a very great friend, we say ' my soul and his are one' ; since then the parts of the soul are more than one, then only will the soul be one, when the reason and the passions are in accord with one another (for so it will be one) : so that when it has become one there will be

16–[b]3 = *E. N.* 1168[b] 1–10.

[1] 1211[a] 1–5.
[2] 1196[a] 28.
[3] 1196[a] 6–25.
[4] 1196[a] 25–30.

friendship towards oneself. And this friendship towards oneself will exist in the virtuous man; for in him alone the parts of the soul are in proper relation to one another owing to their not being at variance, since the bad man is never a friend to himself, for he is always at strife with himself. At all events the incontinent man, when he has done something to which pleasure prompts, not long afterwards repents and reviles himself. It is the same with the bad man in other vices. For he is always fighting with and opposing himself.

There is also a friendship in equality; for instance, that of comrades is on an equality in respect of number and capacity of good (for neither of them deserves more than the other to have a greater share of goods either in number or capacity or size, but what is equal; for comrades are supposed to be a kind of equals). But that between father and son is on an inequality, and that between ruler and subject, between worse and better, between wife and husband, and generally in all cases where there is one who occupies the position of worse or better in friendship. This friendship in inequality, indeed, is proportional. For in giving of good no one would ever give an equal share to the better and the worse, but always a greater to the one who was superior. And this is the proportionally equal. For the worse with a less good is in a kind of way equal to the better with a greater.

12 Among all the above-mentioned forms of friendship love is in a way strongest in that which is based on kindred, and more particularly in the relation of father to son. Now why is it that the father loves the son more than the son the father? Is it, as some say rightly enough as regards the many, because the father has been a kind of benefactor to the son, and the son owes him a return for the benefit? Now this cause would seem to hold good in the friendship which is based on utility. But as we see it to be in the sciences, so it is here also. What I mean is that in some the end and the activity are the same, and there is not any

18-39 = *E. N.* 1167[b] 17-1168[a] 27 = *E. E.* 1241[a] 35-[b] 9.

other end beyond the activity; for instance, to the flute-player the activity and end are the same (for to play the flute is both his end and his activity); but not to the art of housebuilding (for it has a different end beyond the activity); now friendship is a sort of activity, and there is not any other end beyond the act of loving, but just this. Now the father is always in a way more active owing to the son being a kind of production of his own. And this we see to be so in the other cases also. For all feel a sort of kindness towards what they have themselves produced. The father, then, feels a sort of kindness towards the son as being his own production, led on by memory and by hope. This is why the father loves the son more than the son the father.

There are other things which are called and are thought to be forms of friendship, about which we must inquire whether they are friendship. For instance, goodwill is thought to be friendship. Now, speaking absolutely, goodwill would seem not to be friendship (for towards many persons and on many occasions we entertain a feeling of goodwill either from seeing or hearing some good about them. Does it follow then that we are friends? Surely not! For if some one felt goodwill towards Darius, when he was alive among the Persians, as some one may have done, it did not follow that he had a friendship towards Darius); but goodwill would seem to be sometimes the beginning of friendship, and goodwill may become friendship if, where one has the power to do good, there be added the wish to do it for the sake of the person towards whom the goodwill is felt. But goodwill implies moral quality and is relative to it. For no one is said to have a goodwill towards wine or towards anything else without life that is good or pleasant, but if any one be of a good character, goodwill is felt towards him. And goodwill is not separate from friendship, but acts in the same sphere. This is why it is thought to be friendship.

Unanimity borders close on friendship, if the kind of

40–1212a 13 = *E. N.* 1155b 32–1156a 5, 1166b 30–1167a 21: cf. *E. E.* 1241a 1–14. 14–26 = *E. N.* 1167a 22–32 = *E. E.* 1241a 15–33.

unanimity that you take be that which is strictly so called. For if one entertains the same notions as Empedocles and has the same views about the elements as he, is he unanimous with Empedocles? Surely not! Since the same thing would have to hold in any like case. For to begin with, the sphere of unanimity is not matters of thought but matters of action, and herein it is not in so far as they think the same, but in so far as in addition to thinking the same they have a purpose to do the same about what they think. For if both think to rule, but each of them thinks that he is to be ruler, are they therefore unanimous? Surely not. But if I wish to be ruler myself, and he wishes me to be so, then it is that we are unanimous. Unanimity, then, is found in matters of action coupled with the wish for the same thing. It is therefore the establishment of the same ruler in matters of action that is the sphere of unanimity in the strict sense.

13 Since there is, as we maintain,[1] such a thing as friendship towards oneself, will the good man be a lover of self or not? Now the lover of self is he who does everything for his own sake in matters of advantage. The bad man is a lover of self (for he does everything for his own sake), but not the good man. For the reason why he is a good man is because he does so and so for the sake of another; wherefore he is not actuated by self-love. But it is true that all feel an impulse towards things that are good, and think that they themselves ought to have these in the highest degree. This is most apparent in the case of wealth and rule. Now the good man will resign these to another, not on the ground that it does not become him in the highest degree to have them, but if he sees that another will be able to make more use of these than he; but the rest of the world will not do this owing to ignorance (for they do not think they might make a bad use of such goods) or else owing to the ambition of ruling. But the good man will not be affected in either of these ways.

28-b23 = *E. N.* 1167a28–1169b2.

[1] Cf. 1211a16-b3.

Wherefore he is not a lover of self as regards such goods at least; but, if at all, in respect of the noble. For this is the only thing in which he will not resign his share, but in respect of things useful and pleasant he will. In the choice, then, of things in accordance with the noble he will display love of self, but in the choice which we describe as being prompted by the useful and the pleasant it is not he who will do so, but the bad man.

14 Will the good man love himself most of all or not? In a way he will love himself most and in a way not. For since we say[1] that the good man will resign goods in the way of utility to his friend, he will be loving his friend more than himself. Yes: but his resignation of such goods implies that he is compassing the noble for himself in resigning these to his friend. In a way, therefore, he is loving his friend more than himself, and in a way he is loving himself most. In respect of the useful he is loving his friend, but in respect of the noble and good he is loving himself most; for he is compassing these for himself as being noblest. He is therefore a lover of good, not a lover of self. For, if he does love himself, it is only because he is good. But the bad man is a lover of self. For he has nothing in the way of nobility for which he should love himself, but apart from these grounds he will love himself *qua* self. Wherefore it is he who will be called a lover of self in the strict sense.

15 It will come next to speak about self-sufficingness and the self-sufficing man. Will the self-sufficing man require friendship too? Or will he not, but will he be sufficient to himself as regards that also? For even the poets have such sayings as these—

What need of friends, when Heaven bestows the good?[2]

Whence also the difficulty arises, whether he who has all the goods and is self-sufficing will need a friend too? Or

1212b 24–33 = *E. N.* 1169b 3–13 = *E. E.* 1244b 1–7.

[1] a 36 sq.

[2] Eur. *Orest.* 667. Quoted also in *E. N.* 1169b 7, 8.

is it then that he will need him most? For to whom will he do good? Or with whom will he live? For surely he will not live alone. If, then, he will need these things, and these are not possible without friendship, the self-sufficing man will need friendship too. Now the analogy that is generally derived from God in discussions is not right there, nor will it be useful here. For if God is self-sufficing and has need of none, it does not follow that we shall need no one. For we hear this kind of thing said about God. Seeing that God, so it is said, possesses all goods and is self-sufficing, what will he do? We can hardly suppose that he will sleep. It follows, we are told, that he will
1213a contemplate something; for this is the noblest and the most appropriate employment. What, then, will he contemplate? For if he is to contemplate anything else, it must be something better than himself that he will contemplate. But this is absurd, that there should be anything better than God. Therefore he will contemplate himself. But this also is absurd. For if a human being surveys himself, we censure him as stupid. It will be absurd therefore, it is said, for God to contemplate himself. As to what God is to contemplate, then, we may let that pass. But the self-sufficingness about which we are conducting our inquiry is not that of God but of man, the question being whether the self-sufficing man will require friendship or not. If, then, when one looked upon a friend one could see the nature and attributes of the friend, . . . such as to be a second self, at least if you make a very great friend, as the saying has it, 'Here is another Heracles, a dear other self.' Since then it is both a most difficult thing, as some of the sages have said, to attain a knowledge of oneself, and also a most pleasant (for to know oneself is pleasant)—now we are not able to see what we are from ourselves (and that we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; and this is the effect of favour or passion, and there are many of us who are blinded by these things so that we judge not aright); as then when we wish to see our own face, we do

so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert,[1] a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having some one else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself.

Again, if it is a fine thing, as it is, to do good when one has the goods of fortune, to whom will he do good? And with whom will he live? For surely he will not spend his time alone; for to live with some one is pleasant and necessary. If, then, these things are fine and pleasant and necessary, and these things cannot be without friendship, 1213[b] the self-sufficing man will need friendship too.

16 Should one acquire many friends or few? They ought neither to be absolutely many nor yet few. For if they are many, it is difficult to apportion one's love to each. For in all other things also the weakness of our nature incapacitates us from reaching far. For we do not see far with our eyes, but if you set the object unduly far off, the sight fails owing to the weakness of nature; and the case is the same with hearing and with all other things alike. Failing, then, to show love through incapacity one would, not unjustly, incur accusations, and would not be a friend, as one would be loving only in name; but this is not what friendship means. Again, if they are many, one can never be quit of grief. For if they are many, it is always likely that something unfortunate will occur to one at least of them, and when these things take place grief is unavoidable. Nor yet, on the other hand, should one have few, only one or two, but a number commensurate with one's circumstances and one's own impulse to love.

17 After this we must inquire how one ought to treat a friend. This inquiry does not present itself in every friendship, but in that in which friends are most liable to

1213[b] 3–16 = *E. N.* 1170[b] 20–1171[a] 20 = *E. E.* 1245[b] 20–25.

[1] Cf. 11–13.

bring complaints against one another. They do not do this so much in the other cases; for instance, in the friendship between father and son there is no complaint such as the claim that we hear made in some forms of friendship, 'As I to you, so you to me,' failing which there is in those cases grave complaint. But between unequal friends equality is not expected, and the relation between father and son is on a footing of inequality, as is also that between wife and husband, or between servant and master, and generally between the worse and the better. They will therefore not have complaints of this sort. But it is between equal friends and in a friendship of that sort that a complaint of this kind arises. So we must inquire how we ought to treat a friend in the friendship between friends who are on a footing of equality.

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ETHICA EUDEMIA

DE VIRTUTIBUS ET VITIIS

BY

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PREFACE

WITH the permission of Messrs. Teubner I have followed in this translation the text of Susemihl (Leipzig 1884), who here as elsewhere has brought much light by obvious corrections and judicious punctuation. Where readings other than his are adopted they are mentioned with the names of their authors.

In the foot-notes are cited corresponding passages from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*. Here the work of Susemihl has been of the greatest assistance.

The *Eudemian Ethics* and the *De Virtutibus et Vitiis* have not received much attention from scholars. Mr. Ross's suggestions have been of the greatest use to me; Fritzsche's commentary I have sometimes referred to with advantage, and also to some notes printed by Prof. Henry Jackson and kindly sent me by him some years ago. Prof. Jackson is also the author of an article in the *Journal of Philology*, xxxii, which has shed a flood of light on the corrupt passage, Bk. VII, chs. 13, 14. Of course the principal help to the understanding of the two treatises is the *Nicomachean Ethics*, their resemblances to and differences from which work are of great interest.

J. SOLOMON.

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7–9. Now since virtue makes the purpose and the end right, it follows that we judge of a man's character from his purpose. 1227^{b} 36—1228^{a} 4.

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27, 28. The task is a hopeful one, since the combination is natural. 1237^a 3-6.
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Until this is done, virtue is not perfected, for incontinence may occur. 1237^a 6-9.
29. True friendship, then, being founded on virtue, true friends will be absolutely good men. 1237^a 10, 11.
30, 31. But a state of mind that is not perfect virtue may yet be relatively good. 1237^a 11-18.
32. And so with the pleasure which attends upon such a state.
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(2) On which of the two sides lies the love?
(3) Can one love the good, even if not pleasant?
(4) Is it because it is good that the act of loving seems to involve pleasure? 1237^a 18-23.

§ 33. There is always a pleasure in the recognition of the familiar. 1237[a] 23–27.

34. Hence like loves like, and nothing is so pleasant to man as man.

If this is true of the imperfect types, it will be so of the perfect.

∴ Good men find pleasure in each other.

∴ Friendship is the mutual choice of the good and pleasant for their own sakes. 1237[a] 27–33.

35. Or rather friendship itself is the state from which such choice proceeds. But the actuality is love and lies in him who loves.

∴ The joy is in loving, not in being loved. 1237[a] 33–37.

36. The latter may be the case even with things devoid of life. 1237[a] 37–40.

37. The pleasure of friendship consists in loving the friend for what he is in himself. 1237[a] 40–[b] 5.

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40, 41. The wish for friendship may be sudden, but not friendship itself. 1237[b] 17–23.

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43. True friendship cannot exist between the bad; for they are distrustful. 1237[b] 27–30.

44. And they prefer their material interests to a friend. 1237[b] 30–34.

45. Since true friendship requires experience, it cannot exist among many. 1237[b] 34–36.

46. Old friends must not be exchanged for new, unless we know the new to be better. 1237[b] 36—1238[a] 3.

47. However good in himself a man may be, if he is to be your friend he must be good to you. 1238[a] 3–8.

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49. Everything, then, serves to show that true friendship is essentially stable. 1238[a] 11–15.

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51, 52. The truly pleasant is that which pleases in the long run. 1238[a] 21–29.

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8–10. But the essence of friendship lies in loving rather than in being loved. 1239^{a} 31–^{b} 2.

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2–4. The like is reducible to the pleasant and the good. 1239^{b} 10–22.

5. The friendship of opposites is based on utility. 1239^{b} 22–29.

6–8. In a way it is for the sake of the good, that is, of the mean. 1239^{b} 29–39.

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2, 3. But a man's relations to himself constitute friendship only in a metaphorical sense. 1240^{a} 13–21.

3. Friendship is held to imply—

(1) a desire for the good of another for his own sake;

4. (2) a desire for the existence of another for his own sake;

5. (3) the choice of another's society for its own sake;

6–9. (4) sympathy in sorrow and joy. 1240^{a} 22–^{b} 1.

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12, 13. At least, if he be a good man. 1240b 12–21.
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5. How to treat a friend is a question of justice. 1242^a 19–22.

5, 6. Man is not merely a social, but also a domestic animal. 1242^a 22–27.

6–9. The household contains in itself the types of all political relations—
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husband and wife,
father and son,
brethren. 1242^a 27–^{b} 1.

10–12. In unequal friendships justice does not present itself in the same light to both parties. 1242^b 2–16.

12, 13. Equalisation is effected by the superior having the larger share of honour, the inferior of gain. 1242^b 16–21.

14, 15. Political friendship aims at utility, and is based on equality. 1242^b 22–31.

16, 17. The friendship of utility is of two kinds—
(1) legal,
(2) moral. 1242^b 31–37.

17. Complaints are most likely to arise in the latter. 1242^b 37—1243^a 2.

18. And generally in the friendship of utility rather than in that of virtue or pleasure. 1243^a 2–6.

19, 20. Though the legal form lends itself less to complaints than the moral. 1243^a 6–14.

21–23. Is a service to be estimated by its value in itself or to the receiver? 1243^a 14–31.

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2, 3. God needs no friend.

∴ The happier a man is, the less need has he of friends. 1244^{b} 7–15.

4. This seems to show that only he who is loved for his virtue is a friend at all. For we choose him—

(1) when we are in lack of nothing;

(2) when our judgement is least biased.

5. Perhaps the comparison of the happy man with God may be to some extent a misleading one. 1244^{b} 21–25.

6–8. Life is feeling and knowing.

∴ Social life is a fellowship in feeling and knowing.

Self-perception and self-knowledge is the most choiceworthy for every one. This is the reason of our innate love of life.

Every one wishes to live, because he always wishes to know, and therefore himself to be the object of knowledge. 1244^{b} 26—1245^{a} 10.

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10, 11. But facts are too strong for them. We do like to share our pleasures with our friends. 1245^{a} 18–24.

Friendship implies contiguity, like love. 1245^{a} 24–26.

12. This discrepancy between argument and fact may be reconciled thus. 1245^{a} 26–29.

13. The friend is, ideally at all events, a counterpart of oneself. 1245^{a} 29–35.

14. ∴ To perceive and know him is to perceive and know oneself.

∴ There is a reason for the pleasure we take in society. 1245^{a} 35–^{b} 4.

14, 15. Intellectual intercourse is most an end in itself. But each likes to share with a friend the end whereto he can attain; or at all events to confer benefits upon him and receive them from him. 1245^{b} 4–13.

15, 16. Our conclusion, then, is that the happy man does need friends. The analogy of God proves too much.

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§§ 17–19. The number of friends is limited by the possibility of living with them. 1245^{b} 20–25.
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21–23. But here there is room for difference of opinion, as about misfortunes. 1246^{a} 5–25.

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3–5. There is more than a difference of name between 'good' and 'noble and good'. 1248b 16–26.

5. He is good, to whom those things are good that are so by nature. 1248b 26–34.

6. He is noble and good, to whom the noble belongs for its own sake, and who does things noble for the sake of doing them. 1248b 34–37.

7–10. Hence those are not noble and good who make virtue a means to external goods. 1248b 37—1249a 16.

11. We have already seen the coincidence of the absolutely noble and good with the pleasant. 1249a 17–20.

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1214

ETHICA EUDEMIA

BOOK I

I THE man who stated his judgement in the god's precinct 1214[a]
in Delos made an inscription on the propylaeum to the temple of Leto, in which he separated from one another the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant as not all properties of the same thing; he wrote, 'Most beautiful is what is most just, but best is health, and pleasantest the obtaining of what one desires.' But let us disagree with him; for happiness is at once the most beautiful and best of all things and also the pleasantest.

Now about each thing and kind there are many views that are disputed and need investigation; of these some concern knowledge only, some the acquisition of things and the performance of acts as well. About those which involve speculative philosophy only we must at a suitable opportunity say what is relevant to that study. But first we must consider in what the happy life consists and how it is to be acquired, whether all who receive the epithet 'happy' become so by nature (as we become tall, short, or of different complexions), or by teaching (happiness being a sort of science), or by some sort of discipline—for men acquire many qualities neither by nature nor by teaching but by habituation, bad qualities if they are habituated to the bad, good if to the good. Or do men become happy in none of these ways, but either—like those possessed by nymphs or deities—through a sort of divine influence, being as it were inspired, or through chance? For many declare happiness to be identical with good luck.

That men, then, possess happiness through all or some or one of these causes is evident; for practically all new creations

1214[a] 1–8 = *E. N.* 1099[a] 24–30. 14–25 = *E. N.* 1099[b] 9–11.
24–25 = *E. N.* 1099[b] 7 sq.

come under these principles—for all acts arising from intelli-
30 gence may be included among acts that arise from knowledge.
Now to be happy, to live blissfully and beautifully, must consist
mainly in three things, which seem most desirable; for some
say prudence [1] is the greatest good, some virtue, and some
1214[b] pleasure. Some also dispute about the magnitude of the
contribution made by each of these elements to happiness,
some declaring the contribution of one to be greater, some
that of another,—these regarding prudence as a greater
good than virtue, those the opposite, while others regard
pleasure as a greater good than either: and some consider
the happy life to be compounded of all or of two of these,
5 while others hold it to consist in one of them alone.

First then about these things we must enjoin every one 2
that has the power to live according to his own choice to set
up for himself some object for the beautiful life to aim at,
(whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture), with
reference to which he will then do all his acts, since not to
10 have one's life organized in view of some end is a mark of
much folly. Then above all we must first define to ourselves
without hurry or carelessness in which of our belongings
the happy life is lodged, and what are the indispensable
conditions of its attainment—for health is not the same as
15 the indispensable conditions of health; and so it is with
many other things, e.g. the beautiful life and its indispen-
sable conditions are not identical. Of such things some are
not peculiar to health or even to life, but common—to speak
broadly—to all dispositions and actions, e.g. without breath-
20 ing or being awake or having the power of movement we
could enjoy neither good nor evil; but some are indispen-
sable conditions in a more special sense and peculiar to each
kind of thing, and these it is specially important to observe;
e.g. the eating of meat and walking after meals are more
peculiarly the indispensable conditions of a good physical
state than the more general conditions mentioned above.
25 For herein is the cause of the disputes about happy living,

30–33 = *E. N.* 1098[b] 22–26.

[1] 'Prudence,' the traditional rendering of *φρόνησις*.

its nature and causes; for some take to be elements in happiness what are merely its indispensable conditions.

3 To examine then all the views held about happiness is superfluous, for children, sick people, and the insane all have views, but no sane person would dispute over them; for such persons need not argument but years in which they may change, or else medical or political correction—for medicine, no less than stripes, is a correction. Similarly we have not to consider the views of the multitude (for they talk without consideration about almost everything, and most about happiness); for it is absurd to apply argument to those who need not argument but suffering. But since every study has its special problems, evidently there are such relating to the best life and best existence; the opinions then that put these difficulties it is well to examine, for a disputant's refutation of what is opposed to his argument is a demonstration of the argument itself.

Further, it is proper not to neglect these considerations, especially with a view to that at which all inquiry should be directed, viz. the causes that enable us to share in the good and beautiful life—if any one finds it invidious to call it the blessed life—and with a view to the hope we may have of attaining each good. For if the beautiful life consists in what is due to fortune or nature, it would be something that many cannot hope for, since its acquisition is not in their power, nor attainable by their care or activity; but if it depends on the individual and his personal acts being of a certain character, then the supreme good would be both more general and more divine, more general because more would be able to possess it, more divine because happiness would then be the prize offered to those who make themselves and their acts of a certain character.

4 Most of the doubts and difficulties raised will become clear, if we define well what we ought to think happiness to be, whether that it consists merely in having the soul of a certain character—as some of the sages and older writers

28–1215a 3 = *E. N.* 1095a 28–30. 12–19: cf. *E. N.* 1099b 13–20.
22–25: cf. *E. N.* 1098b 29–1099a 7.

thought—or whether the man must indeed be of a certain character, but it is even more necessary that his acts should be of a certain character.

Now if we make a division of the kinds of life, some do not even pretend to this sort of well-being, being only pursued for the sake of what is necessary, e. g. those concerned with vulgar arts, or with commercial or servile occupations—by vulgar I mean arts pursued only with a view to reputation, by servile those which are sedentary and wage-earning, by commercial those connected with buying in markets [1] and huckstering in shops. But there are also three goods directed to a happy employment of life, those which we have above [2] called the three greatest of human goods, virtue, prudence, and pleasure. We thus see that there are three lives which all those choose who have power, viz. the
1215ᵇ lives of 'the political man', the philosopher, the voluptuary; for of these the philosopher intends to occupy himself with prudence and contemplation of truth, the 'political man' with noble acts (i. e. those springing from virtue), the voluptuary with bodily pleasures. Therefore the latter calls a [3] different person happy, as was indeed said before.[4] Anaxagoras of Clazomenae being asked, 'Who was the happiest of men?' answered, 'None of those you suppose, but one who would appear a strange being to you,' because he saw that the questioner thought it impossible for one not great and beautiful or rich to deserve the epithet 'happy', while he himself perhaps thought that the man who lived painlessly and pure of injustice or else engaged in some divine contemplation was really, as far as a man may be, blessed.

About many other things it is difficult to judge well, but most difficult about that on which judgement seems to all easiest and the knowledge of it in the power of any man—viz. what of all that is found in living is desirable, and what, if

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26–1215ᵇ 14 = *E. N.* 1095ᵇ 14–1096ª 10.

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[1] *ὠνὰς ἀγοραίας* for *ἀγορᾶς* (Fr. and Pᵇ).
[2] Cf. 1214ª 30–3.
[3] Sus.'s ⟨*ἕτερος*⟩ not wanted.
[4] Cf. 1214ª 30–ᵇ5.

attained, would satisfy our desire. For there are many consequences of life that make men fling away life, as disease, excessive pain, storms, so that it is clear that, if one were given the power of choice, not to be born at all would, as far at least as these reasons go, have been desirable. Further, the life we lead as children is not desirable,[1] for no one in his senses would consent to return again to this. Further, many incidents involving neither pleasure nor pain or involving pleasure but not of a noble kind are such that, as far as they are concerned, non-existence is preferable to life. And generally, if one were to bring together all that all men do and experience but not willingly because not for its own sake, and were to add to this an existence of infinite duration, one would none the more on account of these experiences choose existence rather than non-existence. But further, neither for the pleasure of eating alone or that of sex, if all the other pleasures were removed that knowing or seeing or any other sense provides men with, would a single man value existence, unless he were utterly servile, for it is clear that to the man making this choice there would be no difference between being born a brute and a man; at any rate the ox in Egypt, which they reverence as Apis, in most of such matters has more power than many monarchs. We may say the same of the pleasure of sleeping. For what is the difference between sleeping an unbroken sleep from one's first day to one's last, say for a thousand or any number of years, and living the life of a plant? Plants at any rate seem to possess this sort of existence, and similarly children; for children, too, continue having their nature from their first coming into being in their mother's womb, but sleep the entire time. It is clear then from these considerations that men, though they look, fail to see what is well-being, what is the good in life.

And so they tell us that Anaxagoras answered a man who was raising problems of this sort and asking why one should choose rather to be born than not—'for the sake of

34: cf. *E. N.* 1095b 19 sq.

[1] Omitting τίς and the note of interrogation.

viewing the heavens and the whole order of the universe'. He, then, thought the choice of life for the sake of some sort of knowledge to be precious; but those who felicitate Sardanapallus or Smindyrides the Sybarite or any other of those who live the voluptuary's life, these seem all to place happiness in the feeling of pleasure. But others would rather choose virtuous deeds than either any sort of wisdom or sensual pleasures; at any rate some choose these not only for the sake of reputation, but even when they are not going to win credit by them; but most 'political' men are not truly so called; they are not in truth 'political', for the 'political' man is one who chooses noble acts for their own sake, while most take up the 'political' life for the sake of money and greed.

From what has been said, then, it is clear that all connect happiness with one or other of three lives, the 'political', the philosophic, and the voluptuary's. Now among these the nature and quality and sources of the pleasure of the body and sensual enjoyment are clear, so that we have not to inquire what such pleasures are, but whether they tend to happiness or not and how they tend, and whether—supposing it right to attach to the noble life certain pleasures—it is right to attach these, or whether some other sort of participation in these is a necessity, but the pleasures through which men rightly think the happy man to live pleasantly and not merely painlessly are different.

But about these let us inquire later.[1] First let us consider about virtue and prudence, the nature of each, and whether they are parts of the good life either in themselves or through
1216b the actions that arise from them, since all—or at least all important thinkers—connect happiness with these.

Socrates, then, the elder,[2] thought the knowledge of virtue to be the end, and used to inquire what is justice, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue; and his conduct

15: cf. *E. N.* 1095b 21 sq. 21–23: cf. *E. N.* 1095b 22 sq. 28, 29: cf. *E. N.* 1095b 14–1096a 5. 3–25: cf. *M. M.* 1182a 1–7, and 1183b 8–18.

[1] No such discussion is to be found in the treatise, but cf. *E. N.* 1153b 7–25.

[2] Distinguished from the younger Socrates, a pupil of Plato.

was reasonable, for he thought all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge, so that to know justice and to be just came simultaneously; for the moment that we have learned geometry or architecture we are architects and geometers. Therefore he inquired what virtue is, not how or from what it arises. This is correct with regard to theoretical knowledge, for there is no other part of astronomy or physics or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the things which are the subjects of those sciences; though nothing prevents them from being in an incidental way useful to us for much that we cannot do without. But the end of the productive sciences is different from science and knowledge, e.g. health from medical science, law and order (or something of the sort) from political science. Now to know anything that is noble is itself noble; but regarding virtue, at least, not to know what it is, but to know out of what it arises is most precious. For we do not wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what being in health is, and to have our body in good condition rather than to know what good condition is.

6 About all these matters we must try to get conviction by argument, using perceived facts as evidence and illustration. It would be best that all men should clearly concur with what we are going to say, but if that is unattainable, then that all should in some way at least concur. And this if converted they will do, for every man has some contribution to make to the truth, and with this as a starting-point we must give some sort of proof about these matters. For by advancing from true but obscure judgements he will arrive at clear ones, exchanging ever the usual confused statement for more real knowledge. Now in every inquiry there is a difference between philosophic and unphilosophic argument; therefore we should not think even in political philosophy that the sort of consideration which not only makes the nature of the thing evident but also its cause is superfluous;

20–25 = *E. N.* 1103b 26–29 : cf. *M. M.* 1. 1. 26 sq. = *E. N.* 1098b 8 sq. 35–1217a 17 : cf. *E. N.* 1094b 11–27, 1095a 30–b 13.

for such consideration is in every inquiry the truly philosophic method. But this needs much caution. For there
1217a are some who, through thinking it to be the mark of a philosopher to make no arbitrary statement but always to give a reason, often unawares give reasons foreign to the subject and idle—this they do sometimes from ignorance, sometimes because they are charlatans—by which reasons
5 even men experienced and able to act are trapped by those who neither have nor are capable of having practical and constructive intelligence. And this happens to them from want of culture; for inability in regard to each matter to distinguish reasonings appropriate to the subject from those
10 foreign to it is want of culture. And it is well to criticize separately the reason that gives the cause and the conclusion both because of what has just been said,[1] viz. that one should attend not merely to what is inferred by argument, but often attend more to perceived facts—whereas now when men are unable to see a flaw in the argument they are compelled to believe what has been said—and because often
15 that which seems to have been shown by argument is true indeed, but not for the cause which the argument assigns; for one may prove truth by means of falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.[2]

After these further preliminary remarks let us start on 7
our discourse from what we have called[3] the first confused
20 judgements, and then[4] seek to discover a clear judgement about the nature of happiness. Now this is admitted to be the greatest and best of human goods—we say human, for there might perhaps be a happiness peculiar to some superior being, e.g. a god; for of the other animals, which
25 are inferior in their nature to men, none have a right to the epithet 'happy'; for no horse, bird, or fish is happy, nor anything the name of which does not imply some share of a

21 sq. = *E. N.* 1095a 16–20. 22–24 = *E. N.* 1102a 13: cf. *M. M.* 1182b 2–5. 24–29 = *E. N.* 1099b 32–1100a 1.

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[1] Cf. 1216b 26–35.
[2] Cf. *Anal. Pr.* ii. cc. 2–4; *An. Post.* i. 75a 3 and 88a 20.
[3] Cf. 1216b 32 sq.
[4] ἔπειτα for ἐπὶ τό.

divine element in its nature; but in virtue of some other sort of participation in good things some have a better existence, some a worse.

But we must see later that this is so.[1] At present we say that of goods some are within the range of human action, some not; and this we say because some things—and therefore also some good things—are incapable of change, yet these are perhaps as to their nature the best. Some things, again, are within the range of action, but only to beings superior to us. But since 'within the range of action' is an ambiguous phrase—for both that for the sake of which we act and the things we do for its sake have to do with practice and thus we put among things within the range of action both health and wealth and the acts done for the sake of these ends, i.e. wholesome conduct and money-bringing conduct—it is clear that we must regard happiness as the best of what is within the range of action for man.

8 We must then examine what is the best, and in how many senses we use the word. The answer is principally contained in three views.[2] For men say that the good *per se* is the best of all things, the good *per se* being that whose property is to be the original good and the cause by its presence in other things of their being good; both of which attributes belong to the Idea of good (I mean by 'both' that of being the original good and also the cause of other things being good by its presence in them); for good is predicated of this Idea most truly (other things being good by participation in and likeness to this); and this is the original good, for the destruction of that which is participated in involves also the destruction of that which participates in the Idea, and is named from its participation in it. 1217[b]

33–35: cf. *E. N.* 1141[a] 34 sqq., 1178[b] 7 sqq. 39 sq.: cf. *E. N.* 1095[a] 13–20. 2–1218[a] 38 = *E. N.* 1096[a] 11–1097[a] 13: cf. *M. M.* 1182[b] 10–1183[b] 8, 1205[a] 8–11.

[1] No such discussion is to be found in the existing treatise.

[2] The three views seem to be those referred to in 1218[b] 7–11, that this good we are seeking is (1) the Idea of Good, (2) the common good, (3) the good as end.

But this is the relation of the first to the later, so that the Idea of good is the good *per se*; for this is also (they say) separable from what participates in it, like all other Ideas.

The discussion, however, of this view belongs necessarily to another inquiry and one for the most part more logical, for arguments that are at once destructive and general belong to no other science but logic. But if we must speak briefly about these matters, we say first that it is to speak abstractly and idly to assert that there is an Idea whether of good or of anything whatever—this has been considered in many ways both in our popular and in our philosophic discussions. Next, however much there are Ideas and in particular an Idea of good, they are perhaps useless with a view to a good life and to action. For the good has many senses, as numerous as those of being. For being, as we have divided it in other works, signifies now what a thing is, now quality, now quantity, now time, and again some of it consists in passivity, some in activity; and the good is found in each of these modes, in substance as mind and God, in quality as justice, in quantity as moderation, in time as opportunity, while as examples of it in change, we have that which teaches and that which is being taught. As then being is not one in all that we have just mentioned, so neither is good; nor is there one science either of being or of the good; not even things named good in the same category are the objects of a single science, e. g. opportunity or moderation; but one science studies one kind of opportunity or moderation, and another another: e. g. opportunity and moderation in regard to food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in military matters by the art of strategy, and similarly with other sorts of action, so that it can hardly be the province of one science to study the good *per se*.

1218a Further, in things having a natural succession, an earlier and a later, there is no common element beyond, and, further, separable from, them, for then there would be something prior to the first; for the common and separable

16 sq. = *E. N.* 1096b 30–32. 23–25 = *E. N.* 1096b 32–1097a 13. 25–1218a 1 = *E. N.* 1096a 23–34 : cf. *M. M.* 1183a 7–23. 1–8 = *E. N.* 1096a 17–23.

element would be prior, because with its destruction the first would be destroyed as well; e.g. if the double is the first of the multiples, then the universal multiple cannot be separable, for it would be prior to the double, if the common element turns out to be the Idea, as it would be if one made the common element separable: for if justice is good, and so also is bravery, there is then, they say, a good *per se*, for which they add '*per se*' to the general definition; but what could this mean except that it is 'eternal' and 'separable'? But what is white for many days is no whiter than that which is white for a single day; † so not even the common good would be identical with 'the Idea', for it is the common property of all†.[1]

But we should show the nature of the good *per se* in the opposite way to that now used. For now from what is not agreed to possess the good they demonstrate the things admitted to be good, e.g. from numbers they demonstrate that justice and health are goods, for they are arrangements and numbers, and it is assumed that goodness is a property of numbers and units because unity is the good itself. But they ought, from what are admitted to be goods, e.g. health, strength, and temperance, to demonstrate that beauty is present even more in the changeless; for all these things in the sensible world are order and rest; but if so, then the changeless is still more beautiful, for it has these attributes still more. And it is a bold way to demonstrate that unity is the good *per se* to say that numbers have desire; for no one says distinctly how they desire, but the saying is altogether too unqualified. And how can one suppose that there is desire where there is no life? One should consider seriously about this and not assume without reasons what it is not easy to believe even with reasons. And to say that all existing things desire some one good is not true; for each seeks its own special good, the eye vision, the body health, and so on.

There are then these difficulties in the way of there being

8-15 = *E. N.* 1096[a] 34-[b] 5. 15-24: cf. *M. M.* 1183[a] 24-28.

[1] Sus.'s additions are rejected.

a good *per se*; further, it would be useless to political
35 philosophy, which, like all others, has its particular good,
e. g. as gymnastic has good bodily condition.

[Further, there is the argument written in the discourse[1]
—that the Idea itself of good is useful to no art or to all
arts in the same way. Further, it is not practicable.] And
similarly neither is good as a universal either the good *per*
1218b *se* (for it might belong even to a small good) or practicable;
for medicine does not consider how to procure an attribute
that may be an attribute of *anything*, but how to procure
health; and so each of the other arts. But 'good' is
ambiguous, and there is in it a noble part,[2] and part is prac-
ticable but the rest not so. The sort of good that is
5 practicable is an object aimed at, but not the good in things
unchanging.

It is clear, then,[3] that neither the Idea of good nor the
good as universal is the good *per se* that we are actually
seeking; for the one is unchanging and not practical, and
the other though changing is still not practical. But the
10 object aimed at as end is best, and the cause of all that
comes under it, and first of all goods. This then would be
the good *per se*, the end of all human action. And this
would be what comes under the master-art of all, which is
politics, economics, and prudence;[4] for these mental habits
differ from all others by their being of this nature; whether
15 they differ from one another must be stated later.[5] And
that the end is the cause of all that comes under it, the
method of teaching shows; for the teacher first defines the
end and thence shows of each of the other things that it is
good; for the end aimed at is the cause. E. g. since to be

38–b 6: cf. *E. N.* 1097a 16 sqq., 1096b 32–35. 10–14 = *E. N.* 1094a 24–b 10, 1097a 16–24: cf. 1095a 13–16, 1094a 18–28.

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[1] The discourse seems to be the discussion of the Idea of Good in 1217b 16–1218a 32; 1217b 19–25 is especially referred to.

[2] i. e. τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀγαθόν, for which cf. 1217a 30, 1218a 22, b 7.

[3] Putting comma after ἕνεκα, l. 6, and inserting οὖν after φανερόν, l. 7 (Brandis).

[4] Cf. *Eth. Nic.* vi.

[5] No such discussion is to be found in the existing treatise, but cf. *E. N.* 1141b 21–1142a 11.

in health is so and so, so and so[1] must needs be what conduces to it; the wholesome is the efficient cause of health and yet[2] only of its actual existence; it is not the cause of health being good. Further, no one demonstrates that health is good (except he is a sophist and no doctor, but one who produces deceptive arguments from inappropriate considerations), any more than any other principle.

†We must now consider, making a fresh start, in how many senses the good as the end of man, the best in the field of action, is the best of all, since this is best.†

22–24: cf. *M. M.* 1182ᵇ 22–27, 1183ᵃ 35 sq.

[1] τοδί for τόδε (Spengel). [2] καίτοι for καὶ τότε (W. D. R.).

BOOK II

AFTER this let us start from a new beginning and speak 1
about what follows from it. All goods are either outside or in the soul, and of these those in the soul are more desirable; this distinction we make even in our popular discussions. For prudence, virtue, and pleasure are in the
35 soul, and some or all of these seem to all to be the end. But of the contents of the soul some are states or faculties, others activities and movements.

Let this then be assumed, and also that virtue is the best state or condition or faculty of all things that have a use
1219[a] and work. This is clear by induction; for in all cases we lay this down: e. g. a garment has an excellence, for it has a work and use, and the best state of the garment is its excellence. Similarly a vessel, house, or anything else has
5 an excellence; therefore so also has the soul, for it has a work. And let us assume that the better state has the better work; and as the states are to one another, so let us assume the corresponding works to be to one another. And the work of anything is its end; it is clear, therefore, from this that the work is better than the state; for the end
10 is best, as being end: for we assume the best, the final stage, to be the end for the sake of which all else exists. That the work, then, is better than the state or condition is plain.

But 'work' has two senses; for some things have a work beyond mere employment, as architecture has a house and
15 not the act of building, medicine health and not the act of curing and restoring to health; while the work of other things is just their employment, e. g. of vision seeing and of mathematical science contemplation. Hence, necessarily,

32–36 = *E. N.* 1098[b] 12–15, *M. M.* 1184[b] 1–6. 35: cf. *E. N.* 1098[b] 31 sqq. 37: cf. *E. N.* 1106[a] 15 sqq. 5 sqq.: cf. *E. N.* 1097[b] 23 sqq. 13–17 = *E. N.* 1094[a] 3–6: cf. *M. M.* 1184[b] 9–17, 1197[a] 3–10.

in those whose work is their employment the employment is more valuable than the state.

Having made these distinctions, we say that the work of a thing is also the work of its excellence, only not in the same sense, e.g. a shoe is the work both of the art of cobbling and of the action of cobbling. If, then, the art of cobbling and the good cobbler have an excellence, their work is a good shoe: and similarly with everything else.

Further, let the work of the soul be to produce living, this[1] consisting in employment and being awake—for slumber is a sort of inactivity and rest. Therefore, since the work must be one and the same both for the soul and for its excellence, the work of the excellence of the soul would be a good life. This, then, is the complete good, which (as we saw)[2] was happiness. And it is clear from our assumptions (for these were[3] that happiness was the best of things, and ends and the best goods were in the soul; and † it is itself either a state or an activity †),[4] since the activity is better than the state, and the best activity than the best state, and virtue is the best state, that the activity of the virtue of the soul is the best thing. But happiness, we saw,[5] was the best of things; therefore happiness is the activity of a good soul. But since happiness was[6] something complete, and living is either complete or incomplete and so also virtue—one virtue being a whole, the other a part—and the activity of what is incomplete is itself incomplete, therefore happiness would be the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue.

And that we have rightly stated its genus and definition common opinions prove. For to do well and to live well is held to be identical with being happy, but each of these—

18–23 = *E.N.* 1098[a] 7 sqq.: cf. *M.M.* 1184[b] 17–21. 23–35 = *E.N.* 1098[a] 5–17: cf. *M.M.* 1184[b] 22–1185[a] 9–13. 23–25 = *E.N.* 1095[b] 30–33, 1102[b] 7 sq. 25–27 = *E.N.* 1098[a] 5 sq., 1098[b] 29–1099[a] 3. 35–[b] 6 = *E.N.* 1098[a] 17–20, 1100[a] 1–5: cf. *M.M.* 1185[a] 1–6.

[1] τοῦτο for τοῦ (Cook Wilson). [2] 1218[b] 7–12.
[3] Cf. 1218[b] 7–12, 32–6; 1217[a] 21 sq.; cf. 39 sq.
[4] Corrupt: or something omitted (Sus.).
[5] 1217[a] 21 sq., 39 sq. [6] Cf. 1218[b] 7–12.

living and doing—is an employment, an activity; for the practical life is one of using or employing, e.g. the smith produces a bridle, the good horseman uses it.

We find confirmation also in the common opinion that we cannot ascribe happiness † to an existence of a single day,† or to a child, or to each of the ages of life; and therefore Solon's advice holds good, never to congratulate a man when living, but only when his life is ended. For nothing incomplete is happy, not being whole.

Further, praise is given to virtue because of its actions, but to actions something higher than praise, the encomium. And we crown the actual conquerors, not those who have the power to conquer but do not actually conquer. Further, our judging the character of a man by his acts is a confirmation. Further, why is happiness not praised? Surely because other things are praised owing to this, either by their having reference to it or by their being parts of it. Therefore felicitation, praise, and encomium differ; for encomium is discourse relative to the particular act, praise declares the general nature of the man, but felicitation is for the end. This clears up the difficulty sometimes raised—why for half their lives the good are no better than the bad, for all are alike when asleep; the cause is that sleep is an inactivity, not an activity of the soul. Therefore, even if there is some other part of the soul, e.g. the vegetative, its excellence is not a part of entire virtue, any more than the excellence of the body is; for in sleep the vegetative part is more active, while the perceptive and the appetitive are incomplete in sleep. But as far as they do to some extent partake of movement, even the visions of the good are better than those of the bad, except so far as they are caused by disease or bodily defect.

After this we must consider the soul. For virtue belongs to the soul and essentially so. But since we are looking

6–8 = *E. N.* 1100[a] 10 sqq.: cf. *M. M.* 1185[a] 6–9. 8, 9 = *E. N.* 1101[b] 31–34: cf. *M. M.* 1183[b] 20–35. 9 sq.: cf. *E. N.* 1099[a] 3–5. 11–16 = *E. N.* 1101[b] 21–34: cf. *M. M.* 1183[b] 20–35. 16–25 = *E. N.* 1102[a] 28–[b] 12: cf. *M. M.* 1185[a] 9–13. 26 sq. = *E. N.* 1102[a] 13–22. 26–1220[a] 12: cf. *M. M.* 1185[a] 36–[b] 12, *E. N.* 1102[a] 23–1103[a] 10. 27–31 = *E. N.* 1102[b] 13–1103[a] 3.

for human virtue, let it be assumed that the parts of the soul partaking of reason are two, but that they partake not in the same way, but the one by its natural tendency to command, the other by its natural tendency to obey and listen; if there is a part without reason in some other sense, let it be disregarded. It makes no difference whether the soul is divisible or indivisible, so long as it has different faculties, namely those mentioned above, just as in the curved we have unseparated the concave and the convex, or, again, the straight and the white, yet the straight is not white except incidentally and is not the same in essence.[1]

We also neglect any other part of the soul that there may be, e.g. the vegetative, for the above-mentioned parts are peculiar to the human soul; therefore the virtues of the nutritive part, that concerned with growth, are not those of man. For, if we speak of him *qua* man, he must have the power of reasoning, a governing principle,[2] moral action; but reason governs not reason, but desire and the passions; he must then have these parts. And just as general good condition of the body is compounded of the partial excellences, so also the excellence of the soul, *qua* end.

But of virtue or excellence there are two species, the moral and the intellectual. For we praise not only the just but also the intelligent and the wise. For we assumed[3] that what is praiseworthy is either the virtue or its act, and these are not activities, but have activities. But since the intellectual virtues involve reason, they belong to that rational part of the soul which governs the soul by its possession of reason, while the moral belong to the part which is irrational but by its nature obedient to the part possessing reason; for we do not describe the character of a man by saying that he is wise or clever, but by saying that he is gentle or bold.

After this we must first consider moral virtue, its nature,

32–36 = *E. N.* 1102a 28–32. 36–1220a 4 = *E. N.* 1102a 32–b 12. 5–12 = *E. N.* 1103a 3–10: cf. *M. M.* 1185b 5–12. 8–11: cf. *E. N.* 1102b 13 sq., 30 sq.

[1] οὐσίᾳ τὸ αὐτό (Bonitz). [2] Retaining καί.
[3] Cf. 1219b 8 sqq., 15 sq., 1218b 37 sqq.

its parts—for our inquiry has been forced back on this—
15 and how it is produced. We must make our search as all
do in other things—they search having something to start
with; so here, by means of true but indistinct judgements,
we must [1] try to attain to what is true and distinct. For
we are now in the condition of one who describes health as
the best condition of the body, or Coriscus as the darkest
20 man in the market-place; for what either of these is we do
not know, but yet for the attainment of knowledge of either [2]
it is worth while to be in this condition. First, then, let it
be laid down that the best state is produced by the best
means, and that with regard to everything the best is done
from the excellence of that thing (e.g. the exercises and
25 food are best which produce a good condition of body, and
from such a condition men best perform exercises). Further,
that every condition is produced and destroyed by some sort
of application of the same things, e.g. health from food, exer-
cises, and weather.[3] This is clear from induction. Virtue too,
then, is that sort of condition which is produced by the
30 best movements in the soul, and from which are produced
the soul's best works and feelings; and by the same things,
if they happen in one way, it is produced, but if they happen
in another, it is destroyed. The employment of virtue is
relative to the same things by which it is increased and
destroyed, and it puts us in the best attitude towards them.
35 A proof that both virtue and vice are concerned with the
pleasant and the painful is that punishment being cure and
operating through opposites, as the cure does in everything
else, acts through these.

That moral virtue, then, is concerned with the pleasant 2
and the painful is clear. But since the character, being as
1220b its name indicates something that grows by habit [4]—and
that which is under guidance other than innate [5] is trained to

26–34 = *E.N.* 1104a 11–b 3: cf. *M.M.* 1185b 13–32. *E.N.* 1105a 14–17. 34–39 = *E.N.* 1104b 4–1105a 13: cf. *M.M.* 1185b 33–37. 39–b 6 = *E.N.* 1103a 14–23: cf. *M.M.* 1185b 38–1186a 8.

[1] δεῖ (MSS.) for ἀεί (Sus.).
[2] αὐτοῖν for αὐτῆς (rc. Mb).
[3] Cf. *Hist. An.* 601a 23 sq. (Fr.).
[4] ἦθος from ἔθος.
[5] ἀγωγὴν (W.D.R.) μὴ ἔμφυτον (Fr.).

a habit by frequent movement of a particular kind—is the active principle present after this process, but in things inanimate we do not see this (for even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times, it will never go upward except by compulsion),—consider, then, character to be this, viz. a quality in accordance with governing reason belonging to the irrational part of the soul which is yet able to obey the reason. Now we have to state in respect of what part of the soul we have character of this or that kind.[1] It will be in respect of the faculties of passion, in virtue of which men are spoken of as subject to passion, and in respect of the habits, in virtue of which men are described, in reference to those passions, either as feeling them in some way or as not feeling them. After this comes the division made in previous discussions[2] into the passions, faculties, and habits. By passions I mean such as anger, fear, shame, sensual desire—in general, all that is usually followed of itself by sensuous pleasure or pain. Quality does not depend on these—they are merely experienced—but on the faculties. By faculty I mean that in virtue of which men who act from their passions are called after them, e.g. are called irascible, insensible, amorous, bashful, shameless. And habits are the causes through which these faculties belong to us either in a reasonable way or the opposite, e.g. bravery, temperance, cowardice, intemperance.

3 After these distinctions we must notice that in everything continuous and divisible there is excess, deficiency, and the mean, and these in relation to one another or in relation to us, e.g. in the gymnastic or medical arts, in those of building and navigation, and in any sort of action, alike scientific and non-scientific, skilled and unskilled. For motion is continuous, and action is motion. In all the mean in relation to us is the best; for this is as knowledge

7–20 = *E. N.* 1105ᵇ 19–1106ᵃ 12 : cf. *M. M.* 1186ᵃ 9–17. 21–35 = *E. N.* 1106ᵃ 26–ᵇ 35 : cf. *M. M.* 1186ᵃ 17–32.

[1] ποῖ ἄττα (ποῖ ἄττα MSS.) for ποιότης τά.

[2] διειλεγμένοις Rass. for ἀπηλλαγμένοις : perhaps the author refers to *E. N.* 1105ᵇ 20.

and reason direct us. And this everywhere also makes the best habit. This is clear both by induction and by reasoning. For opposites destroy one another, and extremes are opposite both to one another and to the mean; for the mean is to either extreme the other extreme, e.g. the equal is greater to the less, but less to the greater. Therefore moral virtue must have to do with the mean and be a sort of mediety. We must then notice what sort of mediety virtue is and about what sort of means; let each be taken from the list by way of illustration, and studied:

irascibility	lack of feeling	gentleness
audacity	cowardice	bravery
1221a shamelessness	shyness	modesty
intemperance	insensibility	temperance
envy	(unnamed)	righteous indignation
gain	loss	the just
lavishness	meanness	liberality
boastfulness	self-depreciation	sincerity
habit of flattery	habit of dislike	friendliness
servility	stubbornness	dignity
luxuriousness	submission to evils	endurance
vanity	meanness of spirit	greatness of spirit
extravagance	pettiness	magnificence
cunning	simplicity	prudence

These and similar are the passions that occur in the soul; they receive their names, some from being excesses, some from being defects. For the irascible is one who is angry more than he ought to be, and more quickly, and with more people than he ought; the unfeeling is deficient in regard to persons, occasions, and manner. The man who fears neither what, nor when, nor as he ought is confident; the man who fears what he ought not, and on the wrong occasions, and in the wrong manner is cowardly. So 'intemperate' is the name for one prone to sensual desire and exceeding in all possible ways, while he who is deficient and does not feel desire even so far as is good for him and

36–1221b 9 = *E.N.* 1107a 26–1108b 10. 13–b 17: cf. *M.M.* 1186a 17–32.

in accordance with nature, but is as much without feeling as a stone, is insensible. The man who makes profit from any source is greedy of gain; the man who makes it from none, or perhaps few,[1] is a 'waster'. The braggart is one who pretends to more than he possesses, the self-depreciator is one who pretends to less. The man who is more ready than is proper to join in praise is a flatterer; the man who is less ready is prone to dislike. To act in everything so as to give another pleasure is servility, but to give pleasure seldom and reluctantly is stubbornness. Further, one who can endure no pain, even if it is good for him, is luxurious; one who can endure all pain alike has no name literally applicable to him, but by metaphor is called hard, patient, or ready of submission. The vain man is he who thinks himself worthy of more than he is, while the poor-spirited thinks himself worthy of less. Further, the lavish is he who exceeds, the mean is he who is deficient, in every sort of expenditure. Similar are the stingy and the purse-proud; the latter exceeds what is fitting, the former falls short of it. The rogue aims at gain in any way and from any source; the simple not even from the right source. A man is envious in feeling pain at the sight of prosperity more often than he ought, for even those who deserve prosperity cause when prosperous pain to the envious; the opposite character has not so definite a name: he is one who shows 1221[b] excess in not grieving even at the prosperity of the undeserving, but accepts all, as gluttons accept all food, while his opposite is impatient through envy.

It is superfluous to add to the definition that the particular relations to each thing should not be accidental; for no art, theoretical or productive, uses such additions to its definitions in speech or action; the addition is merely directed against logical quibbles against the arts. Take the above, then, as simple definitions, which will be made more accurate when we speak of the opposite habits.

But of these states themselves there are species with

10–15 = *E. N.* 1126[a] 8–31.

[1] ⟨εἴ γε⟩ before ὀλιγαχόθεν (Bussemaker).

names differing according as the excess is in time, in degree, or in the object provoking the state: e.g. one is quick-tempered through feeling anger quicker than one ought, irascible and passionate through feeling it more, acrid through one's tendency to retain one's anger, violent and abusive through the punishments one inflicts from anger. Epicures, gluttons, drunkards are so named from having a tendency contrary to reason to indulgence in one or the other kind of nutriment.[1]

Nor must we forget that some of the faults mentioned cannot be taken to depend on the manner of action, if manner means excess of passion: e.g. the adulterer is not so called from his excessive intercourse with married women; 'excess' is inapplicable here, but the act is simply in itself wicked; the passion and its character are expressed in the same word. Similarly with outrage. Hence men dispute the liability of their actions to be called by these names; they say that they had intercourse but did not commit adultery (for they acted ignorantly or by compulsion), or that they gave a blow but committed no outrage; and so they defend themselves against all other similar charges.

4 Having got so far, we must next say that, since there are two parts of the soul, the virtues are divided correspondingly, those of the rational part being the intellectual, whose function is truth, whether about a thing's nature or genesis, while the others belong to the part irrational but appetitive—for not any and every part of the soul, supposing it to be divisible, is appetitive. Necessarily, then, the character must be bad or good by its pursuit or avoidance of certain pleasures and pains. This is clear from our classification [2] of the passions, powers, and states; for the powers and states are powers and states of the passions, and the passions are distinguished by pain and pleasure. So that for these reasons and also because of our previous

15–17: cf. *E. N.* 1118[b] 16–21. 18–26 = *E. N.* 1107[a] 8–27: cf. *M. M.* 1186[a] 36–[b] 3. 27–1222[a] 2: cf. *M. M.* 1186[a] 32–35. 32–1222[a] 5 = *E. N.* 1104[b] 3–1105[a] 13.

[1] i. e. food or drink.

[2] Cf. 1220[b] 7–20.

propositions[1] it follows that all moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains. For by whatever things a soul tends to become better or worse, it is with regard to and in relation to these things that it finds pleasure. But we say men are bad through pleasures and pains, either by the pursuit and avoidance of improper pleasures or pains or by their pursuit in an improper way. Therefore all readily define the virtues as insensibility or immobility as regards pleasures and pains, and vices as constituted by the opposites of these.

5 But since we have assumed[2] that virtue is that sort of habit from which men have a tendency to do the best actions, and through which they are in the best disposition towards what is best; and best is what is in accordance with right reason, and this is the mean between excess and defect relative to us; it would follow that moral virtue is a mean relative to each individual himself, and is concerned with certain means in pleasures and pains, in the pleasant and the painful. The mean will sometimes be in pleasures (for there too is excess and defect), sometimes in pains, sometimes in both. For he who is excessive in his feeling of delight exceeds in the pleasant, but he who exceeds in his feeling of pain, in the painful—and this either absolutely or with reference to some standard, e.g. when he differs from the majority of men; but the good man feels as he ought. But since there is a habit in consequence of which its possessor will in some cases admit the excess, in others the defect of the same thing, it follows that as these acts are opposed to one another and to the mean, so the habits will also be opposed to one another and to virtue.

It happens, however, that sometimes all these oppositions will be clearer, sometimes those on the side of excess, sometimes those on the side of defect. And the reason of the difference is that †the unlikeness or likeness to the mean is not always of the same kind†, but in one case one might change quicker from the excess to the middle habit, some-

2–5 = *E. N.* 1104b 24–28. 6–8 = *E. N.* 1104b 27 sq. 17–1222b 14 = *E. N.* 1108b 11–1109a 19: cf. *M. M.* 1186b 4–32.

[1] Cf. 1220a 26–37, b34, 35. [2] Cf. 1218b 37 sqq.

times from the defect, and the person further distant seems more opposed; e. g. in regard to the body excess in exercise is healthier than defect, and nearer to the mean, but in food defect is healthier than excess. And so of those states of will which tend to training now some, now others, will show a greater tendency to health in case of the two acts of choice[1]—now those good at work, now those good at abstemiousness[2]; and he who is opposed to the moderate and the reasonable will be the man who avoids exercise, not both; and in the case of food the self-indulgent man, not the man who starves himself. And the reason is that from the start our nature does not diverge in the same way from the mean as regards all things; we are less inclined to exercise, and more inclined to indulgence. So it is too with regard to the soul. We regard, then, as the habit opposed to the mean, that towards which both our faults and men in general are more inclined—the other extreme, as though not existent, escapes our notice, being unperceived because of its rarity. Thus we oppose anger to gentleness, and the irascible to the gentle. Yet there is also excess in the direction of gentleness and readiness to be reconciled, and the repression of anger when one is struck. But the men prone to this are few, and all incline more to the opposite extreme; there is none of the spirit of reconciliation[3] in anger.

And since we have reached a list of the habits in regard to the several passions, with their excesses and defects, and the opposite habits in virtue of which men are as right reason directs them to be—(what right reason is, and with an eye to what standard we are to fix the mean, must be considered later[4])—it is clear that all the moral virtues and vices have to do with excesses and defects of pleasures and pains, and that pleasures and pains arise from the above-mentioned habits and passions. But the best habit is that which is the mean in respect of each class of things. It is clear then that all, or at least some, of the virtues will be connected with means.

[1] i. e. choice of amount of exercise, of amount of food.
[2] Keep *οἱ* and adjs. in masc., not fem. as Bz., Sus.
[3] *καταλλακτικόν* (Fr.). [4] 1249a 21–b 23: cf. *E. N.* 1138b 15–34.

6 Let us, then, take another starting-point for the succeeding inquiry. Every substance is by nature a sort of principle; therefore each can produce many similar to itself, as man man, animals[1] in general animals, and plants plants. But in addition to this *man* alone of animals is also the source of certain actions; for no other animal would be said to act. Such principles, which are primary sources of movements, are called principles in the strict sense, and most properly such as have necessary results; God is doubtless a principle of this kind. The strict sense of 'principle' is not to be found among principles without movement, e. g. those of mathematics, though by analogy we use the name there also. For there, too, if the principle should change, practically all that is proved from it would alter; but its consequences do not change themselves, one being destroyed by another, except by destroying the assumption and, by its refutation, proving the truth.[2] But man is the source of a kind of movement, for action is movement. But since, as elsewhere, the source or principle is the cause of all that exists or arises through it, we must take the same view as in demonstrations. For if, supposing the triangle to have its angles equal to two right angles, the quadrilateral must have them equal to four right angles, it is clear that the property of the triangle is the cause of this last. And if the triangle should change, then so must the quadrilateral, having six right angles if the triangle has three, and eight if it has four: but if the former does not change but remains as it was before, so must the quadrilateral.

The necessity of what we are endeavouring to show is clear from the Analytics[3]; at present we can neither affirm nor deny anything with precision except just this.

Supposing there were no further cause for the triangle's

15–1123a 20 = *E. N.* 1113b 3–1115a 13: cf. *M. M.* 1187a 5–b 30. 15–20 = *E. N.* 1113b 16–18. 20: cf. *E. N.* 1099b 32–1100a 1, 1111a 25 sq.

[1] Omit ὄν (Sus.).

[2] e. g. if ἀρχή A led to B and C, of which C was absurd, then C by refuting A would refute the other consequence B.

[3] Cf. *Anal. Post.* i. 4.

having the above property, then the triangle would be a sort of principle or cause of all that comes later. So that if anything existent may have the opposite to its actual
1223a qualities, so of necessity may its principles. For what results from the necessary is necessary; but the results of the contingent might be the opposite of what they are; what depends on men themselves forms a great portion of contingent matters, and men themselves are the sources of such contingent results. So that it is clear that all the acts of which man is the principle and controller may either happen or not happen, and that their happening or not happening—those at least of whose existence or non-existence he has the control—depends on him. But of what it depends on him to do or not to do, he is himself the cause; and what he is the cause of depends on him. And since virtue and vice and the acts that spring from them are respectively praised or blamed—for we do not praise or blame for what is due to necessity, or chance, or nature, but only for what we ourselves are causes of; for what another is the cause of, for that he bears the blame or praise—it is clear that virtue and vice have to do with matters where the man himself is the cause and source of his acts. We must then ascertain of what actions he is himself the source and cause. Now, we all admit that of acts that are voluntary and done from the deliberate choice of each man he is the cause, but of involuntary acts he is not himself the cause; and all that he does from deliberate choice he clearly does voluntarily. It is clear then that virtue and vice have to do with voluntary acts.

We must then ascertain what is the voluntary and the 7
involuntary, and what is deliberate choice, since by these virtue and vice are defined. First we must consider the voluntary and involuntary. Of three things it would seem to be one, agreement with either desire, or choice, or thought—that is, the voluntary would agree, the involuntary

4–9 = *E. N.* 1113b 13–21. 9–13 = *E. N.* 1109b 30–34. 21–b 17 = *E. N.* 1109b 30–1111b 3. 21–b 36: cf. *M. M.* 1187b 31–1188a 37.

would be contrary to one of these. But again, desire is divided into three sorts, wish, anger, and sensual appetite. We have, then, to distinguish these, and first to consider the case of agreement with sensual appetite.

Now all that is in agreement with sensual appetite would seem to be voluntary; for all the involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced is painful, and so is all that men do and suffer from compulsion—as Evenus says,[1] 'all to which we are compelled is unpleasant.' So that if an act is painful it is forced on us, and if forced it is painful. But all that is contrary to sensual appetite is painful—for such appetite is for the pleasant—and therefore forced and involuntary; what then agrees with sensual appetite is voluntary; for these two are opposites. Further, all wickedness makes one more unjust, and incontinence seems to be wickedness, the incontinent being the sort of man that acts in accordance with his appetite and contrary to his reason, and shows his incontinence when he acts in accordance with his appetite; but to act unjustly is 1223b voluntary, so that the incontinent will act unjustly by acting according to his appetite; he will then act voluntarily, and what is done according to appetite is voluntary. †Indeed, it would be absurd that those who become incontinent should be more just.†[2]

From these considerations, then, the act done from appetite would seem voluntary, but from the following the opposite: what a man does voluntarily he wishes, and what he wishes to do he does voluntarily. But no one wishes what he thinks to be bad; but surely the man who acts incontinently does not do what he wishes, for to act incontinently is to act through appetite contrary to what the man thinks best; whence it results that the same man acts at the same time both voluntarily and involuntarily; but this is impossible. Further, the continent will do a just act, †and more so than incontinence†; for continence is a virtue, and virtue makes men more just. Now one acts continently whenever he acts against his appetite in accord-

[1] Fr. 8 Hiller.
[2] This should perhaps be transferred to a 36 or b 12 (Spengel).

ance with his reason. So that if to act justly is voluntary as to act unjustly is—for both these seem to be voluntary, and if the one is, so must the other be—but action contrary to appetite is involuntary, then the same man will at the same time do the same thing voluntarily and involuntarily.

The same argument may be applied to anger; for there is thought to be a continence and incontinence of anger just as there is of appetite; and what is contrary to our anger is painful, and the repression is forced, so that if the forced is involuntary, all acts done out of anger would be voluntary. Heraclitus, too, seems to be regarding the strength of anger when he says that the restraint of it is painful—'It is hard,' he says, 'to fight with anger; for it gives its life for what it desires.' But if it is impossible for a man voluntarily and involuntarily to do the same thing[1] at the same time, and in regard to[2] the same part of the act, then what is done from wish is more voluntary than that which is done from appetite or anger; and a proof of this is that we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire.

It remains then to consider whether to act from wish and to act voluntarily are identical. But this too seems impossible. For we assumed and all admit that wickedness makes men more unjust, and incontinence seems a kind of wickedness. But the opposite will result from the hypothesis above; for no one wishes what he thinks bad, but does it when he becomes[3] incontinent. If, then, to commit injustice is voluntary, and the voluntary is what agrees with wish, then when a man becomes incontinent he will be no longer committing injustice, but will be more just than before he became incontinent. But this is impossible.[4] That the voluntary then is not action in accordance with desire, nor the involuntary action in opposition to it, is clear.

8 But again, that action in accordance with, or in opposition to, choice is not the true description of the voluntary and

18 sqq. = *E. N.* 1111a 24 sq.: cf. *M. M.* 1188a 23 sq. 22–24 = *E. N.* 1105a 7 sq. 37–1225a 1: cf. *M. M.* 1188a 38–b 14.

[1] Reading τὸ αὐτό (Pb Bekker). [2] ἅμα καὶ κατά (Bz.).
[3] Reading γένηται, l. 33. [4] Cf. 1223b 2.

involuntary is clear from the following considerations: it has been shown[1] that the act in agreement with wish was not involuntary, but rather that all that one wishes is 1224a voluntary, though it has also been shown[2] that one may do voluntarily what one does not wish. But we do many things from wish suddenly, but no one deliberately chooses an act suddenly.

But if, as we saw,[3] the voluntary must be one of these three—action according either to desire, choice, or thought, and it is not two of these, the remaining alternative is that the voluntary consists in action with some kind of thought. Advancing a little further, let us close our delimitation of the voluntary and the involuntary. To act on compulsion or not on compulsion seems connected with these terms; for we say that the enforced is involuntary, and all the involuntary is enforced: so that first we must consider the action done on compulsion, its nature and its relation to the voluntary and the involuntary. Now the enforced and the necessary, force and necessity, seem opposed to the voluntary and to persuasion in the case of acts done. Generally, we speak of enforced action and necessity even in the case of inanimate things; for we say that a stone moves upwards and fire downwards on compulsion and by force; but when they move according to their natural internal tendency, we do not call the act one due to force; nor do we call it voluntary either; there is no name for this antithesis; but when they move contrary to this tendency, then we say they move by force. So, too, among things living and among animals we often see things suffering and acting from force, when something from without moves them contrary to their own internal tendency. Now in the inanimate the moving principle is simple, but in the animated there is more than one principle; for desire and reason do not always agree. And so with the other animals the action on compulsion is simple (just as in the inanimate), for they have not desire and reason opposing one another, but live by desire; but man has both, that is

[1] Cf. 1223b 2 sq. and 24-27.
[2] Omit μόνον (J. S.): cf. 1223b 30–36 and 7–9.
[3] Cf. 1223a 23–26.

at a certain age, to which we attribute also the power of action; for we do not use this term of the child, nor of the brute, but only of the man who has come to act from reason.

So the compulsory act seems always painful, and no one acts from force and yet with pleasure. Hence there arises much dispute about the continent and incontinent, for each of them acts with two tendencies mutually opposed, so that (as the expression goes) the continent forcibly drags himself from the pleasant appetites (for he feels pain in dragging himself away against the resistance of desire), while the incontinent forcibly drags himself contrary to his reason. But still the latter seems less to be in pain; for appetite is for the pleasant, and this he follows with delight; so that the incontinent rather acts voluntarily and not from force, because he acts without pain. But persuasion is opposed 1224b to force and necessity, and the continent goes [1] towards what he is persuaded of, and so proceeds not from force but voluntarily. But appetite leads without persuading, being devoid of reason. We have, then, shown [2] that these alone seem to act from force and involuntarily, and why they seem to, viz. from a certain likeness to the enforced action, in virtue of which we attribute enforced action also to the inanimate. Yet if we add [3] the addition made in our definition, there also the statement becomes untrue. For it is only when something *external* moves a thing, or brings it to rest against its own internal tendency, that we say this happens by force; otherwise we do not say that it happens by force. But in the continent and the incontinent it is the present *internal* tendency that leads them, for they have both tendencies. So that neither acts on compulsion nor by force, but, as far at least as the above goes, voluntarily. For the external moving principle, that hinders or moves in opposition to the internal tendency, is what we call necessity, e.g. when we strike some one with the hand of one whose wish and appetite alike resist; but when the principle is from within, there is no force. Further, there

[1] ἄγεται should perhaps be read.
[2] Cf. a 22 sq.
[3] Reading προσθείη (Spengel).

is both pleasure and pain in both; for the continent feels pain now in acting against his appetite, but has the pleasure of hope, i. e. that he will be presently benefited, or even the pleasure of being actually at present benefited because he is in health; while the incontinent is pleased at getting through his incontinency what he desires, but has a pain of expectation, thinking that he is doing ill. So that to say that both act from compulsion is not without reason, the one sometimes acting involuntarily owing to his desire, the other owing to his reason; these two, being separated, are thrust out by one another. Whence men apply the language to the soul as a whole, because we see something like the above in the case of[1] the elements of the soul. Now of the parts of the soul this may be said; but the soul as a whole, whether in the continent or the incontinent, acts voluntarily; and neither acts on compulsion, but one of the elements in them does, since by nature we have both. For reason is in them by nature, because if growth is permitted and not maimed, it will be there; and appetite, because it accompanies and is present in us from birth. But these are practically the two marks by which we define the natural—it is either that which is found with us as soon as we are born, or that which comes to us if growth is allowed to proceed regularly, e. g. grey hair, old age, and so on. So that either acts, in a way,[2] contrary to nature, and yet, broadly speaking, according to nature, but not the same nature. The puzzles then about the continent and incontinent are these—do both, or one of them, act on compulsion, so that they act involuntarily or else at the same time both on compulsion and voluntarily; that is, if the compulsory is involuntary, both voluntarily and involuntarily? And it is tolerably clear from the above how these puzzles are to be met.

In another way, too, men are said to act by force and compulsion without any disagreement between reason and desire in them, viz. when they do what they consider both painful

b 2–36 = *E. N.* 1110a 4 sq.: cf. *M. M.* 1188b 14–24.

[1] ⟨ἐπὶ⟩ before τῶν (J. S.).
[2] ⟨πως⟩ (suggested by Sus.) after πράττει.

and bad, but they are threatened with stripes, imprisonment, or death, if they do not do it. Such acts they say they did on compulsion. Or shall we deny this, and say that all do the act itself voluntarily? for they had the power to abstain from doing it, and to submit to the suffering. Again perhaps one might say that some such acts were voluntary and some not. For whatever of the acts that a man does without wishing them he has the power to do or abstain from doing,[1] these he always does voluntarily and not by force; but those in which he has not this power, he does by force in a sense (but not absolutely), because he does not choose the very thing he does, but the purpose for which it is done, since there is a difference, too, in this. For if a man were to murder another that he might not catch him at blind man's buff he would be laughed at if he were to say that he acted by force, and on compulsion; there ought to be some greater and more painful evil that he would suffer if he did not commit the murder. For then he will act on compulsion, and either[2] by force, or at least not by nature, when he does something evil for the sake of good, or release from a greater evil; then he will at least act involuntarily, for such acts are not subject to his control. Hence, many regard love, anger in some cases, and natural conditions, as involuntary, as being too strong for nature; we feel indulgence for them as things capable of overpowering nature. A man would more seem to act from force and involuntarily, if he acted to escape violent than if to escape gentle pain, and generally if to escape pain than if to get pleasure. For that which depends on him—and all turns on this—is what his nature is able to bear; what it is not, what is not under the control of his natural desire or reason, that does not depend on him. Therefore those who are inspired and prophesy, though their act is one of thought, we still say have it not in their own power either to say what they said, or to do what they did. And so of acts done through appetite. So that some thoughts and passions do not depend on us, nor the acts following such thoughts

[1] μὴ πρᾶξαι ἢ πρᾶξαι instead of μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι (Speng.).
[2] ἤ for μή (Bz.)

and reasonings, but, as Philolaus said, some arguments are too strong for us.

So that if the voluntary and involuntary had to be considered [1] in reference to the presence of force as well as from other points of view, let this be our final distinction. †Nothing obscures the idea of the voluntary so much as the use of the expression that men act from force and yet voluntarily†.

9 Since we have finished this subject, and we have found 1225[b] the voluntary not to be defined either by desire or by choice, it remains to define it as that which depends on thought. The voluntary, then, seems opposed to the involuntary, and to act with knowledge of the person acted on, instrument and tendency—for sometimes one knows the object, e. g. as father, but not that the tendency of the act is to kill, not to save, as in the case of Pelias's daughters; or knows the object to be a drink but takes it to be a philtre or wine when it was really hemlock—seems opposed to action in ignorance of the person, instrument, or thing, if, that is, the action is essentially the effect of ignorance. All that is done owing to ignorance, whether of person, instrument, or thing, is involuntary; the opposite therefore is voluntary. All, then, that a man does—it being in his power to abstain from doing it—not in ignorance and owing to himself must needs be voluntary; voluntariness is this. But all that he does in ignorance and owing to his ignorance, he does involuntarily. But since science or knowledge is of two sorts, one the possession, the other the use of knowledge, the man who has, but does not use knowledge may in a sense be justly called ignorant, but in another sense not justly, e. g. if he had not used his knowledge owing to carelessness. Similarly, one might be blamed for not having the knowledge, if it were something easy or necessary and he does not have it because of carelessness or pleasure or pain. This, then, we must add to our definition.

36–[b] 16 = *E. N.* 1110[b] 18–1111[a] 21 : cf. *M. M.* 1188[b] 25–38.

[1] Cf. 1224[a] 9–11.

Such, then, is the completion of our distinction of the voluntary and the involuntary.

Let us next speak about choice, first raising various difficulties about it. For one might doubt to what genus it belongs and in which to place it, and whether the voluntary and the chosen are or are not the same. Now some insist that choice is either opinion or desire, and the inquirer might well think that it was one or the other, for both are found accompanying it. Now that it is not desire is plain; for then it would be either wish, appetite, or anger, for none desires without having experienced one of these feelings. But anger and appetite belong also to the brutes while choice does not; further, even those who are capable of both the former often choose without either anger or appetite; and when they are under the influence of those passions they do not choose but remain unmoved by them. Further, anger and appetite always involve pain, but we often choose without pain. But neither are wish and choice the same; for we often wish for what we know is impossible, e. g. to rule all mankind or to be immortal, but no one chooses such things unless ignorant of the impossibility, nor even what is possible, generally, if he does not think it in his power to do or to abstain from doing it. So that this is clear, that the object of choice must be one of the things in our own power. Similarly, choice is not an opinion nor, generally, what one thinks; for the object of choice was[1] something in one's power and many things may be thought that are not, e. g. that the diagonal is commensurable; and further, choice is not either true or false. Nor yet is choice identical with our opinion about matters of practice which are in our own power, as when we think that we ought to do or not to do something. This argument applies to wish as well as to opinion; for no one chooses an end, but the means to an end, e. g. no one chooses to be in health, but to walk or to sit for the purpose of keeping well; no one chooses to be happy but to make money or run risks for the purpose of

17–1227a 17 = *E. N.* 1111b 4–1113a 12: cf. *M. M.* 1189a 1–b 25.

[1] Cf. 1223a 16–19.

being happy. And in general, in choosing we show both what we choose and for what we choose it, the latter being that for which we choose something else, the former that which we choose for something else. But it is the end that we specially *wish for*, and we *think* we ought to be healthy and happy. So that it is clear through this that choice is different both from opinion and from wish; for wish and opinion are specially of the end, but choice is not.

It is clear, then, that choice is not wish, or opinion, or judgement simply. But in what does it differ from these? How is it related to the voluntary? The answer to these questions will also make it clear what choice is. Of possible things, then, there are some such that we can deliberate about them, while about others we cannot. For some things are possible, but the production of them is not in our power, some being due to nature, others to other causes; and about these none would attempt to deliberate except in ignorance. But about others, not only existence and non-existence is possible, but also human deliberation; these are things the doing or not doing of which is in our own power. Therefore, we do not deliberate about the affairs of the Indians nor how the circle may be squared; for the first are not in *our* power, the second is wholly beyond the power of action; but we do not even deliberate about all things that may be done and that are in our power (by which it is clear that choice is not opinion simply), though the matters of choice and action belong to the class of things in our own power. One might then raise the problem—why do doctors deliberate about matters within their science, but not grammarians? The reason is that error may occur in two ways (either in reasoning or in perception when we are engaged in the very act), and in medicine one may go wrong in both ways, but in grammar one can do so only in respect of the perception and action, and if they inquired about this there would be no end to their inquiries. Since then choice is[1] neither opinion nor wish singly nor yet both (for no one chooses suddenly, though he thinks he ought to act, and wishes, suddenly), it must be com-

[1] Omitting *ἐστι προαίρεσις* (P^b).

pounded of both, for both are found in a man choosing. But we must ask—how compounded out of these? The very name is some indication. For choice is not simply taking but taking one thing before another; and this is impossible without consideration and deliberation; therefore choice arises out of deliberate opinion.

Now about the end no one deliberates (this being fixed for all), but about that which tends to it—whether this or that tends to it, and—supposing this or that resolved on—how it is to be brought about. All consider this till they have brought the commencement of the production to a point in their own power. If then, no one deliberately chooses without some preparation, without some consideration whether it is better or worse to do so and so, and if one considers all that are in one's power of the means to the end which are capable of existing or not existing, it is clear that choice is a considered desire for something in one's own power; for we all consider what we choose, but we do not choose all that we consider. I call it considered when consideration is the source and cause of the desire, and the man desires because of the consideration. Therefore in the other animals choice does not exist, nor in man at every age or in every condition; for there is not consideration or judgement of the ground of an act; but it is quite possible that many animals have an opinion whether a thing is to be done or not; only thinking with consideration is impossible to them. For the considering part of the soul is that which observes a cause of some sort; and the object of an action is one of the causes; for we call cause that owing to which a thing comes about; but the purpose of a thing's existence or production is what we specially call its cause, e.g. of walking, the fetching of things, if this is the purpose for which one walks. Therefore, those who have no aim fixed have no inclination to deliberate. So that since, if a man of himself and not through ignorance does or abstains from that which is in his power to do or abstain from, he acts or abstains voluntarily, but we do many such things without deliberation or premeditation, it follows that all that has been deliberately chosen is voluntary, but not all the volun-

tary is deliberately chosen, and that all that is according to choice is voluntary, but not all that is voluntary is according to choice. And at the same time it is clear from this that those legislators define well who enact that some states of feeling are to be considered voluntary, some involuntary, and some premeditated; for if they are not thoroughly accurate, at least they approximate to the truth. But about this we will speak in our investigation of justice;[1] meanwhile, it is clear that deliberate choice is not simply wish or simply opinion, but opinion and desire together when following as a conclusion from deliberation. 1227a

But since in deliberating one always deliberates for the sake of some end, and he who deliberates has always an aim by reference to which he judges what is expedient, no one deliberates about the end; this is the starting-point and assumption, like the assumptions in theoretical science (we have spoken about this shortly in the beginning of this work and minutely in the Analytics[2]). Every one's inquiry, whether made with or without art, is about what tends to the end, e.g. whether they shall go to war or not, when this is what they are deliberating about. But the cause or object will come first, e.g. wealth, pleasure, or anything else of the sort that happens to be our object. For the man deliberating deliberates if he has considered, from the point of view of the end, what[3] conduces to bringing the end within his own action, or what he at present can do towards the object. But the object or end is always something good by nature, and men deliberate about its partial constituents, e.g. the doctor whether he is to give a drug, or the general where he is to pitch his camp. To them the absolutely best end is good. But contrary to nature and by perversion[4] not the good but the apparent good is the end. And the reason is that some things cannot be used for anything but what their nature determines, e.g. sight; for one can see nothing

18–b 4 = *E. N.* 1113a 13–b 2. 18–b 11 : cf. *M. M.* 1189b 25–1190a 7.

[1] Not in the existing treatise, but cf. *E. N.* 1135a 16–1136a 9.
[2] Cf. 1214b 6 sqq. and *An. Post.* i. 2.
[3] Omitting ἤ.
[4] διὰ στροφήν (Jackson).

but what is visible, nor hear anything but what is audible. But science enables us to do what does not belong to that science; for the same science is not similarly related to health and disease, but naturally to the former, contrary to nature to the latter. And similarly wish is of the good naturally, but of the bad contrary to nature, and by nature one wishes the good, but contrary to nature and through perversion[1] the bad as well.

But further, the corruption and perversion of a thing does not tend to anything at random but to the contrary or the intermediate between it and the contrary. For out of this province one cannot go, since error leads not to anything at random but to the contrary of truth where there is a contrary, and to that contrary which is according to the appropriate science contrary. Therefore, the error and the resulting choice must deviate from the mean towards the opposite—and the opposite of the mean is excess or defect. And the cause is pleasantness or painfulness; for we are so constituted that the pleasant appears good to the soul and the more pleasant better, while the painful appears bad and the more painful worse. So that from this also it is clear that virtue and vice have to do with pleasures and pains; for they have to do with objects of choice, and choice has to do with the good and bad or what seems such, and pleasure and pain naturally seem such.

It follows then, since moral virtue is itself a mean and wholly concerned with pleasures and pains, and vice lies in excess or defect and is concerned with the same matters as virtue, that moral virtue is a habit tending to choose the mean in relation to us in things pleasant and painful, in regard to which, according as one is pleased or pained, men are said to have a definite sort of character; for one is not said to have a special sort of character merely for liking what is sweet or what is bitter.

These distinctions having been made, let us say whether virtue makes the choice correct and the end right so that a man chooses for the right end, or whether (as some say) it makes

12–1228a 2: cf. *M. M.* 1190a 8–33.

[1] διὰ στροφήν (Jackson).

the reason so. But what does this is continence, for this preserves the reason. But virtue and continence differ. We must speak later about them,[1] since those who think that virtue makes the reason right, do so for this cause—namely, that [2] continence is of this nature and continence is one of the things we praise. Now that we have discussed preliminary questions let us state our view.[3] It is possible for the aim to be right, but for a man to go wrong in the means to that aim; and again the aim may be mistaken, while the means leading to it are right; or both may be mistaken. Does then virtue make the aim, or the means to that aim? We say the aim, because this is not attained by inference or reasoning. Let us assume this as starting-point. For the doctor does not ask whether one ought to be in health or not, but whether one ought to walk or not; nor does the trainer ask whether one ought to be in good condition or not, but whether one should wrestle or not. And similarly no art asks questions about the end; for as in theoretical sciences the assumptions are our starting-points, so in the productive the end is starting-point and assumed. E.g. we reason that since this body is to be made healthy, therefore so and so must be found in it if health is to be had—just as in geometry we argue, if the angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles, then so and so must be the case. The end aimed at is, then, the starting-point of our thought, the end of our thought the starting-point of action. If, then, of all correctness either reason or virtue is the cause, if reason is not the cause, then the end (but not the means) must owe its rightness to virtue. But the end is the object of the action; for all choice is of some thing and for the sake of some object. The object, then, is the mean, and virtue is the cause of this by choosing it.[4] Still choice is not of this but of the things done for the sake of this. To hit on these things—I mean what ought to be done for the sake of the object—belongs to another faculty; but of the rightness of

[1] Not in the existing treatise, but cf. *E. N.* 1150[b] 29–1151[a] 28, 1144[a] 35.
[2] Read colon for full stop after αἴτιον and omit γάρ.
[3] Reading λέγωμεν (C[v]).
[4] Omitting οὗ ἕνεκα.

the end of the choice the cause is virtue. And therefore it is from a man's choice that we judge his character—that is from the object for the sake of which he acts, not from the act itself. Similarly, vice makes the choice to be for the sake of the opposite object. If, then, a man, having it in his power to do the honourable and abstain from the base, does the opposite, it is clear that this man is not good. Hence, it follows that both vice and virtue are voluntary; for there is no necessity to do what is wicked. Therefore vice is blamable and virtue praiseworthy. For the involuntary if base or bad is not blamable, if good is not praiseworthy, but only the voluntary. Further, we praise and blame all men with regard to their choice rather than their acts (though activity is more desirable than virtue), because men may do bad acts under compulsion, but no one chooses them under compulsion. Further, it is only because it is not easy to see the nature of a man's choice that we are forced to judge of his character by his acts. The activity then is more desirable, but the choice more praiseworthy. And this both follows from our assumptions and is in agreement with observation.

2–19: cf. *M. M.* 1190[a] 34–[b] 6.

BOOK III

1 THAT there are mean states, then, in the virtues, and that these are states of deliberate purpose, and that the opposite states are vices and what these are, has been stated in its universal form. But let us take them individually and speak of them in order; and first let us speak of bravery. All are practically agreed that the brave man is concerned with fears and that bravery is one of the virtues. We distinguished also in the table[1] confidence and fear as contraries; in a sense they are, indeed, opposed to one another. Clearly, then, those named after these habits will be similarly opposed to one another, e.g. the coward, for he is so called from fearing more than he ought and being less confident than he ought, and the confident man, who is so called for fearing less than he ought and being more confident than he ought. (Hence they have names cognate to those of the qualities, e.g. 'confident' is cognate to 'confidence'.) So that since bravery is the best habit in regard to fear and confidence, and one should be neither like the confident (who are defective in one way, excessive in another) nor like the cowards (of whom the same may be said, only not about the same objects, but inversely, for they are defective in confidence and excessive in fear), it is clear that 1228[b] the middle habit between confidence and cowardice is bravery, for this is the best.

The brave man seems to be in general fearless, the coward prone to fear; the latter fears many things and few, great things and small, and intensely and quickly, while his opposite fears either not at all or slightly and reluctantly

23–26 = *E. N.* 1114[b] 26–29, 1115[a] 4 sq. 1115[a] 5–1117[b] 22: cf. *M. M.* 1190[b] 9–1191[a] 36. 1115[b] 28–1116[a] 2. 26–1230[a] 36 = *E. N.* 31–35 = *E. N.*

[1] Cf. 1221[a] 17–19.

and seldom, and great things only. The brave endures even what is very formidable, the coward not even what is slightly formidable. What, then, does the brave man endure? First, is it the things that appear formidable to himself or to another? If the latter, his bravery would be no considerable matter. But if it is the things formidable to himself, then he must find many things formidable—formidable things[1] being things that cause fear to those who find them formidable, great fear if very formidable, slight fear if slightly formidable. Then it follows that the brave man feels much and serious fear; but on the contrary bravery seemed to make a man fearless, fearlessness consisting in fearing few things if any, and in fearing slightly and with reluctance. But perhaps we use 'formidable'—like 'pleasant' and 'good'—in two senses. Some things are pleasant or good absolutely, others to a particular person pleasant or good—but absolutely bad and not pleasant, e. g. what is useful to the wicked or pleasant to children as such; and similarly the formidable is either absolutely such or such to a particular person. What, then, a coward as such fears is not formidable to any one or but slightly so; but what is formidable to the majority of men or to human nature, that we call absolutely formidable. But the brave man shows himself fearless towards these and endures such things, they being to him formidable in one sense but in another not—formidable to him *qua* man, but not formidable to him except slightly so, or not at all, *qua* brave. These things, however, are terrible, for they are so to the majority of men. This is the reason, by the way, why the habit of the brave man is praised; his condition is analogous to that of the strong or healthy. For these are what they are, not because, in the case of the one, no toil, in the case of the other, no extreme,[2] crushes them, but because they are either unaffected absolutely or affected only to a slight extent by the things that affect the many

18–38 = *E. N.* 1115b 7–15.

[1] Reading πολλά with some MSS. and Sus., omitting μεγάλα καί, and (after φοβερά) inserting τὰ δὲ φοβερά (Bz.). [2] e. g. of temperature.

or the majority. The sick, then, and the weak and the cowardly are affected by the common affections, as well as by others, only more quickly and to a greater extent than the many, and further, by the things that affect the many they are wholly unaffected or but slightly affected.[1]

But it is still questioned whether anything is terrible to the brave man, whether he would not be incapable of fear. May we not allow him to be capable of it in the way above mentioned? For bravery consists in following reason, and 1229a reason bids one choose the noble. Therefore the man who endures the terrible from any other cause than this is either out of his wits or confident; but the man who does so for the sake of the noble is alone fearless and brave. The coward, then, fears even what he ought not, the confident is confident even when he ought not to be; the brave man both fears and is confident when he ought to be, and is in this sense a mean, for he is confident or fears as reason bids him. But reason does not bid a man to endure what is very painful or destructive unless it is noble; now the confident is confident about such things even if reason does not bid him be so, while the coward is not confident even if it does; the brave man alone is confident about them only if reason bids him.

There are five kinds of courage, so named from a certain analogy between them; for they all endure the same things but not for the same reasons. One is a civic courage, due to the sense of shame; another is military, due to experience and knowledge, not (as Socrates said[2]) of what is fearful, but of the resources they have to meet what is fearful. The third kind is due to inexperience and ignorance;[3] it is that which makes children and madmen face objects moving towards them and take hold of snakes. Another kind is due to hope, which makes those who have often been fortunate, or those who are drunk, face dangers—for wine makes them sanguine. Another

4: cf. *E.N.* 1115a 29–31, 33. b 5, 12 sq., 21. 1116a 15, b 2 sq. 12–31 = *E.N.* 1116a 16–1117a 27.

[1] This sentence is probably spurious, being a repetition of ll. 33–35.
[2] Cf. Plat. *Protag.* 360 D: omit ὅτι (Sylburg). [3] Cf. 1229b 26.

kind is due to irrational feeling, e.g. love or anger; for a man in love is rather confident than timid, and faces many dangers, like him who slew the tyrant in Metapontium or the man of whom stories are told in Crete. Similar is the action of anger or passion, for passion is beside itself. Hence wild boars are thought to be brave though they are not really so, for they behave as such when beside themselves, but at other times are variable, like confident men. But still the bravery of passion is above all natural (passion is invincible, and therefore children are excellent fighters); civic courage is the effect of law. But in truth none of these forms is courage, though all are useful for encouragement in danger.

So far we have spoken of the terrible generally; now it is best to distinguish further. In general, then, whatever is productive of fear is called fearful, and this is all that causes destructive pain. For those who expect some other pain may perhaps have another pain and another emotion but not fear, e.g. if a man foresees that he will suffer the pain of envy or of jealousy or of shame. But fear only occurs in connexion with the expectation of pains whose nature is to be destructive to life. Therefore men who are very effeminate as to some things are brave, and some who are hard and enduring are cowards. Indeed, it is thought practically the special mark of bravery to take up a certain attitude towards death and the pain of it. For if a man were so constituted as to be patient as reason requires towards heat and cold and similar not dangerous pains, but weak and timid about death, not for any other feeling, but just because it means destruction, while another was soft in regard to these but unaffected in regard to death, the former would seem cowardly, the latter brave; for we speak of danger also only in regard to such objects of fear as bring near to us that which will cause such destruction; when this seems close, then we speak of danger.

The objects of fear, then, in regard to which we call a man brave are, as we have said, those which appear capable of causing destructive pain, but only when they appear near

2–12: cf. *E. N.* 1115a 17–27.

and not far off, and are of such magnitude, real or apparent, as is not out of proportion to man, for some things must appear terrible to and must upset any man. For just as things hot and cold and certain other powers are too strong for us and the conditions of the human body, so it may be with regard to the emotions of the soul.

The cowardly, then, and the confident are misled by their habits; for to the coward what is not terrible seems terrible, and what is slightly terrible greatly so, while in the opposite way, to the confident the terrible seems safe and the very terrible but slightly so; but the brave man thinks things what they truly are. Therefore, if a man faces the terrible through ignorance (e.g. if a man faces in the transport of madness the attack of a thunderbolt), he is not brave, nor yet if, knowing the magnitude of the danger, he faces it through passion—as the Celts take up their arms to go to meet the waves; in general, all the bravery of barbarians involves passion. But some face danger also for other pleasures—for passion is not without a certain pleasure, involving as it does the hope of vengeance. But still, whether a man faces death for this or some other pleasure or to flee from greater evils, he would not justly be called brave. For if dying were pleasant, the profligate would have often died because of his incontinence, just as now—since what causes death is pleasant though not death itself—many knowingly incur death through their incontinence, but none of them would be thought brave even if they do it with perfect readiness to die. Nor is a man brave if he seeks death to avoid trouble, as many do; to use Agathon's words: 'Bad men too weak for toil are in love with death.' And so the poets narrate that Chiron, because of the pain of his wound, prayed for death and release from his immortality. Similarly, all who face dangers owing to experience are not really brave; this is what, perhaps, most soldiers do. For the truth is the exact opposite of what Socrates thought; he held that bravery was knowledge. But those who know how to ascend masts are confident not because

28–30 = *E. N.* 1115b 26–29. 30–1230a 4 = *E. N.* 1116a 10–15, 1117a 5–9. 4–16 = *E. N.* 1116b 3–19: cf. 1115b 1–4.

they know what is terrible, but because they know how to help themselves in dangers. Nor is all that makes men fight more boldly courage; for then, as Theognis puts it,[1] strength and wealth would be bravery—'every man' (he says) 'daunted by poverty'. Obviously some, though cowards, face dangers because of their experience, because they do not think them dangers, as they know how to help themselves; and a proof of this is that, when they think they can get no help and the danger is close at hand, they no longer face it. [But it is where shame, among all such causes,[2] makes a man face danger that the man would most seem to be brave, as Homer says Hector faced the danger from Achilles—'and shame seized Hector';[3] and, again, 'Polydamas will be the first to taunt me'.[4] Such bravery is civic. But the true bravery is neither this nor any of the others, but like them, as is also the bravery of brutes which from passion run to meet the blow. For a man ought to hold his ground though frightened, not because he will incur disrepute, nor through anger, nor because he does not expect to be killed or has powers by which to protect himself; for in that case he will not even think that there is anything to be feared. But since all virtue implies deliberate choice—we have said before[5] what this means and that it makes a man choose everything for the sake of some end, and that the end is the noble—it is clear that bravery, because it is a virtue, will make a man face the fearful for some end, so that he does it neither through ignorance—for his virtue rather makes him judge correctly—nor for pleasure, but because the act is noble; since, if it be not noble but frantic, he does not face the danger, for that would be disgraceful. In regard, then, to what things bravery is a mean state, between what, and why, and the meaning of the fearful, we have now spoken tolerably adequately for our present purpose.

16–21 = *E. N.* 1116ª 17–29. 21 sq. = *E. N.* 1116ᵇ 13–1117ª 1.

[1] Cf. Theognis 177. [2] Keep the MS. reading *αἰτίων*.
[3] These words do not exist in Homer as we know him.
[4] Iliad xxii. 100. [5] Cf. 1227ᵇ 21–1228ª 7.

2 After this we must try to draw certain distinctions regarding profligacy and temperance. 'Profligate' has many senses.[1] It is, in a sense, the unchastened and uncured, as the undivided is the not divided, and with the 1230[b] same two classes, i. e. the one capable, the other incapable of division; for undivided means both what is incapable of division, and what is capable but not actually divided; and so with 'profligate'. For it is both that which by its nature refuses chastening, and that which is of a nature to accept but has not yet received chastening for the faults in regard to which the temperate man acts rightly—e. g. children. For we give them the same name as the profligate, but because of this latter kind of profligacy.[2] And, further, it is in different senses that we give the name to those hard to cure and to those whom it is quite impossible to cure through chastening. Profligacy, then, having many senses, it is clear that it has to do with certain pleasures and pains, and that the forms differ from one another and from other states by the kind of attitude towards these; we have already stated how, in the use of the word 'profligacy', we apply it to various states by analogy.[3] As to those who from insensibility are unmoved by these same pleasures, some call them insensible, while others describe them as such by other names; but this state is not very familiar or common because all rather err in the opposite direction, and it is congenital to all to be overcome by and to be sensible to such pleasures. It is the state chiefly of such as the boors introduced on the stage by comic writers, who keep aloof from even moderate and necessary pleasures.

But since temperance has to do with pleasures, it must also have to do with certain appetites; we must, then,

36–1231[b] 4 = *E. N.* 1117[b] 23–1119[b] 20: cf. *M. M.* 1191[a] 35–[b] 22. 38–[b] 20 = *E. N.* 1119[a] 34–[b] 18. 21–1231[a] 25 = *E. N.* 1117[b] 27–1118[b] 7.

[1] The two Greek words *ἀκόλαστος* and *κεκολασμένος* are cognate; we might get cognate words if for 'profligate' we might substitute the more special word 'unchaste', cognate to 'chastened'.

[2] i. e. *ἀκόλαστος* often means no more than 'naughty'.

[3] This seems to refer to words which must have been lost at 1221[a] 20.

ascertain which. For the temperate man does not exhibit his temperance in regard to all appetites and all pleasures, but about the objects, as it seems, of two senses, taste and touch, or rather really about those of touch alone. For his temperance is shown not in regard to visual pleasure in the beautiful (so long as it is unaccompanied by sexual appetite) or visual pain at the ugly; nor, again, in regard to the pleasure or pain of the ear at harmony or discord; nor, again, in regard to olfactory pleasure or pain at pleasant or disagreeable odours. Nor is a man called profligate for feeling or want of feeling in regard to such matters. For instance, if one sees a beautiful statue, or horse, or human being, or hears singing, without any accompanying wish for eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, but only with the wish to see the beautiful and to hear the singers, he would not be thought profligate any more than those who were charmed by the Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two senses whose objects are alone felt by and give pleasure and pain to brutes as well; and these are the senses of taste and touch, the brutes seeming insensible to
1231a the pleasures of practically all the other senses alike, e.g. harmony or beauty; for they obviously have no feeling worth mentioning at the mere sight of the beautiful or the hearing of the harmonious, except, perhaps, in some marvellous instances. And with regard to pleasant and disagreeable odours it is the same, though all their senses are sharper than ours. They do, indeed, feel pleasure at certain odours; but these gladden them accidentally and not of their own nature, being those that give us pleasure owing to expectation and memory, e.g. the pleasure from the scent of food or drinks; for these we enjoy because of a different pleasure, that of eating or drinking; the odours enjoyed for their own nature are such as those of flowers; (therefore Stratonicus neatly remarked that these smell beautifully, food, &c., pleasantly). Indeed, the brutes are not excited over every pleasure connected with taste, e.g. not over those which are felt in the tip of the tongue, but only over those that are felt in the gullet, the sensation being one of touch rather than of taste. Therefore gluttons pray not for

a long tongue but for the gullet of a crane, as did Philoxenus, the son of Eryxis. Therefore, broadly, we should regard profligacy as concerned with objects of touch. Similarly it is with such pleasures that the profligate man is concerned. For drunkenness, gluttony, lecherousness, gormandizing, and all such things are concerned with the above-mentioned senses; and these are the parts into which we divide profligacy. But in regard to the pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell, no one is called profligate if he is in excess, but we blame without considering disgraceful such faults, and all in regard to which we do not speak of men as continent; the incontinent are neither profligate nor temperate.

The man, then, so constituted as to be deficient in the pleasures in which all must in general partake and rejoice is insensible (or whatever else we ought to call him); the man in excess is profligate. For all naturally take delight in these objects and conceive appetites for them, and neither are nor are called profligate; for they neither exceed by rejoicing more than is right when they get them, nor by feeling greater pain than they ought when they miss them; nor are they insensible, for they are not deficient in the feeling of joy or pain, but rather in excess.

But since there is excess and defect in regard to these things, there is clearly also a mean, and this state is the best and opposed to both of the others; so that if the best state about the objects with which the profligate is concerned is temperance, temperance would be the mean state in regard to the above-mentioned sensible pleasures, the mean between profligacy and insensibility, the excess being profligacy, and the defect either nameless or expressed by the names we have suggested. More accurate distinctions about the class of pleasures will be drawn in what is said later[1] about continence and incontinence.

3 In the same way we must ascertain what is gentleness and irascibility. For we see that the gentle is concerned

26–[b] 4 = *E. N.* 1118[b] 28–1119[a] 20. 5–26 = *E. N.* 1125[b] 26–1126[b] 9: cf. *M. M.* 1191[b] 23–38.

[1] Not to be found in the existing treatise.

with the pain that arises from anger, being characterized by a certain attitude towards this. We have given in our list[1] as opposed to the passionate, irascible, and savage—all such being names for the same state—the slavish and the senseless. For these are practically the names we apply to those who are not moved to anger even when they ought, but take insults easily and are humble towards contempt—for slowness to anger is opposed to quickness, violence to quietness, long persistence in that feeling of pain which we call anger to short. And since there is here, as we have said[2] there is elsewhere, excess and defect—for the irascible is one that feels anger more quickly, to a greater degree, and for a longer time, and when he ought not, and at what he ought not, and frequently, while the slavish is the opposite—it is clear that there is a mean to this inequality. Since, then, both the above-mentioned habits are wrong, it is clear that the mean state between them is good; for he is neither too soon nor too late, and does not feel anger when he ought not, nor feel no anger when he ought. So that since in regard to these emotions the best condition is gentleness, gentleness would be a mean state, and the gentle a mean between the irascible and the slavish.

4 Also magnanimity, magnificence, and liberality are mean states—liberality being shown in the acquisition or expenditure of wealth. For the man who is more pleased than he ought to be with every acquisition and more pained than he ought to be at every expenditure is illiberal; he who feels less of both than he ought is lavish; he who feels both as he ought is liberal. (By 'as he ought', both in this and in the other cases, I mean 'as right reason directs'.) But since the two former show their nature respectively by excess and defect—and where there are extremes, there is also a mean and that is best, a single best for each kind of action—liberality must be the mean between lavishness and meanness in regard to the acquisition and expenditure

27–1232a 18 = *E. N.* 1119b 19–1122a 18: cf. *M. M.* 1191b 39–1192a 20.

[1] Cf. 1221b 12–15.

[2] Cf. 1220b 21 sqq.

of wealth. I take wealth and the art of wealth in two senses; the art in one sense being the proper use of one's 1232a property (say of a shoe or a coat), in the other an accidental mode of using it—not the use of a shoe for a weight, but, say, the selling of it or letting it out for money; for here too the shoe is used. Now the lover of money is a man eager for actual money, which is a sign of possession taking the place of the accidental use of other possessions. But the illiberal man may even be lavish in the accidental pursuit of wealth, for it is in the natural pursuit of it that he aims at increase.[1] The lavish runs short of necessaries; but the liberal man gives his superfluities. There are also species of these genera which exceed or fall short as regards parts of the subject-matter of liberality, e.g. the sparing, the skinflint, the grasper at disgraceful gain, are all illiberal; the sparing is characterized by his refusal to spend, the grasper at disgraceful gain by his readiness to accept anything, the skinflint by his strong feeling over small amounts, while the man who has the sort of injustice that involves meanness is a false reckoner and cheat. And similarly one class of spendthrift is a waster by his disorderly expenditure, the other a fool who cannot bear the pain of calculation.

5 As to magnanimity we must define its specific nature from the qualities that we ascribe to the magnanimous. For just as with other things,[2] in virtue of their nearness and likeness up to a certain point, their divergence beyond that point escapes notice, so it is with magnanimity. Therefore, sometimes men really opposite lay claim to the same character, e.g. the lavish to that of the liberal, the self-willed to that of the dignified, the confident to that of the brave. For they are concerned with the same things, and are up to a certain point contiguous; thus the brave man and the confident are alike ready to face danger—but the former in one way, the latter in another; and these ways differ greatly.

19–1233a 30 = *E.N.* 1123a 34–1125a 34: cf. *M.M.* 1192a 21–36.

[1] This seems to mean that he might be lavish of money, if it brought him an increase of commodities.

[2] Omit ἃ (MSS.).

Now, we assert that the magnanimous man, as is indicated by the name we apply to him, is characterized by a certain greatness of soul and faculty; and so he seems like the dignified and the magnificent man, since[1] magnanimity seems to accompany *all* the virtues. †For[2] to distinguish correctly great goods from small is laudable. Now, those goods are thought great which are pursued by the man of the best habit in regard to what seem to be pleasures;[3] and magnanimity is the best habit. But every special virtue correctly distinguishes the greater from the less among its objects, as the wise man and virtue would direct, so that all the virtues seem to go with this one of magnanimity, or this with all the virtues.†

Further, it seems characteristic of the magnanimous man 1232b to be disdainful; each virtue makes one disdainful of what is esteemed great contrary to reason (e. g. bravery disdains dangers of this kind—for it considers it disgraceful to hold them great;[4] and numbers are not always fearful: so the temperate disdains many great pleasures, and the liberal wealth). But this characteristic seems to belong to the magnanimous man because he cares about few things only, and those great, and not because some one else thinks them so. The magnanimous man would consider rather what one good man thinks than many ordinary men, as Antiphon after his condemnation said to Agathon when he praised his defence of himself. Contempt seems particularly the special characteristic of the magnanimous man; and, again, as regards honour, life, and wealth—about which mankind seems to care—he values none of them except honour. He would be pained if denied honour, and if ruled by one undeserving. He delights most of all when he obtains honour.

In this way he would seem to contradict himself; for to

28–30: cf. *E. N.* 1128a 34 sq. 30: cf. *E. N.* 1125a 12 sq. 37 sq.: cf. *E. N.* 1123b 26 sq. 38 sq.: cf. *E. N.* 1124b 5 sq., 29 10: cf. *E. N.* 1124b 6–9. 12–14 sq.: cf. *E. N.* 1123b 17–24, 34: 1124a 12 sq.

[1] ὅτι for ὅτε (Sus.).

[2] 32–8 are unintelligible: the idea seems to be that magnanimity is implied in all the virtues, cf. 38 and 1232b 25.

[3] δοκοῦντ' for τοιαῦτ' (Fr.). [4] γὰρ ⟨ἡγεῖσθαι⟩, cf. 1233a 30.

be[1] concerned above all with honour, and yet to disdain the multitude and[2] reputation, are inconsistent. So we must first distinguish. For honour, great or small, is of two kinds; for it may be given by a crowd of ordinary men or by those worthy of consideration; and, again, there is a difference according to the ground on which honour is given. For it is made great not merely by the number of those who give the honour or by their quality, but also by its being precious;[3] but in reality, power and all other goods are precious and worthy of pursuit only if they are truly great, so that there is no virtue without greatness; therefore every virtue, as we have said,[4] makes man magnanimous in regard to the object with which that virtue is concerned.[5] But still there is a single virtue, magnanimity, alongside of the other virtues, and he who has this must be called in a special sense magnanimous. But since some goods are precious and some not,[6] according to the distinction above[7] made, and of such goods some are in truth great and some small, and of these some men are worthy and think themselves so, among these we must look for the magnanimous man. There must be four different kinds of men. For a man may be worthy of great goods and think himself worthy of them, and again there may be small goods and a man worthy of them and thinking himself worthy; and we may have the opposites in regard to either kind of goods; for there may be a man worthy of small who thinks himself worthy of great and esteemed goods; and, again, one worthy of great but thinking himself worthy only of small. He then who is worthy of the small but thinks himself worthy of the great is blameable; for it is silly and not noble that he should obtain out of proportion to his worth: the man also is blameable who being worthy of great goods, because he possesses the gifts that make a man worthy, does not think himself worthy to share in them. There remains then the 1233a opposite of these two—the man who is worthy of great

[1] τὸ γάρ (best MSS.).
[2] Retaining καί of the MSS.
[3] ⟨τιμία⟩ for τιμίαν (J. S.).
[4] Cf. a39 sqq.
[5] i. e. every virtue is a species of magnanimity.
[6] Add οὔ after τὰ δ' (J. S.).
[7] l. 10 sqq.

goods and thinks himself worthy of them, such being his disposition; he is the mean between the other two and is praiseworthy. Since, then, in respect of the choice and use of honour and the other esteemed goods, the best condition is magnanimity, and we define the magnanimous man [1] as being this, and not as being concerned with things useful; and since this mean is the most praiseworthy state, it is clear that magnanimity is a mean. But of the opposites, as shown in our list,[2] the quality consisting in thinking oneself worthy of great goods when not worthy is vanity—for we give the name of vain to those who think themselves worthy of great things though they are not; but the quality of not thinking oneself worthy of great things though one is, we call mean-spiritedness—for it is held to be the mark of the mean-spirited not to think himself worthy of any thing great though he possesses that for which he would justly be deemed worthy of it; hence, it follows that magnanimity is a mean between vanity and mean-spiritedness. The fourth of the sorts of men we have distinguished is neither wholly blameable nor yet magnanimous, not having to do with anything that possesses greatness, for he is neither worthy nor thinks himself worthy of great goods; therefore, he is not opposite to the magnanimous man; yet to be worthy and think oneself worthy of small goods might seem opposite to being worthy and thinking oneself worthy of great ones. But such a man is not opposite to the magnanimous man, for he is not to be blamed [3] (his habit being what reason directs); he is, in fact, similar in nature to the magnanimous man; for both think themselves worthy of what they really are worthy of. He might become magnanimous, for of whatever he is worthy of he will think himself worthy. But the mean-spirited man who, possessed of great and honourable qualities, does not think himself worthy of great good—what would he do if he deserved only small? Either [4] he would think himself worthy of

9–30 = *E.N.* 1125[a] 16–34, 1122[b] 30 sq.

[1] τὸν μεγαλόψυχον (MSS.). [2] Cf. 1221[a] 10, 31 sq.
[3] Omitting μή (Bekker). [4] ἢ for εἰ (most MSS. and Bekk.).

great goods and thus be vain, or else of still smaller than he has. Therefore, no one would call a man mean-spirited because, being an alien in a city, he does not claim to govern but submits, but only one who does not, being well born and thinking power a great thing.

6 The magnificent man is not concerned with any and every action or choice, but with expenditure—unless we use the name metaphorically; without expense there cannot be magnificence. It is the fitting in ornament, but ornament is not to be got out of ordinary expenditure, but consists in surpassing the merely necessary. The man, then, who tends to choose in great expenditure the fitting magnitude, and desires this sort of mean, and with a view to this sort of pleasure is magnificent; the man whose inclination is to something larger than necessary but out of harmony, has no name, though he is near to those called by some tasteless and showy: e. g. if a rich man, spending money on the 1233[b] marriage of a favourite, thinks it sufficient to make such arrangements as one makes to entertain those who drink to the Good Genius,[1] he is shabby; while one who receives guests of this sort in the way suited to a marriage feast resembles the showy man, if he does it neither for the sake of reputation nor to gain power; but he who entertains suitably and as reason directs, is magnificent; for what looks well is the suitable; nothing unsuitable is fitting. And what one does should be fitting. † For in what is fitting is involved suitability both to the object † (e. g. one thing is fitting for a servant's, another for a favourite's wedding) and to the entertainer both in extent and kind, e. g. one thought [2] that the mission conducted by Themistocles to the Olympian games was not fitting to him because of his previous low station, but would have been to Cimon. But the man who is indifferent to questions of suitability is in none of the above classes.

Similarly with liberality; for a man may be neither liberal nor illiberal.

31–[b] 15 = *E. N.* 1122[a] 18–1123[a] 33: cf. *M. M.* 1192[a] 21–36.

[1] A regular Greek toast. [2] prps. φόντο (Speng.).

In general of the other blameable or praiseworthy qualities 7
of character some are excesses, others defects, others means,
but of feelings, e.g. the envious man and the man who
rejoices over another's misfortunes. For, to consider the
habits to which they owe their names, envy is pain felt at
20 deserved good fortune, while the feeling of the man who
rejoices at misfortunes has itself no name,[1] but such a man
shows his nature by[2] rejoicing over undeserved ill fortune.
Between them is the man inclined to righteous indignation,
the name given by the ancients to pain felt at either good
25 or bad fortune if undeserved, or to joy felt at them if deserved.
Hence they make righteous indignation (*νέμεσις*) a god.
Shame is a mean between shamelessness and shyness; for
the man who thinks of no one's opinion is shameless, he who
thinks of every one's alike is shy, he who thinks only of that
of apparently good men is modest. Friendliness is a mean
30 between animosity and flattery; for the man who readily
accommodates himself in all respects to another's desires is
a flatterer; the man who opposes every desire is prone to
enmity; the man who neither accommodates himself to nor
resists every one's pleasure, but only accommodates himself to
what seems to be best, is friendly. Dignity is a mean between
35 self-will and too great obligingness; for the contemptuous
man who lives with no consideration for another is self-willed;
the man who adapts his whole life to another and is sub-
missive to everybody is too obliging; but he who acts thus
in certain cases but not in others, and only to those worthy,
is dignified. The sincere and simple, or, as he is called,
'downright' man, is a mean between the dissembler and the
charlatan. For the man who knowingly and falsely depre-
1234[a] ciates himself is a dissembler; the man who exalts himself
is a charlatan; the man who represents himself as he is, is
sincere, and in the Homeric phrase 'intelligent'; in general

18–26: cf. *M. M.* 1192[b] 18–29 (*E. N.* 1108[b] 1–7). 26–29 = *E. N.* 1128[b] 10–35: cf. *M. M.* 1193[a] 1–10. 29–34 = *E. N.* 1126[b] 10–1127[a] 12: cf. *M. M.* 1193[a] 20–28. 34–38: cf. *M. M.* 1192[a] 30–38. 38–1234[a] 3 = *E. N.* 1127[a] 13–[b]32: cf. *M. M.* 1193[a] 28–35.

[1] *ἐστίν* for *ἐπὶ τό* (Speng.).
[2] *ἐστι* for *ἐπί* (Casaubon); *τῷ* for *τό* (some MSS., Bekker).

the one loves truth, the other a lie. Wittiness also is a mean, the witty being a mean between the boorish or stiff and the buffoon. For just as the squeamish differs from the omnivorous in that the one takes little or nothing and that with reluctance, while the other accepts everything readily, so is the boor related to the vulgar buffoon; the one accepts nothing comic without difficulty, the other takes all easily and with pleasure. Neither attitude is right; one ought to accept some things and not others, as reason directs—and the man who does this is witty. The proof is the usual one; wittiness of this kind, supposing we do not use the word in some transferred sense, is the best habit, and the mean is praiseworthy, and the extremes blameable. But wit being of two kinds—one being delight in the comic, even when directed against one's self, if it be really comic, like a jeer, the other being the faculty of producing such things—the two sorts differ from one another but both are means. For the man that can [1] produce what a good judge will be pleased at, even if the joke is against himself, will be midway between the vulgar and the frigid man; this definition is better than that which merely requires the thing said to be not painful to the person jeered at, no matter what sort of man he is; one ought rather to please the man who is in the mean, for he is a good judge.

All these mean states are praiseworthy without being virtues; nor are their opposites vices—for they do not involve deliberate choice. All of them occur in the classifications of affections, for each is an affection. But since they are natural, they tend to the natural virtues; for, as will be said later,[2] each virtue is found both naturally and also otherwise, viz. as including thought. Envy then tends to injustice (for the acts arising from it affect another), righteous indignation to justice, shame to temperance—whence some even put temperance into this genus. The sincere and the false are respectively sensible and foolish.

4–23 = *E. N.* 1127[b] 33–1128[b] 3: cf. *M. M.* 1193[a] 11–19.

[1] ὁ δυνάμενος (Sylb.).
[2] Not in the existing treatise, but cf. *E. N.* vi. 1144[b] 1–17.

But the mean is more opposed to the extremes than these to one another, because the mean is found with neither, but
1234[b] the extremes often with one another, and sometimes the same people are at once cowardly and confident, or lavish in some ways, illiberal in others, and in general are lacking in uniformity in a bad sense—for if they lack uniformity in a good sense, men of the mean type are produced; since, in
5 a way, both extremes are present in the mean.

The opposition between the mean and the extremes does not seem to be alike in both cases; sometimes the opposition is that of the excessive extreme, sometimes that of the defective, and the causes are the two first given [1]—rarity, e. g. of those insensible to pleasures, and the fact that the error to
10 which we are most prone seems the more opposed to the mean. There is a third reason, namely, that the more like seems less opposite, e. g. confidence to bravery,[2] lavishness to liberality.

We have, then, spoken sufficiently about the other praiseworthy virtues; we must now speak of justice.

[1] Cf. 1222[a] 22–[b]4.
[2] prps. read *τὸ θάρσος πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν* (Bz.).

BOOKS IV, V, VI = *ETH. N.* BKS. V, VI, VII.

BOOK VII

1 FRIENDSHIP, what it is and of what nature, who is a friend, and whether friendship has one or many senses (and if many, how many), and, further, how we should treat a friend, and what is justice in friendship—all this must be examined not less than any of the things that are noble and desirable in character. For it is thought to be the special business of the political art to produce friendship, and men say that virtue is useful for this, for those who are unjustly treated by one another cannot be friends to one another. Further, all say that justice and injustice are specially exhibited towards friends; the same man seems both good and a friend, and friendship seems a sort of moral habit; and if one wishes to act without injustice, it is enough[1] to make friends, for genuine friends do not act unjustly. But neither will men act unjustly if they are just; therefore justice and friendship are either the same or not far different.

Further, men believe a friend to be among the greatest of goods, and friendlessness and solitude to be most terrible, because all life and voluntary association is with friends; 1235[a] for we spend our days with our family, kinsmen, or comrades, children, parents, or wife. The private justice practised to friends depends on ourselves alone, while justice towards all others is determined by the laws, and does not depend on us.

Many questions are raised about friendship. There is the view of those who include the external world and give the term an extended meaning; for some think that like is

18–22 = *E. N.* 1155[a] 3: cf. *M. M.* 1208[b] 3 sq. 22–1235[a] 3 = *E. N.* 1155[a] 3–31: cf. *M. M.* 1208[b] 4–6. 4–29 = *E. N.* 1155[a] 32–[b] 9: cf. *M. M.* 1208[b] 7–20.

[1] ἄλις for ἀλλ' εἰς (Jackson).

friend to like, whence the saying 'how God ever draws like to like';[1] or the saying 'crow to crow'; or 'thief knows thief, and wolf wolf'. The physicists even systematize the whole of nature on the principle that like goes to like—whence Empedocles said that the dog sat on the tile because it was most like it. Some, then, describe a friend thus, but others say that opposites are friends; for they say the loved and desired is in every case a friend, but the dry does not desire the dry but the moist—whence the sayings, 'Earth loves the rain',[2] and 'in all things change is pleasant'; but change is change to an opposite. And like hates like, for 'potter is jealous of potter',[3] and animals nourished from the same source are enemies. Such, then, is the discrepancy between these views; for some think the like a friend, and the opposite an enemy—'the less is ever the enemy of the more, and begins a day of hate'[4]; and, further, the places of contraries are separated, but friendship seems to bring together. But others think opposites are friends, and Heraclitus blames the poet who wrote 'may strife perish from among gods and men'[5]; for (says he) there could not be harmony without the low and the high note, nor living things without male and female, two opposites. There are, then, these two views about friendship; and when so far separated from one another both are too broad.[6] There are other views that come nearer to and are more suitable to observed facts. Some think that bad men cannot be friends but only the good; while others think it strange that mothers should not love their own children. (Even among the brutes we find such friendship; at least they choose to die for their children.) Some, again, think that we only regard the useful as a friend, their proof being that all pursue the useful, but the useless, even in themselves, they throw away (as old Socrates said,[7] 1235[b] citing the case of our spittle, hairs, and nails), and that we cast off useless parts, and in the end at death our very

29–1235[b] 12 = *E. N.* 1155[b] 9–16: cf. *M. M.* 1208[b] 22–25.

[1] *Od.* xvii. 218.
[2] Eur. fr. 898 Nauck.
[3] Hes. *Works and Days*, 25.
[4] Eurip. *Phoen.* 540.
[5] *Iliad* xviii. 107.
[6] Sus.'s *καί* unnecessary.
[7] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 54.

body, the corpse being useless; but those who have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt. Now all these things [i. e. likeness, contrariety, utility] seem opposed to one another; for the like is useless to the like, and contrariety is furthest removed from likeness, and the contrary is most useless to its contrary, for contraries destroy one another. Further, some think it easy to acquire a friend, others a very rare thing to recognize one, and impossible without misfortune; for all wish to seem friends to the prosperous. But others would have us distrust even those who remain with us in misfortune, alleging that they are deceiving us and making pretence, that by giving their company to us when we are in misfortune they may obtain our friendship when we are again prosperous.

2 We must, then, find a method that will best explain the views held on these topics, and also put an end to difficulties and contradictions. And this will happen if the contrary views are seen to be held with some show of reason; such a view will be most in harmony with the facts of observation; and both the contradictory statements will in the end stand, if what is said is true in one sense but untrue in another.

Another puzzle is whether the good or the pleasant is the object of love. For if we love what we *desire*—and love is of this kind, for 'none is a lover but one who ever loves'[1] —and if desire is for the pleasant, in this way the object of love would be the pleasant; but if it is what we *wish for*, then it is the good—the good and the pleasant being different.

About all these and the other cognate questions we must attempt to gain clear distinctions, starting from the following principle. The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good. Now this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good; for some think it such, and to some it appears such, though they do not

13–1236[a] 15: cf. *M. M.* 1208[b] 26–1209[a] 3. 13–1236[a] 6 = *E. N.* 1155[b] 17–27.

[1] Eurip. *Troad.* 1051.

think so. For appearance and opinion do not reside in the same part of the soul. It is clear, then, that we love both the good and the pleasant.

This being settled, we must make another assumption. Of the good some is absolutely good, some good to a particular man, though not absolutely; and the same things are at once absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For we say that what is advantageous to a body in health is absolutely good for a body, but not what is good for a sick body, such as drugs and the knife. Similarly, things absolutely pleasant to a body are those pleasant to a healthy and unaffected body, e. g. seeing in light, not in darkness, though the opposite is the case to one with ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not that which is pleasant to one whose tongue has been spoilt by inebriety (for such men[1] add vinegar to it), but that which is pleasant to sensation unspoiled. So with the soul; what is pleasant not to children or brutes, but to the adult, is really pleasant; at least, when we remember both we choose the latter. And as the child or brute is to the adult man, so are the bad and foolish to the good and sensible. To these, that which suits their habit is pleasant, and that is the good and noble.

Since, then, 'good' has many meanings—for one thing we call good because its nature is such, and another because it is profitable and useful—and further, the pleasant is in part absolutely pleasant and absolutely good, and in part pleasant to a particular individual and apparent good; just as in the case of inanimate things we may choose and love a thing for either of these reasons, so in the case of a man loving one because of his character or because of virtue, another because he is profitable and useful, another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure. And[2] a man becomes a friend when he is loved and returns that love, and this is recognized by the two men in question.

There must, then, be three kinds of love, not all being so

7–15 = *E. N.* 1155b 27–1156a 5. 16–32 = *E. N.* 1156a 6–14: cf. *M. M.* 1209a 3–36.

[1] Read οὗτοι for οὔτ' (Sus.). [2] Read δέ for δή (Jackson).

named for one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet having the same name quite by mere accident. For all the senses of love are related to one which is the primary, just as is the case with the word 'medical', and[1] just as we speak of a medical soul, body, instrument, or act, but properly the name belongs to that primarily so called. The primary is that of which the definition is implied in the definition of all;[2] e. g. a medical instrument is one that a medical man would use, but the definition of the instrument is not implied in that of 'medical man'. Everywhere, then, we seek for the primary. But because the[3] universal is primary, they also take the primary[4] to be universal, and this is an error. And so they are not able to do justice to all the observed facts about friendship; for since one definition will not suit all, they think there are no other[5] friendships; but the others are friendships, only not similarly so. But they, finding the primary friendship will not suit, assuming it would be universal if really primary, deny that the other friendships even are friendships; whereas there are many species of friendship; this was part of what we have already said,[6] since we have distinguished the three senses of friendship—one due to virtue, another to usefulness, a third to pleasantness.

Of these the friendship based on usefulness is of course[7] that of the majority; men love one another because of their usefulness and to the extent of this; so we have the proverb 'Glaucus, a helper is a friend so long as[8] he fights', and 'the Athenians no longer know the Megarians'. But the friendship based on pleasure is that of the young, for they are sensitive to pleasure; therefore also their friendship easily changes; for with a change in their characters as they grow up there is also a change in their pleasures. But the friendship based on virtue is that of the best men.

It is clear from this that the primary friendship, that of

33–1237ᵇ 7 = *E. N.* 1156ª 14–1157ª 16: cf. *M. M.* 1209ᵇ 11–19. 33–1236ᵇ 17 = *E. N.* 1156ª 14–ᵇ 6.

[1] Omit stop after *ἰατρικόν* (Jackson) and omit *γάρ* (19).
[2] *πᾶσιν* for *ἡμῖν* (Bz., Jackson).
[3] *διὰ δὲ τὸ ⟨τὸ⟩ καθόλου εἶναι πρῶτον.* [4] *⟨τὸ⟩ πρῶτον* (Speng.).
[5] Omit *τάς* (MSS.). [6] Cf. ll. 7–17.
[7] *ἐστι νὴ Δία* (Jackson). [8] *τόσσον φίλος* (Fr.), *ἕστε* (J. S.).

good men, is a mutual returning of love and purpose. For what is loved is dear to him who loves it, but a man loving another man is himself dear[1] also to the man loved. This friendship, then, is peculiar to man, for he alone perceives another's purpose. But the other friendships are found also among the brutes where utility is in some degree present, both between tame animals and men, and between animals themselves, as in the case mentioned by Herodotus[2] of the friendship between the sandpiper and the crocodile, and the coming together and parting of birds that soothsayers speak of. The bad may be friends to one another on the ground both of usefulness and of pleasure; but some deny them to be friends, because there is not the primary friendship between them; for a bad man will injure a bad man, and those who are injured by one another do not love one another; but in fact they love, only not with the primary friendship. Nothing prevents their loving with the other kinds; for owing to pleasure they put up with each other's injury, so long as they are[3] incontinent. But those whose love is based on pleasure do not seem to be friends, when we look carefully, because their friendship is not of the primary kind, being unstable, while that is stable; it is, however, as has been said,[4] a friendship, only not the primary kind but derived from it. To speak, then, of friendship in the primary sense only is to do violence to facts, and makes one assert paradoxes; but it is impossible for all friendships to come under one definition. The only alternative left is that in a sense there is only one friendship, the primary; but in a sense all kinds are friendship, not as possessing a common name accidentally without being specially related to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as in relation to one and the same thing.

†But since the same thing is at the same time absolutely good and absolutely pleasant (if nothing interferes), and the genuine friend is absolutely the friend in the primary sense, and such is the man desirable for himself (and he must be

17–1237b 7 = *E.N.* 1156b 7–17, 33–1157a 12.

[1] αὐτὸς ὁ φιλῶν for ἀντιφιλῶν (W.D.R.). [2] Cf. Hdt. ii. 68.
[3] ἕως ἄν (Jackson). [4] a 7–b 1.

such; for the man to whom[1] one wishes good to happen for himself, one must also desire to exist), the genuine friend is also absolutely pleasant; hence any sort of friend is thought pleasant†; but here one ought rather to distinguish further, for[2] the subject needs reflection. Is what is good for one's self or what is good absolutely dear? and is actual loving attended with pleasure, so that the loved object is pleasant, or not? For the two must be harmonized. For what is not absolutely good, but perhaps[3] bad, is something to avoid, and what is not good for one's self is nothing to one; but what is sought is that the absolutely good should be good in the further sense of being good to the individual. For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but for each individual his own; and these must agree. Virtue brings about this agreement, and the political art exists to make them agree for those to whom as yet they do not. And one who is a human being[4] is ready and on the road for this (for by nature that which is absolutely good is good to him), and man rather than woman, and the gifted rather than the ungifted; but the road is through pleasure; the noble must be pleasant. But when these two disagree a man cannot yet be perfectly good, for incontinence may arise; for it is in the disagreement of the good with the pleasant in the passions that incontinence occurs.

So that since the primary friendship is grounded on virtue, friends of this sort will be themselves absolutely good, and this not because they are useful, but in another way. For good to the individual and the absolutely good are two, and as with the profitable so with habits. For the absolutely profitable differs from what is profitable to certain people, as[5] taking exercise does from taking drugs. So that the habit called human virtue is of two kinds, for we will assume man to be one of the things excellent by nature; therefore[6] the virtue of the naturally excellent is an absolute good, but the virtue of that which is not thus

[1] For ὡς read ᾧ (Spengel).
[2] ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν, πότερον τό γε (Erasmus).
[3] ἄν πως for ἁπλῶς (Jackson).
[4] ⟨ὁ⟩ ἄνθρωπος (Jackson).
[5] τοισδί, ὃν τρόπον for τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον (Jackson).
[6] ἄρα for γάρ (Sus.).

good only to it. Similarly, then, with the pleasant. For here one must pause and examine whether friendship can exist without pleasure, how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which of the two—goodness or pleasure—the loving depends, whether one loves a man because he is good even if not pleasant, and in any case not for his pleasantness. Now, loving having two senses,[1] does actual love seem to involve pleasure because activity is good? It is clear that just as in science what we have recently contemplated and learnt is most perceptible † because of its pleasantness †, so also is the recognition of the familiar, and the same account applies to both. Naturally, at least, the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and pleasant to those to whom it is good. From which it at once follows that like takes pleasure in like, and that nothing is so pleasant to man as man; and if this is so even before they are perfect, it is clear it must be so when they are perfected; and the good man is perfect. But if active loving is a mutual choice with pleasure in each other's acquaintanceship, it is clear that in general the primary friendship is a reciprocal choice of the absolutely good and pleasant because it is good and pleasant; and friendship itself[2] is the habit from which such choice springs. For its function is an activity, and this is not external, but in the one who feels love, but the function of every faculty is external; for it is in something different or in one's self *qua* different. Therefore to love is to feel pleasure, but not to be loved; † for to be loved is the activity of what is lovable, but to love is the activity of friendship also †; and the one is found only in the animate, the other also in the inanimate, for even inanimate things are loved. But since active loving is to treat the loved[3] *qua* 1237b loved, and the friend is loved by the friend *qua* friend and not *qua* musician or doctor, the pleasure coming from him merely as being himself is the pleasure of friendship; for he loves the object as himself and not for being something else.[4] So that if he does not rejoice in him for being good the primary friendship does not exist, nor should any of his

[1] Potential and actual love.
[2] *αὐτὴ ἡ φιλία* (St. G. Stock).
[3] *τῷ φιλουμένῳ* (Fritzsche).
[4] *ἄλλο* (Jackson).

incidental qualities hinder more than his goodness gives pleasure. For if[1] a man has an unpleasant odour he is left. For he must be content with goodwill without actual association.[2] This then is primary friendship, and all admit it to be friendship. It is through it that the other friendships seem friendships to some, but are doubted to be such by others. For friendship seems something stable, and this alone is stable. For a formed decision is stable, and where we do not act quickly or easily, we get the decision right. There is no stable friendship without confidence, but confidence needs time. One must then make trial, as Theognis says,[3] 'You cannot know the mind of man or woman till you have tried them as you might cattle.' Nor is a friend made except through time; they do indeed wish to be friends, and such a state easily passes muster as friendship. For when men are eager to be friends, by performing every friendly service to one another they think they not merely wish to be, but are friends. But it happens with friendship as with other things; as man is not in health merely because he wishes to be so, neither are men at once friends as soon as they wish to be friends. The proof is that men in this condition, without having made trial of one another, are easily made enemies; wherever each has allowed the other to test him, they are not easily made enemies; but where they have not, they will be persuaded whenever those who try to break up the friendship produce evidence. It is clear at the same time that this friendship does not exist between the bad, for the bad man feels distrust and is malignant to all, measuring others by himself. Therefore the good are more easily deceived unless experience has taught them distrust. But the bad prefer natural goods to a friend and none of them loves a man so much as things; therefore they are not friends. The proverbial 'community among friends' is not found among them; the friend is made a part of things, not things regarded as part of the friend. The primary friendship then is not found between

8–1238a 29 = *E. N.* 1156b 17–32.

[1] *εἰ* (Bekk.). [2] *ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν* (W. D. R.) *συζῆν δὲ μή* (J. S.).
[3] Theog. 125.

many, for it is hard to test many men, for one would have to live with each. Nor should one choose a friend like a garment. Yet in all things it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two alternatives; and if one has used the worse garment for a long time and not the better, the better is to be chosen, but not in place of an old friend one of whom you do not know whether he is better. For a friend is not to be had without trial nor in a single day, but there is need of time and so 'the bushel of salt' has become proverbial. He must also be not merely good absolutely but good for you, if the[1] friend is to be a friend to you. For a man is good absolutely by being good, but a friend by being good for another, and absolutely good and friend when these two attributes are combined † so that what is absolutely good is good for the other, or else not absolutely good,[2] but good to another in the sense of useful.† But the need of active loving also prevents one from being at the same time a friend to many; for one cannot be active towards many at the same time.

From these facts then it is clear that it is correctly said that friendship is a stable thing, just as happiness is a thing sufficient in itself. It has been rightly said, 'for nature is stable but not wealth',[3] but it is still better to say 'virtue' than 'nature'; and Time is said to show the friend,[4] and bad fortune rather than good fortune. For then it is clear that the goods of friends are common (for these alone instead of things naturally good and evil—which are the matters with which good and bad fortune are concerned—choose a man rather than the existence of some of those things and the non-existence of others). But misfortune shows those who are not really friends, but friends only for some accidental utility. But time reveals both sorts; for even the useful man does not show his usefulness quickly, as the pleasant man does his pleasantness; yet the absolutely pleasant is not quick to show himself either. For men are like wines

[1] εἰ ὁ for εἰ δή (Bu.).
[2] τοῦτο τῷ for τὸ τούτου (Jackson), ἤ for εἰ (Π²), σπουδαῖος for σπουδαίῳ (Fritzsche).
[3] Eur. *Elect.* 941.
[4] ὅ τε for ὅτι before χρόνος, φίλον for φιλούμενον (Jackson).

and meats; the pleasantness of them shows itself quickly, but if it continues longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and so it is with men.// For the absolutely pleasant[1] must be determined as such by the end it realizes and the time for which it continues pleasant. Even the vulgar would admit this, judging not[2] merely according to results but in the way in which, speaking of a drink, they call it sweeter. For this is unpleasant not[3] for the result but from not being continuous, though it deceives us at the start.

The first friendship then—by reason of which the others get the name—is that based on virtue and due to the pleasure of virtue, as has been said before;[4] the other kinds occur also in children, brutes, and bad men, whence the sayings, 'like is pleased with like' and 'bad adheres to bad from pleasure'.[5] And[6] the bad may be pleasant to one another, not *qua* bad or *qua* neither good nor bad, but (say) as both being musicians, or the one fond of music and the other a musician, and inasmuch as all have some good in them, and in this way they harmonize with one another. Further, they might be useful and profitable to one another, not absolutely but in relation to their purpose, in virtue of[7] some neutral characteristic. Also a bad man may be a friend to a good,[8] the bad being of use to the good in relation to the good man's existing purpose, the good to the incontinent in relation to his existing purpose, and to the bad in relation to his natural purpose. And he will wish for his friend what is good, the absolutely good absolutely, and conditionally what is good for the friend, so far as poverty or illness is of advantage to him—and these for the sake of absolute goods; taking a medicine is an instance, for that no one wishes, but wishes only for some particular purpose. Further, a good man and a bad man may be friends in the way in which those not good might be friends to one another. A man might be pleasant, not as bad but as partaking in some common property, e.g. as being

[1] Omitting *καί* with the MSS.
[2] *οὐκ* (MSS.) for *ὅτι*.
[3] ⟨*οὐ*⟩ before *διά* (Jackson).
[4] Cf. 1236[b] 2–1237[b] 8.
[5] Eur. fr. 298 Nauck.
[6] *ἐνδέχεται δέ* (MSS.).
[7] *προαίρεσιν ἧ* (W. D. R.).
[8] *τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ φαῦλον* (Bekker).

musical, or again, so far as there is something good in all (for which reason some might be glad to associate even with the good), or in so far as they suit each individual; for all have something of the good.

These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all 3 of them the word friendship implies a kind of equality. For even those who are friends through virtue are mutually friends by a sort of equality of virtue.

But another variety is the friendship of superiority to inferiority, e. g. as the virtue of a god is superior to that of a man (for this is another kind of friendship)—and in general that of ruler to subject; just as justice in this case is different, for here it is a proportional equality, not numerical equality. Into this class falls the relation of father to son and of benefactor to beneficiary; and there are varieties of these again, e. g. there is a difference between the relation of father to son, and of husband to wife, the latter being that of ruler to subject, the former that of benefactor to beneficiary. In these varieties there is not at all, or at least not in equal degree, the return of love for love. For it would be ridiculous to accuse God because the love one receives in return from him is not equal to the love given him, or for the subject [1] to make the same complaint against his ruler. For the part of a ruler is to receive not to give love, or at least to give love in a different way. And the pleasure is different, and [2] that of the man who needs nothing over his own possessions or child, and that of him who lacks over what comes to him, are not the same. Similarly also with those who are friends through use or pleasure, some are on an equal footing with each other, in others there is the relation of superiority and inferiority. Therefore those who think themselves to be on the former footing find fault if the other is not equally useful to and a benefactor of them; and similarly with regard to pleasure. This is obvious in the case of lover and beloved; for this is

15–1240a 4: cf. *M. M.* 1210a 6–22. 15–39 = *E. N.* 1158b 1–19.

[1] ὁ ἀρχόμενος for καὶ ἀρχομένῳ (Bz.).
[2] καὶ ⟨ἡ⟩ ἡδονὴ διαφέρει, οὐδ' ἕν (Jackson).

frequently a cause of strife between them. The lover does not perceive that the passion in each has not[1] the same reason; therefore Aenicus has said 'a beloved, not a lover, would say such things'.[2] But they think that there is the same reason for the passion of each.

4 There being, then, as has been said,[3] three kinds of friendship—based on virtue, utility, and pleasantness—these again are subdivided each into two, one kind based on equality, the other on superiority. Both are friendships, but only those between whom there is equality are friends; it would be absurd for a man to be the friend of a child, yet certainly he loves and is loved by him. Sometimes the superior ought to be loved, but if he loves, he is reproached for loving one undeserving; for measurement is made by the worth of the friends and a sort of [i.e. proportional] equality. Some then, owing to inferiority in age, do not deserve to receive an equal love, and others because of virtue or birth or some other such superiority possessed by the other person. The superior ought to[4] claim either not to return the love or not to return it in the same measure, whether in the friendship of utility, pleasure, or virtue. Where the superiority is small, disputes naturally arise; for the small is in some cases of no account, e.g. in weighing wood, though not in weighing gold. But men judge wrongly what is small; for their own good by its nearness seems great, that of another by its distance small. But when the difference is excessive, then not even those affected seek to make out that their love should be returned or equally returned, e.g. as if a man were to claim this from God. It is clear then that men are friends when on an equality with each other, but we may have return of love without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek the friendship of superiority rather than that of equality; for in the 1239a

1–b 6 = *E. N.* 1158b 20–1159a 33. 17–19 = *E. N.* 1158b 33–1159a 5: cf. *M.M.* 1208b 29–31. 21–b 6 = *E.N.* 1159a 13–b 1: cf. *M.M.* 1210b 6–32.

[1] ἐστὶ τῆς προθυμίας (Fritzsche).
[2] διὸ εἴρηκεν Αἴνικος· ἐρώμενος τοιαῦτ' ἄν, οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι (Jackson).
[3] Cf. 1236a 7–1238b 15.
[4] δεῖ for ἀεί (Cook Wilson).

former they obtain both love and superiority. Therefore with some the flatterer is more valued than the friend, for he procures the appearance of both love and superiority for the object of his flattery. The ambitious are especially of this kind; for to be an object of admiration involves superiority. By nature some grow up loving, and others ambitious; the former is one who delights rather in loving than in being loved, the other is rather fond of honour. He, then, who delights in being loved and admired really loves superiority; the other, the loving, is fond of the pleasure of loving.[1] This by his mere activity of loving he must[2] have; for to be loved is an accident; one may be loved without knowing it, but not love. Loving, rather than being loved, depends on lovingness; being loved rather depends on the nature of the object of love. And here is a proof. The friend or lover would choose, if both were not possible, rather to know than to be known, as we see women do when allowing others to adopt their children,[3] e. g. Antiphon's Andromache. For wishing to be known seems to be felt on one's own account and in order to get, not to do, some good; but wishing to know is felt in order that one may do and love. Therefore we praise those who persist in their love towards the dead; for they know but are not known. That, then, there are several sorts of friendship, that they are three in number, and what are the differences between being loved and having love returned, and between friends on an equality and friends in a relation of superiority and inferiority, has now been stated.

But since 'friendly' is also used more universally, as was indeed said at the beginning,[4] by those who take in extraneous considerations—some saying that the like is friendly, and some the contrary,—we must speak also of the relation of these friendships to those previously

6–1240[a] 7 = *E. N.* 1159[b] 10–24.

[1] τῆς . . . ἡδονῆς (MSS.).
[2] ἀνάγκῃ ἐνεργοῦντι for ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα (J. S.).
[3] ὑποβολαῖς (Vict.); cf. Plat. *Rep.* 538 A and *Eth. Nic.* 1159[a] 28.
[4] Cf. 1235[a] 4 sqq.

mentioned. The like is brought both under the pleasant and under the good, for the good is simple, but the bad various in form; and the good man is ever like himself and does not change in character; but the bad and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning. Therefore unless the bad come to some agreement, they are not friends to one another but are parted; but unstable friendship is not friendship. So thus the like is friendly, because the good is like; but it may also be friendly because of pleasure; for those like one another have the same pleasures, and everything too is by nature pleasant to itself. Therefore the voices, habits, and company of those of the same species are pleasantest to each side, even in the animals other than man; and in this way it is possible for even the bad to love one another: 'pleasure glues the bad to the bad.'[1]

But opposites are friendly through usefulness; for the like is useless to itself; therefore master needs slave, and slave master; man and wife need one another, and the opposite is pleasant and desired *qua* useful, not as included in the end but as a means towards it. For when a thing has obtained what it desires, it has reached its end and no longer desires the opposite, e. g. heat does not desire cold, nor dryness moisture. Yet in a sense the love of the contrary is love of the good; for the opposites desire one another because of the mean; they desire one another like tallies[2] because thus out of the two arises a single mean. Further, the love is accidentally of the opposite, but *per se* of the mean, for opposites desire not one another but the mean. For if over-chilled they return to the mean by being warmed, and if over-warmed by being chilled. And so with everything else. Otherwise they are ever desiring, never in the mean states; but that which is in the mean delights without desire in what is naturally pleasant, while the others delight in all that puts them out of their natural condition. This kind of relation then is found also among inanimate things; but love occurs when the relation is found among the living. Therefore some delight in what 1240[a]

[1] Cf. 1238[a] 34.

[2] Cf. Plat. *Symp.* 191 D.

is unlike themselves, the rigid in the witty, the energetic in the lazy; for they reduce each other to the mean state. Accidentally, then, as has been said,[1] opposites are friendly, because of the good.

The number then of kinds of friendship, and the different senses in which we speak of 'friends' and of persons as 'loving' and 'loved', both where this constitutes friendship and where it does not, have now been stated.

6 The question whether[2] a man is a friend to himself or not requires much inquiry. For some think that every man is above all a friend to himself; and they use this friendship as a canon by which to test his friendship to all other friends. If we look to argument and to the properties usually thought characteristic of friends, then the two kinds of friendship are in some of these respects opposed to one another, but in others alike. For this friendship—that to oneself—is, in a way, friendship by analogy, not absolutely. For loving and being loved requires two separate individuals. Therefore a man is a friend to himself rather in the sense in which we have described[3] the incontinent and continent as willing or unwilling, namely in the sense that the parts of his soul are in a certain relation to each other; and all problems of this sort have a similar explanation, e. g. whether a man can be a friend or enemy to himself, and whether a man can wrong himself. For all these relations require two separate individuals; so far then as the soul is two, these relations can in a sense belong to it; so far as these two are not separate, the relations cannot belong to it.

By a man's attitude to himself the other modes of friendship, under which we are accustomed to consider friendship in this discourse, are[4] determined.[5] For a man seems to us a friend, who wishes the good or what he thinks to be such to some one, not on his own account but for the sake of that

8–ᵇ39 = *E. N.* 1166ª 1–ᵇ29: cf. *M. M.* 1210ᵇ 33–1211ª 5.

[1] Cf. 1239ᵇ 32 sq.
[2] δὲ τοῦ αὐτόν (τοῦ omitted accidentally by Susemihl).
[3] Cf. 1223ª 36–ᵇ17.
[4] εἰσίν for ὡς (Speng., Jackson).
[5] φίλον εἶναι ὡρισμένοι (Jackson).

other; or, in another way, if he wishes for another man existence—even if he is not bestowing goods, still less[1] existence—on that other's account and not on his own, he would seem most of all to be a friend to him.[2] And in yet another manner he would be a friend to him whom he wishes to live with merely for the sake of his company and for no other reason; thus fathers wish the existence of their sons, but prefer to live with others. Now[3] these various ways of friendship are discordant with one another. For some think they are not loved, unless the other wishes them this or that good,[4] some unless their existence or their society is desired. Further, to sorrow with the sorrowing, for no other reason than their sorrow, we shall regard as love (e. g. slaves towards their masters feel grief because their masters when in trouble are cruel to them, not for the sake of the masters themselves)—as mothers feel towards their children, and birds that share one another's pains. For the friend wants, if possible,[5] not merely to feel pain along with his friend, but to feel the same pain, e. g. to feel thirsty when he is thirsty, if that were possible, and if not,[6] then to feel a pain as like as possible. The same words are applicable to joy, which, if felt for no other reason than that the other feels joy, is a sign of friendship. Further, 1240ᵇ we say about friendship such things as that friendship is equality, and true friends a single soul. All such phrases point back to the single individual; for a man wishes good to himself[7] in this fashion; for no one benefits himself for some further reason or speaks well of himself for a certain consideration, because his action is that of an individual;[8] for he who shows that he loves wishes not to love but to be thought to love.[9] And wishing the existence above all of the friend, living with him, sharing his joy and his

1–3 = *E. N.* 1168ᵇ 6–8.

[1] ⟨μήτοι⟩ for μὴ τῷ (Jackson).
[2] φίλος εἶναι for φιλεῖν (Jackson).
[3] δέ for δή (Spengel).
[4] τοδὶ αὐτοῖς for τὸ ἑαυτοῖς (Jackson).
[5] τε for γε (MSS.).
[6] εἴ τε μή (Jackson).
[7] αὑτῷ (Jackson).
[8] χάριν τοσοῦδε λέγει, ὅτι (Jackson).
[9] δοκεῖν γὰρ φιλεῖν βούλεται (Jackson).

grief, unity of soul with the friend, the impossibility of even living without one another, and the dying together are characteristic of a single individual. (For such is the condition of the individual and he is perhaps company to himself.) All these characters then[1] we find in the relation of the good man to himself. In the bad man, e. g. the incontinent, there is variance, and for this reason it seems possible for a man to be at enmity with himself; but so far as he is single and indivisible, he is an object of desire to himself.[2] Such is the good man, the man whose friendship is based on virtue, for the wicked man is not one but many, in the same day other than himself and fickle. So that a man's friendship for himself is at bottom friendship towards the good; for because a man is in a sense like himself,[3] single, and good for himself, so far he is a friend and object of desire to himself. And this is natural to man; but the bad man is unnatural. The good man never finds fault with himself at the moment of his act, like the incontinent, nor the later with the earlier man, like the penitent, nor the earlier with the later, like the liar. Generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'Coriscus' to 'good Coriscus'.[4] †For it is clear that some identical portion of them is good†; for when they blame themselves, they kill themselves. But every one seems good to himself. But the man that is good absolutely, seeks to be a friend to himself, as has been said,[5] since he has within him two parts which by nature desire to be friends and which it is impossible to tear apart. Therefore in the case of man each is thought to be the friend of himself; but not so with the other animals; e. g. the horse is himself to himself . . .[6] therefore not a friend. Nor are children, till they have attained the power of deliberate choice; for already then the mind is at variance with the appetite. One's friendship to oneself resembles the friendship arising from kinship; for neither bond can be dissolved by one's own power; but, even if

[1] δή for δέ (Jackson).
[2] αὑτῷ for αὑτοῦ (MSS.).
[3] ὅμοιος (Bekker).
[4] Cf. *Soph. El.* c. 17.
[5] Cf. ^{a}13–21.
[6] A lacuna in the text.

they quarrel, the kinsmen remain kinsmen; and so the man remains one so long as he lives.

The various senses then of loving, and how all friendships reduce to the primary kind, is clear from what has been said.

7 It is appropriate to the inquiry to study agreement of 1241a feeling and kindly feeling; for some identify these, and others think they cannot exist apart. Now kindly feeling is not altogether different from friendship, nor yet the same; for when we distinguish friendship according to its three sorts, kindly feeling is found neither in the friendship of usefulness nor in that of pleasure. For if one wishes well to the other because that is useful to one, one would be so wishing not for the object's sake, but for his own; but goodwill seems like . . .[1] to be not for the sake of[2] him who feels the goodwill, but for the sake of him towards whom it is felt. But[3] if goodwill existed in the friendship towards the pleasant, then men would feel goodwill towards things inanimate. So that it is clear that goodwill is concerned with the friendship that depends on character; but goodwill shows itself in merely wishing, friendship in also doing what one wishes. For goodwill is the beginning of friendship; every friend has goodwill, but not all who have goodwill are friends. He who has goodwill only is like a man at the beginning, and therefore it is the beginning of friendship, not friendship itself.

For friends seem to agree in feeling, and those who agree in feeling seem to be friends. Friendly agreement is not about all things, but only about things that may be done by those in agreement and what relates to their common life. Nor[4] is it agreement merely in thought or merely in desire, for it is possible to know one thing and desire the opposite,[5] as in the incontinent the motives disagree, nor if a man agrees with another in deliberate choice, does he

1–14 = *E. N.* 1166b 30–1167a 21: cf. *M. M.* 1211b 40–1212a 12.
15–33 = *E. N.* 1167a 22–b16: cf. *M. M.* 1212a 13–27.

[1] A lacuna here, possibly 'virtuous friendship' (Sus.).
[2] *ἕνεκα* for *εὔνοια* (Jackson).
[3] *δέ* for *δή* (Π² Bekker).
[4] *οὐδέ* for *οὔτε* (coni. Susemihl).
[5] *νοεῖν καὶ* for *τὸ κινοῦν*.

necessarily agree in desire.[1] Agreement is only found in the case of good men; at least, bad men when they choose and desire the same things[2] harm one another. Agreement, like friendship, does not appear to have a single meaning; but still in its primary and natural form it is morally good; and so the bad cannot agree; the agreement of the bad, when they choose and desire the same things, is something different. And the two parties must so desire the same thing that it is possible for both to get what they desire;[3] for if they desire that which cannot belong to both, they will quarrel; but those in agreement will not quarrel. There is agreement when the two parties make the same choice as to who is to rule, who to be ruled, meaning by 'the same', not that each one should choose himself, but that both should choose the same person. Agreement is the friendship of fellow citizens. So much then about agreement and goodwill.

8 It is disputed why benefactors are more fond of the benefited than the benefited of their benefactors. The opposite seems to be just. One might suppose it happens from consideration of utility and what is profitable to oneself; for the benefactor has a debt due to him, while the benefited has to repay a debt. This, however, is not all; the reason is partly the general natural principle—activity 1241[b] is more desirable. There is the same relation between the effect and the activity, the benefited being as it were an effect or creation of the benefactor. Hence in animals their strong feeling for their children, both in begetting them and in preserving them afterwards. And so fathers love their children—and still more mothers—more than they are loved by them. And these again love their own children more than their parents, because nothing is so good as activity; in fact, mothers love more than fathers because they think the children to be more their own creation; for

34-[b]11 = *E. N.* 1167[b] 17-1168[a] 27: cf. *M. M.* 1211[b] 18-39.

[1] οὐδ' εἰ . . . ὁμονοεῖ (rc. P[b]). [2] ταὐτά (Bekker).
[3] e.g. Charles V and Francis I did not 'agree'—as the former said—because both desired Milan.

the amount of work is measured by the difficulty, and the mother suffers more in birth. So much then for friendship towards oneself and among more than one.

9 But both justice seems to be a sort of equality and friendship also involves equality, if the saying is not wrong that 'love is equality'.[1] Now constitutions are all of them a particular form of justice; for a constitution is a partnership, and every partnership rests on justice, so that whatever be the number of species of friendship, there are the same of justice and partnership; these all border on one another, and the species of one have differences akin to those of the other. But since there is the same relation between soul and body, artisan and tool, and master and slave, between each of these pairs there is no partnership; for they are not two, but the first term in each is one, and the second a part of this one, but not itself one.[2] Nor is the good to be divided between the two, but that of both belongs to the one for the sake of which the pair exists. For the body is the soul's congenital tool, while the slave is as it were a part and detachable tool of the master, the tool being a sort of inanimate slave.

The other partnerships are a part of the civic partnership, e. g. those of the phratries and priestly colleges[3] or pecuniary partnerships.[4] All constitutions are found together in the household, both the true and the corrupt forms, for the same thing is true in constitutions[5] as of harmonies. The government of the children by the father is royal, the relation of husband and wife aristocratic, the relation of brothers that of a commonwealth; the corruption of these three are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. The forms of justice then are also so many in number.

But since equality is either numerical or proportional, there will be various species of justice, friendship, and

11–1242b 1 = *E. N.* 1159b 25–1162a 33.

[1] Keeping ἡ. [2] οὐ δ' ἓν for οὐδέν (Jackson).
[3] ὀργέων (L. and S. s.v. ὀργεών s. fin.) or ὀργεώνων (Dietsche).
[4] Omit ἔτι πολιτεῖαι as dittography (Fr.).
[5] Omit τῶν (Spengel). For the sense cf. *Pol.* 1342a 24.

partnership ; on numerical equality rests the commonwealth,[1] and the friendship of comrades—both being measured by the same standard, on proportional the aristocratic (which is best),[2] and the royal. For the same thing is not just for the superior and the inferior; what is proportional is just. Such is the friendship between father and child; and the same sort of thing may be seen in partnerships.

1242a We speak of friendships of kinsmen, comrades, partners, the so-called 'civic friendship'. That of kinsmen has more than one species, that of brothers, that of father and sons. There is the friendship based on proportion, as that of the father to his children, and that based on mere number, e. g. that of brothers, for this latter resembles the friendship of comrades; for here too age gives certain privileges. Civic friendship has been established mainly in accordance with utility; for men seem to have come together because each is not sufficient for himself, though they would have come together anyhow for the sake of living in company. Only the civic friendship and its parallel corruption are not merely friendships, but the partnership is that of friends;[3] other friendships rest on the relation of superiority. The justice belonging to the friendship of those useful to one another is pre-eminently justice, for it is civic or political justice. The concurrence of the saw and the art that uses it is of another sort; for it is not for some end common to both—it is like instrument and soul—but for the sake of the user. It is true that the tool itself[4] receives attention, and it is just that it should receive it, for its function, that is; for it exists for the sake of its function. And the essence of a gimlet is twofold, but more properly it is its activity, namely boring. In this class come the body and a slave, as has been said before.[5]

To inquire, then, how to behave to a friend is to look for a particular kind of justice, for generally all justice is in

[1] Dispensing with Susemihl's addition of δημοκρατική.
[2] ἡ ἀρίστη (W. D. R.).
[3] Cf. 1239a 4, 5.
[4] αὐτὸ τό for τοῦτο (Bz.).
[5] Cf. 1241b 17–24.

relation to a friend. For justice involves a number of individuals who are partners, and the friend is a partner either in family or in one's scheme of life. For man is not merely a political but also a household-maintaining animal, and his unions are not, like those of the other animals, confined to certain times, and formed with any chance partner, whether male or female; but in a special sense man is not a lonely being,[1] but has a tendency to partnership with those to whom he is by nature akin. There would, then, be partnership and a kind of justice, even if there were no State; and the household is a kind of friendship; the relation, indeed, of master and servant is that of an art and its tools, a soul and its body; and these are not friendships, nor forms of justice, but something similar to justice; just as health is not justice, but something similar. But the friendship of man and wife is a friendship based on utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that of God to man, of the benefactor to the benefited, and in general of the natural ruler to the natural subject. That of brothers to one another is eminently that of comrades, inasmuch as it involves equality[2]—'for I was not declared a bastard brother to him; but the same Zeus, my king, was called the father of both of us.'[3] For this is the language of men that seek equality. Therefore in the household first we 1242[b] have the sources and springs of friendship, of political organization, and of justice.

But since there are three sorts of friendship, based on virtue, utility, and pleasantness respectively, and two varieties of each of these—for each of them may imply either superiority or equality—and the justice involved in these is clear from the debates that have been held on it, in a friendship between superior and inferior the claim for proportion takes different forms, the superior's claim being one for inverse proportion, i. e. as he is to the inferior, so should what he receives from the inferior be to what the inferior

2–21 = *E. N.* 1162[a] 34–[b]4, 1163[a] 24–[b] 27.

[1] ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ οὐ μοναυλικόν for the gibberish ἀλλ' αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν (Speng.).

[2] ἢ κατ' ἰσότητα (Jackson).

[3] Soph. Fr. 684 Nauck.

receives from him, he being in the position of ruler to subject; if he cannot get that, he demands at least numerical equality. For so it is in the other associations, the two members enjoying an equality sometimes of number, sometimes of ratio. For if they contributed numerically equal sums of money, they divide an equal amount, and by an equal number; if not equal sums, then they divide proportionally. But the inferior inverts this proportion and joins crosswise.[1] But in this way the superior would seem to come off the worse, and friendship and partnership to be a gratuitous burden. Equality must then be restored and proportion created by some other means; and this means is honour, which by nature belongs to a ruler or god in relation to a subject. The profit and the honour must be equated.

But civic friendship is that resting on equality; it is based on utility; and just as cities are friends to one another, so in the like way are citizens. 'The Athenians no longer know the Megarians';[2] nor do citizens one another, when they are no longer useful to one another, and the friendship is merely a temporary one for a particular exchange of goods.[3] There is here, too, the relation of ruler and subject which is neither the natural relation, nor that involved in kingship, but each is ruler and ruled in turn; nor is it either's purpose to act with the free beneficence of a god,[4] but that he may share equally in the good and in the burdensome service. Civic friendship, then, claims to be one based on equality. But of the friendship of utility there are two kinds, the strictly legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object as sellers and buyers do; hence the proverb 'a fixed wage for a friend'. When, then, friendship proceeds by contract, it is of the civic and strictly legal kind;[5] but when each of the two parties

21–1243b 14 = *E. N.* 1162b 16–1163a 23.

[1] i. e. he claims that *A*'s receipt shall not be to *B*'s as *A*'s contribution to *B*'s, but as *B*'s contribution to *A*'s.

[2] *Fr. eleg.* adesp. 6 Bergk.

[3] Cf. *E. N.* 1162b 26.

[4] ποιῇ ὡς ὁ θεός (ὡς omitted by mistake in Susemihl).

[5] Reading καθ' ὁμολογίαν ᾖ, πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία καὶ νομική (Fr. and apparently the Vetus Versio).

leaves the return for his services to be fixed by the other, we have the moral friendship, that of comrades. Therefore recrimination is very frequent in this sort of friendship; and the reason is that it is unnatural; for friendships based on utility and based on virtue are different; but these wish to have both together, associating together really for the sake of utility, but representing their friendship as moral, like that of good men; pretending to trust one another they make out their friendship to be not merely legal. For in general there are more recriminations in the useful friendship than in either of the other two (for virtue is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got what they wanted, and given what they had, are done with it; but useful friends do not dissolve their association at once, if their relations are not merely legal but those of comrades); still the legal form of useful friendship is free from recrimination. The legal association is dissolved by a money-payment (for it measures equality in money), but the moral is dissolved by voluntary consent. Therefore in some countries the law forbids lawsuits for voluntary transactions between those who associate thus as friends, and rightly; for good men do not go to law[1] with one another; and such as these have dealings with one another as good men themselves, and dealing with men who can be trusted.[2] In this kind of friendship it is uncertain how either will recriminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters.

It is a further problem on which of two grounds we are to determine what is just, whether by looking to the amount of the service rendered, or to what was its character for the recipient; for, to borrow the language of Theognis,[3] the service may be 'Small to thee, O goddess, but great to me'. Or the opposite may happen, as in the saying, 'this is sport to you but death to me.' Hence, as we have said,[4] come recriminations. For the benefactor claims a return on the

[1] δίκη for δίκαιον (J. S.). [2] πιστοῖς (Jackson). [3] Theog. 14.
[4] Reading ὥσπερ εἴρηται (coni. Fritzsche), or possibly εἴρηται alone may bear this sense. The reference is to 1242b 37.

ground of having done a great service, because he has done it at the request of the other, or with some other plea of the great value of the benefit to the other's interest, saying nothing about what it was to himself; while the recipient insists on its value to the benefactor, not on its value to himself. †Sometimes the receiver inverts the position,† insisting how little the benefit has turned out to him, while the doer insists on its great magnitude[1] to *him*, e.g. if at considerable risk one has benefited another to the extent of a drachma, the one insists on the greatness of the risk, the other on the smallness of the money, just as in the repayment of money—for there the dispute is on this point—the one claims the value of it when it was lent, the other concedes only the value of it now when it is returned, unless they have made an explicit provision in the contract. Civic friendship, then, looks to the agreement and the thing, moral friendship to the purpose; here then we have more truly justice, and a friendly justice. The reason of the quarrel is that moral friendship is more noble, but useful friendship more necessary; men come,[2] then, proposing to be moral friends, i.e. friends through virtue; but when some private interest stands in the way,[3] they show clearly they were not so. For the multitude aim at the noble only when they 1243b have plenty of everything else; and at noble friendship similarly. So that it is clear what distinctions should be drawn in these matters. If the two are moral friends, we must look to see if the purpose of each is equal; and then nothing more should be claimed by either from the other. But if their friendship is of the useful or civic kind, we must consider what would have been profitable lines for an agreement. And if one declares that they are friends on one basis, but the other on the other, it is not honourable, if one ought to *do* something in return, merely to use fine language; and so too, in the other case,[4] but since they have not

[1] Omit *μέγα* as a gloss (J. S.). [2] *ἔρχονται* (P^b Bekker).
[3] *ἀντικρούσῃ* for *ἄντικρυς ᾖ* (Jackson).
[4] i.e. if it really was a business agreement, it is not honourable for one party to get off by saying it was a 'moral' friendship; and if it really was a 'moral' friendship, it is not honourable for one party to claim a return as if it had been a business agreement.

declared their friendship a moral friendship, some one[1] must be made judge, so that neither cheats the other by a false pretence; and so each must put up with his luck. But that moral friendship is based on purpose is clear, since even if after receiving great benefits one does not repay them through inability, but repays only to the extent of his ability, he acts honourably; and God is satisfied at getting sacrifices as good as our power allows. But a seller of goods will not be satisfied if the buyer says he cannot pay more; nor will a lender of money.

Recriminations are common in dissimilar friendships, where[2] action and reaction are not in the same straight line; and it is not easy to see what is just. For it is hard to measure by just this one unit different directions; we find this in the relation of lovers, for there the one pursues the other as the one pleasant person,[3] in order to live with him, while the latter seeks the other at times for his utility. When the love is over, one changes as the other changes. Then they calculate the *quid pro quo*;[4] thus Python and Pammenes quarrelled; and so in general do teacher[5] and pupil (for knowledge and money have no common measure), and so Herodicus the doctor quarrelled with a patient who paid him only a small fee; such too was the case of the king and the lyre-player; the former regarded his associate as pleasant, the latter his as useful; and so the king, when he had to pay, chose to regard himself as an associate of the pleasant kind, and said that just as the player had given him pleasure by singing, so he had given the player pleasure by his promise. But it is clear here too how one should decide; the measurement must be by one measure, only here not by a number[6] but by a ratio; we must measure by proportion, just as one measures in the associations of citizens. For how is a cobbler to have dealings with a farmer

15–38 = *E. N.* 1163b 28–1164b 21: cf. *M. M.* 1210a 24–b6.

[1] Reading τινά (Bekker).
[2] ταῖς for τοῖς (Bz.).
[3] Keeping τόν with the MSS.
[4] τί ἀντὶ τίνος for the MSS. reading παντί τινος (Jackson).
[5] Reading καὶ ὅλως διδάσκαλος (MSS.).
[6] οὐκ ἀριθμῷ for οὐχ ὅρῳ (Jackson).

unless one equates the work of the two by proportion? so to all whose exchanges are not of the same for the same, proportion is the measure, e.g. if the one complains that he has given wisdom, and the other that he has given money, we must measure first the ratio of wisdom to wealth,[1] and then what has been given for each. For if the one gives half of the lesser, and the other does not give even a small fraction of the greater object, it is clear that the latter does injustice. Here, too, there may be a dispute at the start, if one party pretends they have come together for use, and the other denies this and alleges that they have met from some other kind of friendship.

1244[a] As regards the good man who is loved for his virtue, we must consider whether we ought to render useful services and help to him, or to one who makes a return and has power. This is the same problem as whether we ought rather to benefit a friend or a virtuous man. For if a man is both virtuous and a friend,[2] there is perhaps no great difficulty, if one does not exaggerate the one quality and minimize the other, making him very much of a friend, but not much of a good man. But in other cases many problems arise, e.g. if the one has been [3] but will no longer remain so, and the other will be but is not yet what he is going to be, or the one was but is not, and the other is but has not been and will not be. But the other [4] is a harder question. For perhaps Euripides is right in saying, 'A word is your just pay for a word,[5] but a deed for him who has given deeds.'[6] And one must not do everything for one's father, but there are some things also one should do for one's mother, though a father is the better of the two. For, indeed, even to Zeus we do not sacrifice all things, nor does he have all honours but only some. Perhaps, then, there are things which should be rendered to the useful friend and others to the good one; e.g. because a man gives you

II

1–36 = *E.N.* 1164[b] 22–1165[a] 35.

[1] τί σοφία πρὸς τὸν πλοῦτον (J. S.).
[2] Reading ἂν μὲν γὰρ φίλος (MSS.).
[3] Perhaps understand φίλος.
[4] Cf. l. [a] 2.
[5] Reading λόγον . . . λόγου (Bekk.).
[6] Fr. 882 Nauck.

food and what is necessary, you need not give him your society; nor, therefore, need you give the man to whom you grant your society that which not he but the useful friend[1] gives. †Those who doing this give all to the object of their love, when they ought not, are worthless.†

And the various definitions of friendship that we give in our discourse all belong to friendship in some sense, but not to the same friendship. To the useful friend applies the fact that one wishes what is good for him, and to a benefactor, and in fact to any[2] kind of friend—for this definition does not distinguish the class of friendship; to another we should wish existence, of another we should wish the society, to the friend on the basis of pleasure sympathy in joy and grief is the proper gift. All these definitions are appropriate to some friendship, but none to a single unique thing, friendship. Hence there are many definitions, and each appears to belong to a single unique thing, viz. friendship, though really it does not, e. g. the purpose to maintain the friend's existence. For the superior friend and benefactor wishes the existence of that which he has made, and to him who has given one existence one ought to give it in return, but not necessarily one's society; that gift is for the pleasant friend.

Some friends wrong one another; they love rather the things than the possessor of them; and so they love the persons much as they choose wine because it is pleasant, or wealth because it is useful; for wealth is more useful than its owner. Therefore the owner is indignant,[3] as if the other had preferred his wealth to him as to something inferior. But the other side complain in turn; for they now look to find in him a good man, when before they looked for one pleasant or useful.

12 We must also consider about independence and friendship, 1244ᵇ and the relations they have to one another. For one might doubt whether, if a man be in all respects independent, he

1–1245ᵇ 19 = *E. N.* 1169ᵇ 3–1170ᵇ 19: cf. *M. M.* 1212ᵇ 24–1213ᵇ 2, *E. N.* 1171ª 21–ᵇ28.

[1] ⟨ὁ⟩ *χρήσιμος* (coni. Susemihl).
[2] *ὁποίῳ δή* for *ὁποῖος δέ* (Jackson).
[3] *διὸ δὴ ἀγανακτεῖ* (rc. Pᵇ).

will have a friend, if one seeks a friend from want and the good man[1] is perfectly independent.[2] If the possessor of virtue is happy, why should he need a friend? For the independent man neither needs useful people nor people to cheer him, nor society; his own society is enough for him. This is most plain in the case of a god; for it is clear that, needing nothing, he will not need a friend, nor have one, supposing that he does not need one.[3] So that the happiest man will least need a friend, and only as far as it is impossible for him to be independent. Therefore the man who lives the best life must have fewest friends, and they must always be becoming fewer, and he must show no eagerness for men to become his friends, but despise not merely the useful but even men desirable for society. But surely this makes it all the clearer that the friend is not for use or help, but that the friend through virtue[4] is the only friend. For when we need nothing, then we all seek others to share our enjoyment, those whom we may benefit rather than those who will benefit us. And we judge better when independent than when in want, and most of all we then seek friends worthy to be lived with. But as to this problem, we must see if we have not been partially right, and partially missed the truth owing to our illustration.[5] It will be clear if we ascertain what is life in its active sense and as end. Clearly, it is perception and knowledge, and therefore life in society is perception and knowledge in common. And mere perception and mere knowledge[6] is most desirable to every one, and hence the desire of living is congenital in all; for living must be regarded as a kind of knowledge. If then we were to cut off and abstract mere knowledge and its opposite—this passes unnoticed in the argument as we have given it, but in fact need not remain unnoticed—there would be no difference between this and another's knowing instead

[1] *ἀγαθός* (W.D.R.).
[2] Reading a comma after *φίλος*, l. 3, and a full-stop after *αὐταρκέστατος*.
[3] *εἴ γε μηθὲν δέοιτό του* (Jackson).
[4] *ἀλλ' ὁ δι' ἀρετήν* (Aldine, Bekker).
[5] Of the case of man from that of God: cf. 1245[b] 13 sqq.
[6] *αὐτὸ τό* for MS. *τὸ αὐτό bis* (J.S.).

of oneself; and this is like another's living instead of oneself.[1] But[2] naturally the perception and knowledge of oneself is more desirable. For we must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable and also the good, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself[3] as belongs to them. If, then, of such a pair of corresponding series[4] there is always one series of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by their participation in the nature of the determined,[5] .... so that to wish to perceive one's self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite character,—since, then, we are not in ourselves possessed of each of such characters, but only by participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing—for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way and in that respect in which he first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way—therefore it is for this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known. The choice to live with others might seem, from a certain point of view, silly—(first, in the case of things common also to the other animals, e. g. eating together, drinking together; for what is the difference between doing these things in the neighbourhood of others or apart from them, if you take away speech? But even to share in speech of a casual kind does not make the case different. Further, for friends who are self-dependent neither teaching nor learning is possible; for if one learns, he is not as he should be: and if he teaches, his friend is not; and likeness is friendship)—but surely it is obviously so, and all of us find greater pleasure in sharing good things with friends as far as these come to[6] each—I mean the greatest good one can share; but to some it falls to share in bodily delights, to others in artistic contemplation, to others in philosophy. And the friend must be present

[1] τῷ for τοῦ.
[2] δέ (MSS.) for δή.
[3] αὐτοῖς for αὐτὸ τοῖς (Bz.).
[4] As that of the Pythagoreans, One, Good &c. X Many, Bad &c.
[5] τὸ ὡρισμένον belonging to the 'desirable' series of the συστοιχία or pair of series.
[6] ἑκάστῳ for ἕκαστον (W.D.R.).

too ; whence the proverb, ' distant friends are a burden ', so that men must not be at a distance from one another when there is friendship between them. Hence sensuous love seems like friendship ; for the lover aims at the society of his beloved, but not as ideally he ought, but in a merely sensuous way.

The argument, then, says what we have before mentioned, raising difficulties ; but the facts are as we saw later, so that it is clear that the objector is in a way misleading us. We must see the truth from this : a friend wants to be, in the words of the proverb, ' another Heracles ', ' a second self ' : but he is severed from his friend, and it is hard to find in two people the characteristics of a single individual. But though a friend is by nature what is[1] most akin to his friend, one man is like another in body, and another like him in soul, and one like him in one part of the body or soul, and another like him in another. But none the less[2] does a friend wish to be as it were a separate self. Therefore to perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one's self and to know one's self.[3] So that even the vulgar forms of pleasure and life in the society of a friend are naturally pleasant (for perception of the friend always takes place at the same time), but still more the communion in the diviner pleasures. And the reason is, that it is always pleasanter 1245b to see one's self enjoying the superior good. And this is sometimes a passion, sometimes an action, sometimes something else. But if it is pleasant for a man himself to live well and also his friend, and in their common life to engage in mutually helpful activity, their partnership surely would be above all in things included in the end. Therefore men should contemplate in common and feast in common, only not on the pleasures of food or on necessary pleasures ; such society does not[4] seem to be true society, but sensuous enjoyment. But the end which each can attain is that in which he desires the society of another ; if that is not possible, men desire to benefit and be benefited by friends in preference to others. That society then is right, that all

[1] ὅ (MSS.) for τό. [2] γε for τε (Sylburg).
[3] Omitting τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν τό. [4] ⟨ὁμιλίαι γὰρ οὐχ⟩ (Sus.).

wish it above all things, and that the happiest and best man tends especially to do so, is clear. But that the contrary appeared as the conclusion of the argument was also reasonable, since the argument said what was true. For it is in respect of the comparison of the two cases[1] that the solution is found,[2] the case compared being in itself truly enough stated. For because God is not such as to need a friend, the argument claims[3] the same of the man who resembles God. But by this reasoning the virtuous man will not even think; for the perfection of God is not in this, but in being superior to thinking of aught beside himself. The reason is, that with us welfare involves a something beyond us, but the deity is his own well-being.

As to our seeking and praying for many friends, while we say that the man who has many friends has no friend, both are correct. For if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at the same time, it is most desirable that these should be as numerous as possible; but since this is most difficult, the activity of joint perception must exist among fewer. So that it is not only hard to get many friends—for probation is necessary—but also to use them when you have got them.

Sometimes we wish the object of our love to be happy away from us, sometimes to share the same fortune as ourselves; the wish to be together is characteristic of friendship. For if the two can both be together and be happy, all choose this; but if they cannot be both, then we choose as[4] the mother of Heracles might have chosen, e.g. that her son should be a god rather than in her company but a serf to Eurystheus. One might say something like the jesting remark[5] of the Laconian,[6] when some one bade him in a storm to summon the Dioscuri.

15–19: cf. *M. M.* 1212b 37–1213b 4. 20–1246a 25: cf. *M. M.* 1213b 3–17, 1245b 20–5 = *E. N.* 1170b 20–1171a 20. 26–1246a 25 = *E. N.* 1171a 21–b28.

[1] Cf. 1244b 7. [2] Omitting οὐκ. [3] ἀξιοῖ (Bz.).
[4] μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δὲ ἅμα, ὥσπερ (Jackson).
[5] ὅ for ὃν (Jackson).
[6] He doubtless said that being in trouble himself he did not wish to involve the Dioscuri in it.

It appears to be the mark of one who loves to keep the object of his love from sharing in hardships, but of the beloved to wish to share them; the conduct of both is reasonable. For nothing ought to be so painful to a friend as his friend should be pleasant to him,[1] but it is thought that he ought not to choose what is for his own interest. Therefore men keep their friends from participation in their calamities; their own suffering is enough, that they may not show themselves studying their own interest, and choosing joy at the cost of a friend's pain, or relief by not bearing their troubles alone. But since both well-being and participation are desirable, it is clear that participation with a smaller good is more desirable than to enjoy a greater good in solitude. But since the weight to be attached to participation is not ascertained, men differ, and some think that participation in all things at once is the mark of friendship, e. g. they say that it is better to dine together than separately, though having the same food: others wish them to share prosperity,[2] since (they say) if[3] one takes extreme cases, great adversity in company is on a par[4] with great prosperity enjoyed alone. We have something similar in the case of ill-fortune. For sometimes we wish our friends to be absent and we wish to give them no pain, when they are not going to be of any use to us; at another time we find it pleasantest for them to be present. But this contradiction is quite reasonable. For this happens in consequence of what we have mentioned above,[5] and because we often simply avoid the sight of a friend in pain or in bad condition, as we should the sight of ourselves so placed; yet to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can be (because of the above-mentioned[6] cause), and, indeed,[7] to see him ill is pleasant if you are ill yourself. So that whichever of these two is the pleasanter decides us whether to wish the friend present or not. This also happens, for the same reason, in the case of the worse sort of men; for they are most

1246a

[1] ὡς ἡδὺ τὸν φίλον (MSS.).
[2] οἱ δ' ἅμα (Spengel) μὲν τοῦ εὖ βούλονται (Jackson).
[3] ἐπειδὴ εἰ (Jackson).
[4] ὁμολόγους εἶναι ἅμα (Jackson).
[5] Cf. 1245b 26–1246a 1.
[6] Cf. 1245a 26–b9.
[7] μήν for μή.

anxious that their friends should not fare well nor even exist if they themselves have to fare badly.[1] Therefore some kill the objects of their love with themselves. For they think that if the objects of their love are to survive they perceive their own trouble more acutely, just as one who remembered that once he had been happy would feel it more than if he thought himself to be always unhappy.

13 Here one might raise a question. One can use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise, and either *per se* or again[2] *per accidens*, as, for instance, one might use the eye, as eye,[3] for seeing, and also for falsely seeing by squinting, so that one thing appears as two. Both these uses are due to the eye being an eye, but it was possible to use the eye in another way—*per accidens*,[4] e. g. if one could sell or eat it. Knowledge may be used similarly[5]; it is possible to use it really or to do what is wrong, e. g. when a man voluntarily writes incorrectly, to make knowledge into ignorance for the time, as dancing-girls sometimes exchange the uses of the hand and the foot,[6] and use the foot as a hand and the hand as a foot. If, then, all the virtues are kinds of knowledge, one might use justice also as injustice, and so one would be unjust and do unjust actions from justice, as ignorant things may be done from knowledge. But if this is impossible, it is clear that the 1246[b] virtues are not species of knowledge. And even if ignorance cannot proceed from knowledge, but only error and the doing of the same things as[7] proceed from ignorance, it must be remembered that from justice one will not act as from injustice. But since Prudence[8] is knowledge and something true, it may behave like knowledge;[9] one might act imprudently though possessed of prudence, and commit the errors of the imprudent. But if the use of each thing[10]

[1] ἂν ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς κακῶς (W. D. R.).
[2] ᾗ αὐτὸ ἢ αὖ (Jackson). [3] οἷον ᾗ ὀφθαλμός (Jackson).
[4] ὅτι μὲν ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν, ἦν δ' ὀφθαλμῷ, ἄλλῃ δέ, κατὰ συμβεβηκός (Jackson).
[5] ἐπιστήμῃ (Spengel).
[6] μεταστρέψασαι τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ⟨τὸν πόδα⟩ (Jackson).
[7] Omitting ἅ. [8] 'Prudence' as usual = moral wisdom.
[9] κἀκείνη (MSS.). [10] ἡ ἑκάστου χρεία (MSS.).

as such were single,[1] then in so acting men would still be acting prudently. Over other kinds of knowledge, then, there is something superior that diverts them; but how can there be any knowledge that diverts the highest knowledge of all? There is no longer any knowledge or intuitive reason to do this. But neither can virtue do it, for prudence *uses* that; for the virtue of the ruling part uses that of the subject. Who is there then whose prudence is thus diverted? Perhaps the position is like that of incontinence, which is said to be a vice of the irrational part of the soul. The incontinent man is in a sense[2] intemperate; he has reason, but supposing appetite to be strong it will twist him and he will draw the opposite conclusion. Or is it an obvious consequence[3] that, similarly, if there is virtue in the irrational part, but folly[4] in the rational, they are transformed in yet another way.[5] Thus it will be possible to use justice unjustly[6] and badly, and prudence foolishly—and therefore the opposite uses will also be possible. For it is absurd that vice occurring sometimes in the irrational part should twist the virtue in the rational part and make the man ignorant, but that virtue in the irrational part,[7] when folly[8] is present[9] in the rational, should not divert the latter and make the man judge prudently and as is right, and again, prudence in the rational part should not make the intemperance in the irrational part act temperately. This seems the very essence of continence. And therefore we shall also get prudent action arising out of ignorance. But all these consequences are absurd, especially that of acting prudently out of ignorance, for we certainly do not see this[10] in any other case, e. g. intemperance perverts[11] one's medical or grammatical knowledge. But at any rate we may say that not[12] ignorance, if opposite, (for[13] it has no superiority), but virtue, is rather related in this way to vice in general. For whatever the unjust[14] can do, the just can do;

[1] It was shown in a28–30 that it is not. [2] *πως* (Jackson).
[3] *ἢ ἔστι δῆλον* (Jackson). [4] *ἄνοια* (MSS.).
[5] *ἑτέρᾳ* (Jackson). [6] *τ' οὐ* for *τό* (Jackson).
[7] *⟨ἢ⟩ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ* (Jackson). [8] *ἀνοίας* (MSS.).
[9] *⟨ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ⟩* (Susemihl). [10] *οὐδαμῶς* (MSS.). [11] Omit *οὐ*.
[12] *οὐ* for *ὁ* (Jackson). [13] *διό* in Susemihl is a misprint for *διά*.
[14] *καὶ γὰρ ἃ ὁ ἄδικος πάντα ὁ δίκαιος δύναται* (Jackson).

and in general powerlessness is covered by power. And so it is clear that prudence and virtue go together, and that those complex states are states of one in whom prudence and virtue are not combined,[1] and the Socratic saying that nothing is stronger than prudence is right. But when Socrates said this of knowledge he was wrong. For prudence is virtue and not scientific knowledge, but another kind of cognition.

14 But since not only prudence and virtue produce well-doing, but we say also that the fortunate 'do well', thus assuming that good fortune produces well-doing and the 1247a same results as knowledge,[2] we must inquire whether it is or is not by nature that one man is fortunate, another not, and what is the truth about these things. For that there are fortunate men we see, who though silly are often successful in matters controlled by fortune, some also[3] in 5 matters involving art but into which chance largely enters, e.g. strategy and navigation. Does their success, then, arise from some acquired mental condition, or do they effect fortunate results not because of their own acquired qualities at all (at present men take the latter view, regarding them as having some special natural endowment); does nature, rather, make men with different qualities so that they differ 10 from birth; as some are blue-eyed and some black-eyed because they have some particular part[4] of a particular nature, so are some lucky and others unlucky? For that they do not succeed through prudence is clear, for prudence is not irrational but can give a reason why it acts as it does; but they could not say why they succeed; that 15 would be art. Further, it is clear that they succeed though imprudent,[5] and not merely imprudent about other things —that would not be strange at all, e.g. Hippocrates was a geometer, but in other respects was thought foolish and imprudent, and once on a voyage was robbed of much money by the customs-collectors at Byzantium, owing to his silliness, as we are told—but imprudent in the very 20

[1] ἀγαθοί, ἐκείναι δ' ἄλλου ἕξεις (Jackson).
[2] τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ for τῆς ἐπιστήμης (Speng.)
[3] οἱ δὲ καί (Bekker). [4] τῷ τοδὶ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν (J. S.).
[5] ὅτι δέ, φανερόν, ὄντες ἄφρονες (Jackson).

business in which they are lucky. For in navigation not the cleverest are the most fortunate, but it is as in throwing dice, where one throws nothing, another throws something; so a man is lucky according as nature determines.[1] Or is it because he is loved, as the phrase is, by a god, success being something coming from without, as a worse-built vessel often sails better, not owing to itself but because it has a good pilot? But, if so, the[2] fortunate man has a good pilot, namely, the divinity. But it is absurd that a god or divinity should love such a man and not the best and most prudent. If, then, success must be due either to nature or intelligence[3] or some sort of protection, and the latter two causes are out of the question, then the fortunate must be so by nature. But, on the other hand, Nature is the cause of the absolutely uniform or of the usual, Fortune the opposite. If, then, it is thought that unexpected success is due to chance, but that, if it *is* through chance that one is fortunate, the cause of his fortune is not the sort of cause that produces always or usually the same result[4]—further, if a person succeeds or fails because he is a certain sort of man, just as a man sees badly because he is blue-eyed, then it follows that not fortune but nature is the cause; the man then is not fortunate but rather naturally gifted. So we must say that the people we call fortunate are not so through
1247[b] fortune; therefore they are not fortunate, for those goods only are in the disposal of fortune of which good fortune is the cause.

But if this is so, shall we say that fortune does not exist at all, or that it exists but is not a cause? No, it must both exist and be a cause. It will, then, also cause good or evil to certain people. But whether it is to be wholly removed, and we *ought* to say that nothing happens by chance, but *do* say that chance is a cause simply because, though there is some other cause, we do not see it (and therefore, in defining chance, some make it a cause incalculable to human reasoning, taking it to be a genuine reality)—this would be

[1] Omitting πολύ (MSS.) and reading καθὰ ἦν φύσει (Jackson).
[2] οὕτως ὁ (Sus.). [3] νῷ (Jackson).
[4] Colon after πολύ (W. D. R.).

matter for another inquiry. But since we see people who are fortunate once only, why should they not be fortunate a second time for the same reason,[1] and a third time? For the same antecedent is cause of the same consequent.[2] Then this cannot be a matter of chance. But when the same event follows from indefinite[3] and undetermined antecedents, it will be for a particular man[4] good or evil, but there will not be the science that comes by experience[5] of it, since otherwise some lucky people[6] would have learned it, or even—as Socrates said[7]—all the sciences would have been kinds of good luck. What, then, prevents such things happening to a man often in succession, not because he has a certain character,[8] but as, say, dice might continually throw a lucky number? But again, are there not in the soul impulses, some from reason and others from irrational desire, the latter being the earlier? For if the impulse arising from appetite for the pleasant is natural, the desire also would by nature[9] march in each case[10] towards the good. If, then, some have a fortunate natural endowment —as musical[11] people, though they have not learned to sing, are fortunately endowed in this way—and move without reason in the direction[12] given them by their nature, and desire that which they ought at the time and in the manner they ought, such men are successful, even if they are foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing[13] well though not able to teach singing. And such men are fortunate, namely those who generally succeed without the aid of reason. Men, then, who are fortunate will be so by nature. Perhaps, however, 'good fortune' is a phrase with several senses. For some things are done from impulse and are due to deliberate choice, and others not, but the opposite; and if, in the former cases, they succeed where they seem to have reasoned badly, we say that they have been lucky; and again, in the

[1] *πάλιν ἂν διὰ τὸ* (MSS.) *αὐτὸ* (B[f]) *κατορθώσαιεν* (Jackson).
[2] *τοῦ γὰρ αἰτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον* (B[f], Jackson).
[3] *ἀπ' ἀπείρων* (B[f], Jackson).
[4] *τῳ* for *τό* (Jackson).
[5] *ἡ δι'* (MSS.) *ἐμπειρίαν* (B[f]).
[6] *εὐτυχεῖς* (MSS.).
[7] *Euthyd.* 279 D.
[8] *ὅτι τοιοσδί* (Jackson).
[9] *καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις φύσει* (MSS.).
[10] *πάντοτε* (B[f], Jackson).
[11] *οἱ ᾠδικοί* (Sylburg). Cf. 1238[a] 36.
[12] *ᾗ ἡ φύσις* (Jackson).
[13] *ᾄσονται* (Sylburg).

latter cases, if they wished for a different good or less of the good than they got.[1] Men who are lucky in the former way,[2] then, may be fortunate by nature, for the impulse and the desire was for the right object[3] and succeeded, but the reasoning was silly; and people in this case, when it happens that their reasoning seems incorrect but desire is the cause of their reasoning, are saved by the rightness of their desire[4]; but on another occasion a man reasons again in this way owing to appetite and turns out unfortunate.

But in the other cases[5] how can the good luck be due to a natural goodness in desire and appetite? But surely the good fortune and chance spoken of here and in the other case[6] are the same, or else there is more than one sort of good fortune, and chance has two meanings.[7] But since we see some men lucky contrary to all knowledge and right reasonings, it is clear that the cause of luck must be something different from these. But is it luck or not by which a man desires[8] what and when he ought, though for him[9] human reasoning could not lead to this? For that is not altogether unreasonable, whereof[10] the desire is natural, though reason is misled by something. The man, then, is thought to have good luck, because luck is the cause of things contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason (for it is contrary to science and the universal). But probably it does not spring from chance, but seems so for the above reason. So that this argument shows not that good luck[11] is due to nature, but that not all who seem to be lucky are successful owing to fortune, but rather owing to nature; nor does it show that there is no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the cause of anything,[12] but only not of all that it seems to be the cause of. This, however, one might question: whether fortune is the cause of just this, viz. desiring what and when one ought. But will it not in

[1] ἐβούλοντο ἄλλο ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἔλαβον τἀγαθόν (Jackson).
[2] Cf. ll. 29, 30.
[3] οὗ δεῖ (MSS.).
[4] εἶναι τύχῃ, ἡ δ' αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὖσα, αὕτη ὀρθὴ οὖσα ἔσωσεν (Spengel).
[5] Cf. l. 30 τὰ δ' οὔ.
[6] κἀκείνη (MSS.).
[7] καὶ τύχη διττή to follow αἱ εὐτυχίαι (Speng.).
[8] ᾗ ἐπεθύμησεν (Fritzsche).
[9] ὅτε ἔδει ᾧ (Jackson).
[10] οὗ γε (Jackson).
[11] εὐτυχεῖται (Bf).
[12] ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη, οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη αἰτία οὐθενός (Jackson).

this case be the cause of everything, even of thought and deliberation? For one does not deliberate after previous deliberation which itself presupposed deliberation, but there is some starting-point; nor does one think after thinking previously to thinking, and so *ad infinitum*. Thought, then, is not the starting-point of thinking nor deliberation of deliberation. What, then, can be the starting-point except chance? Thus everything would come from chance. Perhaps there is a starting-point with none other outside it, and this can act in this sort of way by being such as it is.[1] The object of our search is this—what is the commencement of movement in the soul? The answer is clear: as in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything.[2] For in a sense the divine element in us moves everything. The starting-point of reasoning is not reasoning, but something greater. What, then, could be greater even than knowledge and intellect but God? Not virtue, for virtue is an instrument of the intellect. And for this reason, as I said a while ago,[3] those are called fortunate who, whatever they start on,[4] succeed in it without being good at reasoning. And deliberation is of no advantage to them, for they have in them a principle that is better than intellect and deliberation, while the others have not this but have intellect; they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For, though lacking reason, they attain the attribute of the[5] prudent and wise—that their divination is speedy; and we must mark off as included in it all but the judgement that comes from reasoning; in some cases it is due to experience, in others to habituation in the[6] use of reflection: and both experience and habituation use God. This quality sees well the future and the present, and these[7] are the men in whom the reasoning-power is relaxed. Hence we have the melancholic men, the dreamers of what is true. For the moving principle seems to become stronger when the reasoning-power is relaxed. So the blind remember better, their memory being

[1] αὕτη δὲ διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη γε εἶναι τοιοῦτο (Jackson).
[2] δῆλον δή· ὥσπερ . . . καὶ πᾶν (MSS.) ἐκεῖ κινεῖ (Jackson).
[3] ὃ πάλαι ἔλεγον (Jackson). Cf. 1247b 26. [4] οἱ ⟨οἱ⟩ (W. D. R.).
[5] ἐπιτυγχάνουσι καὶ τοῦ τῶν (Sylb.)
[6] τοῦ for τε ἐν (J. S.). [7] οὗτοι for οὗτος (J. S.).

freed from concern with the visible.[1] It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good luck, the one divine—and so the lucky seem to succeed owing to God[2]; men of this sort seem to succeed in following their aim, the others to succeed contrary to their aim; both are irrational, but the one is persistent good luck, the other not.

About each virtue by itself we have already spoken; now since we have distinguished[3] their natures separately, we must describe clearly the excellence that arises out of the combination of them, what we have already[4] called nobility and goodness. That he who truly deserves this denomination must have the separate virtues is clear; it cannot be otherwise with other things either, for no one is healthy in his entire body and yet healthy in no part of it, but the most numerous and important parts, if not all, must be in the same condition as the whole. Now goodness and nobility-and-goodness differ not only in name but also in themselves. For all goods have ends which are to be chosen for their own sake. Of these, we call noble those which, existing all of them for their own sake, are praised. For these are those which are the source of praised acts and are themselves praised, such as justice itself and just acts; also temperate acts,[5] for temperance is praised, but health is not praised, for its effect is not; nor vigorous action, for vigour is not. These are good but not praised. Induction makes this clear about the rest, too. A good man, then, is one for whom the natural goods are good. For the goods men fight for and think the greatest—honour, wealth, bodily excellences, good fortune, and power—are naturally good, but may be to some hurtful because of their dispositions. For neither the imprudent nor the unjust nor the intemperate would get any good from the employment of them, any more than an invalid from the food of a healthy man, or one weak and maimed from the equipment of one in health and sound in all limbs. A man

[1] *τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον* (W. D. R.).
[2] Omitting *ἢ δὲ φύσει*.
[3] Cf. 1228[a] 25–1234[b] 14.
[4] Not in the existing treatise.
[5] *αἱ* for *οἱ*.

is noble and good because those goods which are noble are possessed by him for themselves, and because he practises the noble and for its own sake, the noble being the virtues and the acts that proceed from virtue. There is also what we may call the 'civic' disposition, such as the Laconians have, and others like them might have; its nature would be something like this—there are some who think one should have virtue, but only for the sake of the natural goods, and so such men are good (for the natural goods are good[1] for them), but they have not nobility and goodness. For it is not true of them that they acquire the noble for itself, that they purpose acts good and noble at once[2]—more than this, that what is not noble by nature but good by nature is noble to them; for objects are noble when a man's motives for acting and choosing them are noble. Wherefore[3] to the noble and good man the naturally good is noble—for what is just is noble, justice is proportion to merit, and the perfect man merits these things; or what is fitting is noble, and to the perfect man these things, wealth, high birth, and power, are fitting. So that to the perfect man things profitable are also noble; but to the many the profitable and the noble do not coincide, for things absolutely good are not good for them as they are for the good man; to the 'noble and good' man they are also noble, for he does many noble deeds by reason of them.[4] But the man who thinks he ought to have the virtues for the sake of external goods does deeds that are noble[5] only *per accidens*. 'Nobility and goodness', then, is complete virtue.

About pleasure, too, we have spoken,[6] what it is and in what sense good; we have said that the absolutely pleasant is also noble, and the absolutely good pleasant. But pleasure only arises in action; therefore the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly: that this should be so is no idle demand of man.

But since the doctor has a standard by reference to which

[1] *ἀγαθὰ ἀγαθά* (cf. 1248b 26).
[2] *καλὰ κἀγαθά* (W. D. R.).
[3] *διό* for *διότι*.
[4] *δι' αὐτά* (MSS.).
[5] Omitting *τά*, which is not in the MSS.
[6] Not in the existing treatise, but cf. *E. N.* 1152b 1–1154b 31.

he distinguishes the healthy[1] from the unhealthy body, and with reference to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome,[2] while if less or more is done health is the result no longer, so in regard to actions
25 and choice of what is naturally good but not praiseworthy,
1249[b] the good man should have a standard both of disposition and of choice, and similarly in regard to avoidance of excess[3] or deficiency of wealth and good fortune, the standard being —as above said[4]—'as reason directs'; this corresponds to saying in regard to diet that the standard should be medical
5 science and its principles. But this, though true, is not clear. One must, then, here as elsewhere, live with reference to the ruling principle and with reference to the formed habit and[5] the activity of the ruling principle, as the slave must live with reference to that of the master, and each of us by the rule
10 proper to him. But since man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part, each of us should live according to the governing element within himself—but this is ambiguous, for medical science governs in one sense, health in another, the former existing for the latter. And so it is with the theoretic faculty; for God is not an imperative ruler, but is the end with a view to which prudence issues its commands
15 (the word 'end' is ambiguous, and has been distinguished elsewhere),[6] for God at least needs nothing. What choice, then, or possession of the natural goods—whether bodily goods, wealth, friends, or other things—will most produce the contemplation of God, that choice or possession is best; this is the noblest standard, but any that through deficiency
20 or excess hinders one from the contemplation and service of God is bad; this man possesses in his soul, and this is the best standard for the soul—to perceive the irrational part of the soul, as such, as little as possible.

So much, then, for the standard[7] of perfection and the object of the absolute goods.

[1] τὸ ὑγιαῖνον (P[b]) σῶμα (MSS.).
[2] καὶ ὑγιεινόν for καὶ εὖ ὑγιαῖνον (W. D. R.).
[3] καὶ περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων (MSS.).
[4] Cf. 1222[a] 6–10, [b]7, 1231[b] 32 sq. [5] καί for κατά (W. D. R.).
[6] Cf. *Met.* Λ. 72[b] 2, *Phys.* 194[a]36, *De An.* 415 [b]2, 20. The two senses of τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα are (1) the person or thing for whose good a thing is done, (2) the end for which something is done. God is οὗ ἕνεκα in sense (2).
[7] τις in Susemihl is a misprint for τίς.

DE VIRTUTIBUS ET VITIIS

1 THE noble is the object of praise, the base of blame: at 1249[a]
the head of what is noble stand the virtues, at the head of what is base the vices; the virtues, then, are objects of praise, but so also are the causes of the virtues and their accompaniments and results, including the acts they give rise to: the opposites are objects of blame.

If in agreement with Plato we take the soul to have three parts, then prudence is the virtue of the rational, 1249[b]
gentleness and bravery of the passionate, temperance and continence of the appetitive; and of the soul as a whole, justice, liberality, and magnanimity. Folly is the vice of the rational, irascibility and cowardice of the passionate, intemperance and incontinence of the appetitive; and of 1250[a]
the soul as a whole, injustice, illiberality, and small-mindedness.

2 Prudence is a virtue of the rational part capable of procuring all that tends to happiness. Gentleness is a virtue of the passionate part, through which men become difficult to stir to anger. Bravery is a virtue of the passionate part, through which men are difficult to scare by apprehension of death. Temperance is a virtue of the appetitive part, by which men cease to desire bad sensual pleasures. Continence is a virtue of the appetitive part, by which men check by thinking the appetite that rushes to bad pleasures. Justice is a virtue of the soul that distributes to each according to his desert. Liberality is a virtue of the soul ready to spend on noble objects. Magnanimity is a virtue of the soul, by which men are able to bear good and bad fortune, honour and dishonour.

3 Folly is a vice of the rational part, causing evil living.

Irascibility is a vice of the passionate part, through which men are easily stirred to anger. Cowardice is a vice of the passionate part, through which men are scared by apprehensions, especially such as relate to death. Intemperance is a vice of the appetitive part, by which men become desirous of bad sensual pleasures. Incontinence is a vice of the appetitive part, through which one chooses bad pleasures, though thinking opposes this. Injustice is a vice of the soul, through which men become covetous of more than they deserve. Illiberality is a vice of the soul, through which men aim at gain from every source. Little-mindedness is a vice of the soul, which makes men unable to bear alike good and bad fortune, alike honour and dishonour.

4 To prudence belongs right decision, right judgement as to what is good and bad and all in life that is to be chosen and avoided, noble use of all the goods that belong to us, correctness in social intercourse, the grasping of the right moment, the sagacious use of word and deed, the possession of experience of all that is useful. Memory, experience, tact, good judgement, sagacity—each of these either arises from prudence or accompanies it. Or possibly some of them are, as it were, subsidiary causes of prudence (such as experience and memory), while others are, as it were, parts of it, e.g. good judgement and sagacity.

To gentleness belongs the power to bear with moderation accusations and[1] slights, not to rush hastily to vengeance, not to be easily stirred to anger, to be without bitterness or contentiousness in one's character, to have in one's soul quietude and steadfastness.

To bravery belongs slowness to be scared by apprehensions of death, to be of good courage in dangers and bold in facing risks, and to choose a noble death rather than preservation in some base way, and to be the cause of victory. Also it belongs to bravery to labour, to endure, and to choose to play the man. And there accompanies it readiness to dare, high spirits, and confidence; and further, fondness for toil and endurance.

[1] Omit *μετρίως* as dittography (Bas.[2], Bekker).

To temperance belongs absence of admiration for the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, absence of desire for all base sensual enjoyment, fear of just ill-repute, an ordered course of life, alike in small things and in great. And temperance is accompanied by discipline, orderliness, shame, caution.

5 To continence belongs the power to restrain by reason the appetite when rushing to base enjoyment of pleasures, endurance, steadfastness under natural want and pain.

To justice belongs the capacity to distribute to each his deserts, to preserve ancestral customs and laws and also the written law, to be truthful in matters of importance, to observe one's agreements. First among acts of justice come those towards the gods, then those to deified spirits, then those towards one's country and parents, then those towards the departed: amongst these comes piety, which is either a part of justice or an accompaniment of it. Also justice is accompanied by purity, truth, trust, and hatred of wickedness.

To liberality it belongs to be profuse of money on praiseworthy objects, to be extravagant in spending on a proper purpose, to be helpful and kind in disputed matters, and not to take from improper sources. The liberal man is also clean in his dress and house, ready to provide himself with what is not strictly necessary but beautiful and enjoyable without profit, inclined to keep all animals that have anything peculiar or marvellous about them. Liberality is accompanied by a suppleness and ductility of disposition, by kindness, by pitifulness, by love for friends, for foreign intimates, for what is noble.

It belongs to magnanimity to bear nobly and bravely alike good and bad fortune, honour and dishonour; not to admire luxury or attention or power or victory in contests, but to have a sort of depth and greatness of soul. The magnanimous is one who neither values living highly nor is fond of life, but is in disposition simple and noble, one who can be injured and is not prompt to avenge himself. The accompaniments of magnanimity are simpleness, nobleness, and truth.

To folly it belongs to judge things badly, to decide 6
45 badly, to be bad in social intercourse, to use badly present
1251a goods, to think erroneously about what is good and noble as regards life. Folly is accompanied by ignorance, inexperience, incontinence, tactlessness, shortness of memory.

Of irascibility there are three species—promptness to anger, peevishness, sullenness. It is the mark of the angry
5 man to be unable to bear small slights or defeats, to be ready to punish, prompt at revenge, easily moved to anger by any chance word or deed. The accompaniments of irascibility are a disposition easily excited, ready changes of feeling, attention to small matters, vexation at small things, and all
10 these rapid and on slight occasion.

To cowardice it belongs to be easily moved by unimportant apprehensions, especially if relating to death or maiming of the body, and to suppose preservation in any manner to be better than a noble death. Its accompaniments are softness, unmanliness, despair, love of life.
15 Beneath it, however, is a sort of caution of disposition and slowness to quarrel.

To intemperance it belongs to choose the enjoyments of hurtful and base pleasures, to suppose that those living in such pleasures are in the highest sense happy, to love
20 laughter, jeering, wit, and levity in word and deed. Its accompaniments are disarrangement, shamelessness, disorder, luxury, ease, negligence, contempt, dissipation.

To incontinence it belongs to choose the enjoyment of pleasures though reason forbids, to partake of them none the less though believing it to be better not to partake of
25 them, and while thinking one ought to do what is noble and profitable still to abstain from these for the sake of pleasures. The accompaniments of incontinence are effeminacy, negligence, and generally the same as those of intemperance.

30 Of injustice there are three species — impiety, greed, 7
outrage. Impiety is wrong-doing towards gods, deified spirits, the departed, one's parents, and one's country. Greed is wrong-doing in regard to agreements, claiming a share of the object in dispute beyond one's deserts. Out-

rage occurs when in providing pleasure for oneself one brings shame on others, whence Evenus says of it 'That which while gaining nothing still wrongs another'. It belongs to injustice to violate ancestral customs and laws, to disobey enactments and rulers, to lie, to commit perjury, to violate agreements and pledges. The accompaniments 1251b of injustice are quibbling, charlatanry, unamiability, pretence, malignity, unscrupulousness.

Of illiberality there are three species, pursuit of disgraceful gain, parsimony, stinginess: pursuit of disgraceful gain, in so far as such men seek gain from all sources and think more of the profit than of the shame; parsimony, in so far as they are unready to spend money on a suitable purpose; stinginess, in so far as, while spending, they spend in small sums and badly, and are more hurt than profited from not spending in season. It belongs to illiberality to value money above everything, and to think no reproach can ever attach to what yields a profit. The life of the illiberal is servile, suited to a slave, and sordid, remote from ambition and liberality. The accompaniments of illiberality are attention to small matters, sullenness, small-mindedness, self-humiliation, lack of measure, ignobility, misanthropy.

It belongs to small-mindedness to be able to bear neither honour nor dishonour, neither good nor ill fortune, but to grow braggart when honoured, to be elated at small prosperities, to be unable to bear even the smallest deprivation of honour, to regard any ill-success whatever as a great misfortune, to bewail oneself and to be impatient over everything. Further, the small-minded man is such as to call every slight an outrage and a dishonour, even such as are inflicted through ignorance or forgetfulness. The accompaniments of small-mindedness are attention to small things, grumbling, hopelessness, self-humiliation.

8 In general it belongs to virtue to make the condition of the soul good, using quiet and ordered motions and in agreement with itself throughout all its parts: whence the condition of a good soul seems a pattern of a good political constitution. It belongs also to virtue to do good

to the worthy, to love the good and to hate the bad; not to be prompt either to chastise or seek vengeance, but to be placable, kindly, and forgiving. Its accompaniments are worth, equity, indulgence, good hope, good memory, and further all such qualities as love of home, love of friends, love of comrades, love of one's foreign intimates, love of men, love of the noble: all these qualities are among the laudable. The marks of vice are the opposites, and its accompaniments the opposites; and all these marks and accompaniments of vice belong to the class of the blameable.

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